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ABSTRACT 
Attempts to engender a ‘user-oriented’ architecture were a perennial 
occurrence during the 20th century, and remain so today; their success, however, is 
underwhelming. In this context, understanding how knowledge of the ‘user’ is 
constituted and incorporated into architectural practice, its obstacles and dimensions 
of success, and the ramifications of such a project become pertinent topics. In this 
thesis, I follow this imperative by examining a specific case of ‘knowing the user’: that 
involving ubiquitous architectural ‘handbooks’. I ask how knowing the user is 
successfully accomplished with handbooks, taking two contemporary iterations, 
Architects’ Data and Architectural Graphic Standards, as the loci for textual analysis. 
Employing an image of knowledge-as-ability and the extendedness of knowing, I 
account for the accomplishment of knowing in its distribution amongst assemblages 
orchestrated in practice. To articulate the composition of this ‘knowing assemblage’ I 
focus on two salient aspects, or dimensions of its success: its mobility and its stability 
within structures of meaning and significance. I propose the shape of this knowing (a 
prominently ‘spatial’ user and a ‘secondary’ status) is bound to the specificities and 
historicity of the complex of practices in which architectural labour transpires, and I 
situate it within a broader trajectory of the user, as an ‘object of knowledge’ thrown 
amongst the jostling agencies in architectural projects. This research adds to the 
sociological literature that has, focusing on the activity of architectural labour itself, 
worked to dispel reductionist myths of ‘design’ and depict the heterogeneous corpus 
of agents in this process. The picture of knowing I offer illustrates some of the 
complexities and sites of its negotiation, contributes to accounts that have sought to 
shift and complicate the agency of knowing, and serves to usefully orient further 
research into accomplishing knowing in architectural labour. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A common thread ties together the following brief selection of artefacts and 
events from the history of architecture: Meyer’s (1970, p.119) 1928 manifesto 
positing twelve fundamental motives of building grounded in examining the routines 
“of everyone who lives in the house”; the concluding observations of the CIAM (1970, 
p.137) 1933 Charter of Athens which declared the destiny of cities is “to satisfy the 
primordial biological and psychological needs of their inhabitants”; the formation of 
the discipline of Environment-Behaviour Studies in the 1960s; the appointment of 
sociologists within departments of architecture (Gutman 1975, p.219); the ‘people-
minded’ studio courses run by architect-educators like Denise Scott-Brown since the 
early 1960s (Scott Brown 1981); the emergence and global dissemination of the 
universal design movement (Imrie 2012); Jane Jacobs’ inciting of collective 
opposition to projects in Greenwich Village; a host of major and minor reports and 
guidelines, such as Homes for today and tomorrow (Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government 1961), issued by governmental bodies; efforts to frame the relevance of 
contemporary neuroscience to architecture (Robinson & Pallasmaa 2015); the ‘half-
houses’ of Elemental (Aravena 2011); and the architect’s disposition to occasionally 
make assertions like “the social grouping in a dorm should not exceed 20 people” 
(Cuff 1992a, p.85). Though diverse and diverging sites, shared ground may justify 
collecting them, and others like them, under the umbrella of a loose project directed 
towards bringing a particular object to bear on the production of architecture - the 
object named variously in architectural discourse as the ‘user’, ‘occupant’, 
‘inhabitant’, ‘human beings’, or, simply, ‘people’.  
Broadly speaking, this ‘user’ is those that use, occupy, inhabit, dwell or 
otherwise go about populating, being in, and interacting with the built environment. 
Advocacy for and attempts to establish a mode of architectural practice and a built 
environment where-in this ‘user’ is a determinative agent (an architecture that is 
‘user-centred’ or ‘human-oriented’) has figured with particular prominence in the 
history of architecture for, at least, the majority of the 20th century, to the extent that 
at times it has taken a place “at the centre of [architects’] professional objectives” 
(Lipman 1970, p.15). 
In part, this project has manifested in ‘participatory design’, itself a somewhat 
diverse practice involving wrangling future occupants into ‘direct’ involvement in the 
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design process (Blundell-Jones, Petrescu & Till 2005). Other, more contemporary, 
manifestations include advocacy for acknowledging the active contribution that users 
make to creating architecture, beyond traditional ‘design’ or ‘construction’ phases, 
with a role “as important” as the architect (Hill 2003, p.88). However, this project also, 
and perhaps more frequently and pervasively, manifests in calls for, and attempts to 
engender, the integration (or better integration) of knowledge (or better knowledge) 
of the user (see, for example, Fawcett 1996; Lerup 1974; Lipman 1976). This 
particular branch of this project to produce a so-called ‘user-centred’ architecture, 
concerned with the incorporation, integration, movement, and production of 
knowledge, is the focus for this thesis. 
However, this project’s success is far from overwhelming, and often 
somewhat local. Despite being a “generally held design objective” it has often 
remained “frustrated” (Lipman 1976, p.13). Though apparently gaining ground earlier 
in the 20th century and a particular fervour in the 1960s (Forty 2004a, p.313), more 
contemporary reports suggest that, in some regards, “architectural discourse and 
production ignores the user” (Hill 1998, p.6). That it, at least, does not enjoy a 
normative or given status in architectural practice is evident in, for example, the fact 
that firms employ an espoused ‘user-oriented’ status of their work as a marketable 
point of differentiation, via specialization in ‘people work’ (Montgomery 1989, p.276); 
Woods Bagot’s “People Architecture” slogan exemplifies this (Woods Bagot 2018). 
This status is also evident in that types of advocacy made in the 1960s are still 
deemed necessary fifty years later, such as in the echo of the Architectural Review’s 
(AR) 1969 “Manplan” campaign (‘Manplan: Frustration’ 1969) with a 2015 
“Humanplan” editorial (Slessor 2015). That advocacy for and attempts to engender a 
‘user-centred’ architecture often appear to be a perennial, rather than progressive, 
occurrence might seem to indicate the presence of some kind of general obstacle or 
obstacles to this project.  
Indeed, to take the dialogue between architecture and sociology as an 
iteration of this project, the frequent occurrence of such obstacles is illustrated in 
reports from some of its prominent figures. Kostof (1989), reflecting on the trajectory 
of concerns for the user in educational programmes, paints a picture of its waxing 
and waning rather than one of any definite progress (see also Marmot & Symes 
1985; Scott Brown 1981). Further, both Blau (1991) and Gutman (1975, p.220) 
proposed fairly fundamental incongruities between academic disciplines like 
sociology and the pragmatics of architectural labour, residing in the character of 
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these discipline’s products (being too abstract or qualified) or the current state of 
development of this knowledge. The problem has also been located in the character 
of architectural students (Scott Brown 1981, p.44) and sociologists (Gutman 1968, 
p.13, 1975, p.220) and their proclivities to resist participation in each others core 
disciplinary practices and modes of thought.  
Though Cuff (1992a, p.32, 32n10) remarks on the possibility that 
consolidating the integration of literature on “user needs” might aid architecture to 
overcome its troubling lack of a defined knowledge base and distinguish its product 
within the built environment, she additionally notes the apparent difficulties of this 
integration, despite the quantity of literature available. Indeed, Fawcett (1996) posits 
that it is this sheer volume of research which hampers its employment in practice.  
Further, Blau (1984, p.x, 53) suggested that, despite finding a majority of 
architects wished to prioritise the needs of users, these efforts are often impeded by 
the realities of the market for architectural labour, to the extent that those who 
identified most strongly with this project felt, in the mid 1970s, most alienated from 
their work. She posited that major changes in the American economy were a 
precondition for ‘user-centred’ architecture to take hold. Blundell-Jones, Petrescu & 
Till (2005) have more recently reiterated this conflict between the realities of the 
market for architectural labour (subservience to a client) and a desire for ‘user-
oriented’ architecture. 
Such institutional, economic, or psychological dynamics reflected in these 
accounts are all useful contributions to understanding the success, or lack of, the 
project of embedding the user in architectural practice. This thesis, however, looks to 
focus at a different scale, the enactment of knowing in practice itself, to explore how 
the realities of accomplishing such performances in the context of architectural 
labour may bear on the possibilities for and resultant character of the knowing so 
constituted. 
 
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Situated in this context, I propose the pertinence of investigating how 
knowledge of the user is constituted within architectural practice and, given this, how 
it is or might be incorporated. Or, put otherwise, how is it that ‘knowing the user’ is 
accomplished, and such accomplishments made generally present or spatio-
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temporally dispersed in their reproduction in the world of architectural practice? This 
second formulation is most in accord with the conception of knowledge put forward in 
chapter two (see §2.3). Reframed in terms outlined there, it is to enquire into the 
composition of ‘knowing assemblages’, and how such assemblages are built and 
reproduced within the complex of practices that is architectural labour, what the 
elements of such compositions are, the associations wrought between them, their 
specificity, and their historicity.  
In addressing a topic such as this, one might assume the intent to be to 
critique the conceptions or enactment of human beings within architectural practice, 
perhaps relative to more ‘authoritative’ views from academic disciplines. Though this 
has been undertaken previously (e.g. Spencer 2005) this, it is important to 
emphasise, is not my intent here. 
There are innumerable ways that the user has been brought to bear on 
architectural production via ‘knowing’, and instances there-of. Attempting a large-
scale account and generalization on the means of constituting such knowing would 
be a sizeable undertaking and is beyond the scope of this study. Thus, I examine 
one particular (relatively successful) knowing assemblage or mode of knowing the 
user: that of which the contemporary architectural ‘handbook’ is part, on the premise 
that useful insights into the more general phenomenon of ‘knowing the user’ may be 
gained via this notable case. Given the character of the foregoing discussion of the 
context in which this question is posed, this inquiry is obviously made with an eye to 
the apparent ‘successes’ in, or perhaps lack of and obstacles to, this particular mode. 
In doing so I also attend to how establishing such successes, within this specific 
context of practice, bears on the particular character or shape of the knowing 
accomplished.  
Lastly, but far from least, to make this inquiry is also to attend to what it 
means for ‘knowing the user’ to be constituted within or incorporated into 
architectural practice, in the sense of the ramifications, implications, or the effects 
wrought, of such a process. 
This intent to provide an account of the accomplishment of knowing the user 
in which the architectural handbook figures also runs in tandem with an overarching 
intent to establish direction and identify valuable sites for further research. This is 
addressed further in the concluding chapter. 
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1.2 THESIS STRUCTURE 
To address these questions, I focus on two, closely intertwined, aspects, or 
dimensions of success, of this mode of knowing the user: the mobility of this knowing 
assemblage, and its stability within structures of meaning and significance. These 
are taken as valuable analytical sites in which the manner of composition and 
accomplishment of knowing, the interactions between the realities of the composition 
of knowing and the context of practice in which this composition is made, of its 
successes or obstacles there-to, and the outcomes of such processes are especially 
manifest. Thus, these two sites structure the main body of the thesis. 
Prior to this, in chapter two I clarify some key concepts underlying the 
positions I take in this thesis: ‘architecture’, ‘practice’, and ‘knowledge’. This also 
provides the space for a summary of the existing literature that centres on these key 
concepts and is relevant to the general argument of the thesis. These clarifications 
are also accompanied by a section addressing the methodologies of the research 
reported. This clarifies where in the thesis I outline and recount methods employed, 
and addresses some salient issues relative to the research questions posed. 
Following this, I provide further material to introduce the ‘user’ in chapter 
three. The aim of this chapter is not to give a comprehensive account of the user or 
its history. Rather, it is to provide an elaboration on what it is to understand the user 
as an ‘object of knowledge’ within architectural practice. I draw on selected moments 
from the history of the user for this purpose, focusing especially on the entanglement 
of ‘objects of knowledge’ in the crowd of agencies jostling within architectural 
projects. 
Within chapter four I move on to focusing on the composition of this particular 
knowing assemblage wrought about the ‘handbook’. Firstly, I address mobility, 
elucidating the manner in which the successful accomplishment of knowing the user 
across varied sites is bound to the realities of movement and distribution of the 
components of knowing assemblages. Results of content analysis of contemporary 
architectural handbooks provide the initial ground for this account where I posit that 
the manner in which competencies are distributed and labour delegated amongst 
components, specifically relative to the extant character of the complex of practices 
that is architecture, provides the grounds for this mobility. As part of this account I 
illustrate the bearing this has on the character of the knowing constituted. 
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Continuing this account of the composition of this knowing assemblage, in 
chapter five I discuss certain ascribed meanings, set within broader structures of 
significance, as necessary to the successful accomplishment of knowing the user in 
architecture. Building on the results of discourse analysis, I posit that the stability 
(unproblematic and uncontentious status) of this particular mode of knowing the user, 
and of ‘doing architecture’ generally, is grounded in a ‘schism’ of architectural 
practice where various domains of labour are enacted as alternately ‘primary’ and 
‘secondary’ relative to the enactment of the architect’s agency within these. 
Finally, I recapitulate and synthesize the analysis and descriptions offered in 
the preceding chapters within a final concluding chapter. Here, I draw out some 
overarching conclusions regarding the account constructed, along with implications 
and potential avenues for further research on this basis. 
 
1.3 THE ‘HANDBOOK’ 
Given that ‘knowing the user’ with the contemporary architectural handbook is 
the focus for this thesis, it is pertinent to, firstly, introduce this genre, the ‘handbook’. 
Innumerable and diverse cases of incorporating knowledge of the user into 
architectural practice abound, but often remain somewhat ‘local’ compared to the 
relatively widespread mode of knowing the user of which the handbook is part.  
I employ this term ‘handbook’ throughout this thesis to refer to a corpus of 
texts that are to be found ‘at-hand’, as an element embroiled in the action constituting 
architectural labour. This definition will be elaborated and more precisely articulated 
in the chapters to follow, but here foregrounds that it is to define these artefacts by 
how they are used rather than, as is typical with texts, their ‘content’. This definition 
may be regarded as somewhat idiosyncratic,1 at least in so far as some texts that 
explicitly include “handbook” in their title (e.g. “The SAGE Handbook of Architectural 
Theory”) would be excluded from this categorisation. I offer this definition not to 
circumscribe a definite genre of texts, but to identify a spectrum of ‘handbook-ness’: 
texts of a greater-or-lesser extent or frequency to be found in the thick of 
architectural labour. For instance, with this definition there may be some texts 
                                                
1 Employing this term in this thesis in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner (and perhaps more 
broadly than might be the case in other venues - regarding its inclusion of an earlier corpus of 
texts) seems not unjustified given its use otherwise is far from strictly defined. 
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regarded as ‘a bit handbook-ish’ (or, only infrequently enacted as ‘handbooks’) such 
as the architectural monograph, when temporarily thrown from the coffee table into 
practice at the drawing board.  
These ‘handbooks’, so defined, are also set off against other documents 
found in similar positions within architectural labour (e.g. standards, ‘guides’ 
produced by legislating authorities, development controls and applications, or 
manufacturers pamphlets and product information) to which they share a 
resemblance but from which they are distinguished on the basis of characteristics 
including the manner of publication and circulation, size, range of distribution of use, 
and their summative or compiling character.2 Furthermore, with larger historical 
scope, this definition includes texts more diverse than those identified as 
‘contemporary’ handbooks. It draws together a range of texts similarly found in the 
thick of architectural labour, known variously as genres of ‘pattern books’, ‘copy 
books’, ‘books of designs’, ‘manuals’, ‘model books’, or ‘books of orders’, among 
others. Making this categorisation is not to deny the variation amongst such texts in 
their content or subtleties of use, or between them and more contemporary 
handbooks. Nevertheless, their underlying commonality regarding the composition of 
agency through which architectural labour transpires is a foundation for the analysis 
made in this thesis and is argued as justified given that the genealogy of 
contemporary handbooks includes these predecessors. Though the contemporary 
handbook is the locus for this study, I address these earlier handbooks as part of this 
analysis. 
This mode of knowing makes for a valuable case study based, in part, on its 
mundane and ubiquitous character. It illustrates that even the most seemingly stable 
and unproblematic knowing is no simple process. Undertaking research on a more 
established mode was, additionally, directed by the conjecture that directions may be 
garnered for studying comparatively ‘local’ modes of knowing and, perhaps, 
instances of knowing ‘in the making’. Furthermore, the condition of ‘distributed’ or 
                                                
2 Indeed, by the definition given, there is no hard distinction between these and ‘handbooks’ 
(as defined). Rather, it is a case of them falling outside a general family resemblance. This is 
to say, what are here regarded as ‘handbooks’ (or what distinguishes these from the similar 
texts noted) are those that are published by publishing organisations and circulate as 
commodities, are relatively large, and are used beyond local centres (e.g. those where a 
certain development control is applicable). Perhaps most important, however, is their 
‘bricolage’ and summative character, in the sense that those texts regarded here as 
‘handbooks’ most often subsume and compile the content of these other documents (e.g. 
standards, manufacturers information). 
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‘extended’ knowing underpinning this research project (see §2.3), and the 
ramifications for this for understanding ‘knowing the user’ in architectural practice, is 
particularly manifest in and well illustrated by this case. 
Two of the most successful contemporary handbooks form the primary focus 
and material for analysis: Neufert’s Architects’ Data (Neufert & Neufert 2012), which 
has been through 41 German editions since its original publication in 1936, 
translated into 17 languages, is supposedly “known to every practising architect” 
(Graaf 2017, p.55), and was the best selling architectural publication in Germany in 
the twentieth century (Weckherlin 2007, p.150), while Architectural Graphic 
Standards (AGS), first published in 1932, is in its 12th edition and had sold over a 
million copies before the turn of the century (American Institute of Architects 2016) 
along with garnering the title of the “architect’s bible” early in its history (Emmons 
2005, p.15). Appraisals from leading lights of the profession, including Eero Saarinen 
(1956), Philip Johnson (2000), and Walter Gropius (1936), have attested to the 
magnitude of these books.3  
This success, combined with their early publication dates, makes these two 
paradigms of the twentieth century architectural handbook. Though having the oldest 
pedigree, they are still ongoing projects. Their ongoing significance for the world of 
architecture is reflected in the status of the institutions which now administer their 
newer editions, the American Institute of Architects (AIA), in the case of AGS, and 
the dedicated Neufert Foundation with the support of the Dessau Bauhaus in the 
case of Architects’ Data (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.xii). Though not the only 
contemporary architectural handbooks analysed in the chapters to follow, it is the 
predominance of Architects’ Data and AGS (primarily in Europe and the US, 
respectively) that justifies their status as the primary focus.  
Additionally, their prominence is reflected in them being a focus for the small 
body of literature on the modern architectural handbook. This writing, however, has 
principally interpreted these texts as the expression of some ‘ideology’ of the author 
or the broader architectural or social context (see, for example, Emmons & 
                                                
3 Saarinen (1956, p.v) declared AGS to be “an essential part of architectural practice” and 
Philip Johnson (2000, p.xv) furthered this, saying “I have always considered my Graphic 
Standards as important in design as is my pencil… No architect can be without Graphic 
Standards, and with it every architect is empowered and equipped to practice architecture”. 
Similarly, no less than Walter Gropius (1936, p.173) remarked of Architects’ Data that, after 
only a few months of use, he had found it to be now “indispensible” to his practice. 
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Mihalache 2013; Hosey 2001), or else of other general trends within these (e.g. 
Johnston 2008). This, generally speaking, is how texts are usually apprehended in 
social research, as expression of the agency of some other phenomenon (see §2.4). 
This is not, however, the approach I take. Rather, I examine them not as effects or 
expression of some external agency, but in what they themselves do, specifically in 
so far as this figures in the constitution of knowing. Though, it is important to make 
clear that the topic for this thesis is not the ‘handbook’ per se, but the ‘knowing 
assemblage’ of which it is part. 
While the above may justify regarding Architects’ Data and AGS as 
exemplary iterations of a ‘successful’ genre of artefact, this, it might be contended, 
does not necessarily justify them being regarded as part of a successful case of 
‘knowing the user’. That is, these are diverse texts, addressing many varied objects 
of knowledge, and their success as artefacts may not necessarily entail the success 
of the knowing of this particular object that figures within their pages – they may, 
simply, be used otherwise. However, this inference is justified, firstly, based on the 
importance of ‘the user’ (or ‘man’) to both Neufert’s and Ramsey and Sleeper’s 
formulation of their projects, as a locus for the content of the books generally.4 
Secondly, the user’s prominent position in the ordering of content in the handbooks is 
both indicative of its relative importance to its authors and a source of its prominence 
to those who employ the texts.5 Finally, evidence that in their use this object of 
knowledge retains this prominence (i.e. the books are not, instead, just employed to 
know the host of other objects represented) is in the character of their reception by 
those who employ them. The user figures prominently in descriptions given of 
Architects’ Data and AGS, indicating the salience of enacting ‘knowing the user’ to 
                                                
4 The genesis of Architects’ Data was in an initial pamphlet, Mensch als Mass und Ziel (‘Man 
as measure and purpose’), that clearly foregrounds the centrality of this particular object of 
knowledge (Harwood 2012, p.75). Likewise, Ramsey and Sleeper stated the first of three 
classes of subjects in their book proposal for AGS as “Data, standards and dimensions fixed 
by the human scale” (cited in Johnston 2008, p.151, emphasis added). For both texts, ‘man’, 
‘the human’, or ‘the user’ was, evidently, a prominent object to be known and, further, on 
which knowledge of other objects was to be grounded. 
5 Over the numerous editions of both Architect’s Data and AGS, specific sections on the user 
(‘man’, or ‘human’) have featured early in the sequence of material in the texts (foregrounding 
this particular object) or, in earlier editions of AGS, in the easy-reference sections on most 
essential data at the end of the book. It also, despite having its own section, is additionally 
dispersed throughout most of the sections of the handbooks, rendering it a somewhat 
pervasive object and providing, as Neufert says, ‘measure and purpose’ to other areas of 
knowledge. 
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those that use them (see, for example, Gropius 1936, p.173).6 Further, these texts 
are frequently employed within programs of architectural education specifically for 
the purpose of integrating knowledge of the user into design activities (Imrie 2003, 
p.54), such that, for many practitioners, their first contact with these texts is in 
facilitating knowing this particular object, the user.  
                                                
6 Gropius (1936, p.173) notes that Architects’ Data’s “quintessence [lies] in the keeping of 
every building problem in relation to man and his natural dimensions”. 
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SUMMARY OF EXISTING LITERATURE AND 
CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS AND 
METHODOLOGIES 
In the preceding chapter I employed a series of key concepts in the course of 
formulating the core questions and areas of inquiry of this thesis. These, 
‘architecture’, ‘practice’, and ‘knowledge’, require particular attention and clarification 
prior to the discussion and analysis in subsequent chapters, not least because each 
is (to varying extents) a contested or ambiguous site within both academic literature 
and common parlance, and a particular understanding of each is pertinent to the 
following analysis. This chapter addresses these concepts, with this clarification 
additionally providing the space to offer an overview of the sociological work (and 
work of other disciplines) that has been conducted in these key areas, thereby 
situating the positions I take in this particular study. Given this background, I present 
some further clarifications regarding research methodologies, relative to these key 
concepts and theoretical frames, along with indicating where in the thesis recounts of 
methods are given. 
 
2.1 ARCHITECTURE 
Amongst everyday uses of the term ‘architecture’ two distinguishable, though 
related, meanings can be identified;1 ‘architecture’ can refer alternately to a certain 
kind of artefact or a certain kind of activity. In the first instance, ‘architecture’ denotes 
a particular type or corpus of buildings. Notably (usually) a limited range of the totality 
of structures within the built environment; “A bicycle shed is a building; Lincoln 
Cathedral is a piece of architecture” (Pevsner 1963, p. 15). Though contests over 
and attempts to shift this boundary are frequently made, such contests maintain the 
consensus that a boundary between architecture and ‘mere building’ is there to be 
discerned. Even attempts to dissolve it (e.g. Rudofsky 1987) reaffirm, in their 
polemical character, the conventionality of the conception of architecture as a 
delimited portion of the built environment. 
                                                
1 This is to put aside completely the, somewhat metaphorical, uses of the term to refer to 
things such as the ‘architecture of the computer software’. 
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Distinct from, though intertwined with, this conception of ‘architecture-as-
artefact’ is that of ‘architecture-as-activity’; roughly and conventionally, that activity 
involved in the production of the aforementioned artefacts. Thus, ‘architecture-as-
activity’ subsumes, in a sense, the understanding of architecture as artefact. In so far 
as architecture refers to this kind of activity, it (usually) more-or-less exclusively 
refers to the activity of a particular figure, ‘the architect’. Exactly what activities are 
considered architecture, or architectural, and who is an architect is, again, an old site 
of contestation, intertwined with those over the delimitation of artefacts. For now, this 
history is to be put aside. The aim of this brief clarification is simply to state that it is 
‘architecture-as-activity’ that is the concern of this study.  
This is an old corner of social life, and has not gone unnoticed by sociology. 
Though, comparatively speaking, is also not an intense focus of sociological inquiry. 
As a profession, architects’ work has caught the gaze of sociologists concerned with 
elucidating this branch of work and sociality. The first major sociological forays into 
architectural practice emerged from within the sociology of professions and of work 
and occupations. Blau's (1984) significant monograph Architects and Firms, a large-
scale study of New York-based offices, with a focus on determinants of firm success 
and failure and on latent contradictions amongst architects’ ideals, organisational 
structures, and the everyday realities of practice, was one such early foray. Reviews 
of her contribution in the early 1980s attested to the scarcity of interest and 
engagement with architectural practice as a valuable object of inquiry,2 at least within 
the discipline of sociology (Adler 1986; Faulkner 1985; King 1986; Lang 1987; Sydie 
1986). Further significant contributions (see, for example, Blau, La Gory & Pipkin 
1983; Knox 1988; Larson 1993) adjoined earlier historical case studies of 
professionalization (Kaye 1960; Levy 1980) in defining architecture as a viable 
research topic. Architecture, qua profession, remains a fruitful area of research for 
those employing it as a vehicle to further an understanding of the professions in 
general, or viewing it primarily through frameworks of the sociology of professions.3  
                                                
2 A status that hasn’t shifted dramatically, with contemporary comments still deeming 
architecture to be “relatively neglected” by sociology (Cohen et al. 2005), though “rapidly 
expanding” (Jones 2016, p.466).  
3 Case studies have explored common themes of professions and professionalisation via the 
peculiarities of architecture, including areas such as the place of professionals within class 
and power structures (Shadar, Orr & Maizel 2011), forms of firm ownership and 
organisational archetypes (Pinnington & Morris 2002), professionals understanding of work 
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However, architecture has piqued the interest of numerous sociologists that 
divert from a specific interest in professions per se and examine architecture through 
the prism of broader interests and theoretical projects. Examples include a critical 
engagement with the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, notably in Stevens' (2002) 
account of distinction, Gartman's (2002, 2009) analysis of large scale cultural 
change, and Lipstadt's (2003) analysis of architectural competitions. This frame 
additionally informs Fowler & Wilson's (2004) account of architecture’s gendered 
structure, and this concern is furthered by Sang, Dainty & Ison's (2014) research on 
the discursive reproductions of hegemonic masculinity. Further, realities of globalism 
and trans-nationalism have been explored through the case of the architectural 
professional, investigating the movement of people, knowledge, and practices 
(Faulconbridge 2010; McNeill 2009), the interaction of globally mobile architectural 
actors with inter/national regulation (Champy 2008; Faulconbridge 2009), and the 
constitution of transnational classes (Sklair 2005). Further, architecture is also taken 
up by Collins & Guillén (2012) as a site for articulating Collins’ theory of interaction 
ritual chains. 
This sociological gaze towards architecture has not been unreciprocated. The 
relation between the disciplines has, rather, been more of a dialogue, with 
architecture making concerted attempts to instrumentalise the knowledge of the 
social sciences. This attempt to draw sociology into architecture’s professional 
activities may even outdate sociology’s attempt to draw out accounts of the activities 
of the architectural profession. I raise this dynamic in order to identify the particular 
position of certain key scholars, whose significant contributions have emerged from 
contexts of close disciplinary interaction. Robert Gutman epitomizes such a position. 
His writing reflects being embedded within the world of architecture itself (as both 
consultant and educator), with his research on the profession (e.g. Gutman 1988) 
coloured by a strong advocacy for the utility of social sciences knowledge within 
architectural schools and offices.  
Similarly, Cuff's (1992a) Architecture: The Story of Practice emerges from 
these disciplinary ties, though from the position of a scholar educated in architecture 
taking to a sociological mode of research and analysis. Cuff's (1992a) work (an 
ethnography of architectural firms) is important, in the context of this study, as a 
                                                
through particular discursive strategies (Cohen et al. 2005), and experiences and ascriptions 
of meaning to long work hours (Sturges 2013). 
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sizeable publication marking a turn in observation and analysis towards the regime of 
activities in which architectural labour is constituted. Such investigations, particularly 
attentive to the activities within the walls of offices, are of most importance to this 
study, both as being those nearest to the research focus and, thus, its immediate 
context within existing literature, while also providing material utilized in the analysis 
undertaken (see §2.4). 
An important outcome of this literature has been the fuller and more complex 
picture of architectural labour constructed, moving beyond reductionist myths of 
‘design’ that circulate in architectural discourse. It is to this picture that I contribute in 
this study. In part, this is to broaden the range of actors that figure in accounts of 
architecture. As Cuff (1992a) states, she seeks to ‘subjectify’ design, to position it as 
social construction. The position I take is that Cuff makes the right move in bringing 
more actors into the scene but, perhaps, is mistaken in an attempt to ‘subjectivise’4 
practice and not widen the list of agents further. Architectural projects incorporate a 
heterogeneous host of players, many of them not ‘subjects’. 
A growing body of ethnographic work has apprehended the diversity of 
agents within architectural practice. In this regard, the work of Yaneva (2005, 2009a, 
2009b) has been especially significant in the headway it has made via accounts of 
design that have articulated the place of various ‘non-humans’, such as models and 
‘modelscopes’ (Yaneva 2005), within architecture. Identifying that “an architect has to 
be equipped with diverse tools— aids of imagination and instruments of thinking tied 
to the body—in order to carry out the simplest procedure” (Latour & Yaneva 2008, 
p.86) and, thus the multitude of entities embroiled in architecture, has, as in the case 
of this study, usefully oriented attempts to elucidate architectural labour (e.g. Comi & 
Whyte 2017; Ewenstein & Whyte 2007, 2009; Faulconbridge 2010; Fischer & Guy 
2009; Houdart 2016; Iedema 2001; Imrie & Street 2011, 2014; Ivarsson 2010; 
Loukissas 2012; Lloyd Thomas & Amhoff 2015). 
 
 
 
                                                
4 Rather, ‘espoused attempt’ may be a more accurate description, as the account Cuff gives 
certainly doesn’t altogether exile ‘objects’ entirely.  
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2.2 PRACTICE 
In this thesis, I situate ‘practice’ as key to understanding knowing the user in 
architecture. This is not, however, to emphasise an interest in the portion of 
architecture indicated by this native use of the term in the world of architects.5 
Rather, it is to make explicit the importance, when examining social life, of an 
orientation towards ‘practices’. This is to align this study with contemporary practice 
theory, or practice-based approaches, which share a common understanding of the 
phenomena encountered within the social world “as constellations of, aspects of, or 
rooted in practices” (Schatzki 2016, p. 29).  
Practice theory precipitated in the efforts of a number of contemporary 
authors (Ortner 1984; Schatzki 1996; Schatzki, Cetina & Savigny 2001; Reckwitz 
2002a), to coalesce a range of late twentieth century theorists (principally Pierre 
Bourdieu, Anthony Giddens, and, to an extent, the later work of Michel Foucault) and 
their Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian influences, on the basis of a common 
orientation towards ‘practices’ as fundamental to inquiry into sociality. The work of 
contemporary practice theorists has been to settle the fertile ground common to 
these earlier writers and develop and extend it into a fruitful programme of theory and 
empirical research based on the premise that practices are fundamental to any social 
object of inquiry and the basic entity from which ‘the social’ is constituted, in contrast 
to “individuals, (inter)actions, language, signifying systems, the life world, 
institutions/roles, structures, or systems” (Schatzki 2001, p. 12). The work of these 
contemporary authors (Hui, Schatzki & Shove 2017; Nicolini 2012; Reckwitz 2002a; 
Schatzki, Cetina & Savigny 2001; Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012) has gone beyond 
and elaborated the original insights garnered from the ‘practice turn’, pursuing 
emergent questions and challenges and contributing to defining ‘practice theory’ as 
an identifiable and valuable mode of apprehending social phenomena. Though, the 
contributions remain as diverse in their interpretations of fundamental concepts and 
in their intellectual origins as earlier theorists. Even conceptions of ‘practice’ itself is a 
site for variation, often tailored to the intellectual task at hand. As Schatzki (2001, p. 
                                                
5 A ‘native’, but distinct, use of the term ‘practice’ is present in the world of architects (and is 
occasionally employed in this manner during this thesis). Architectural offices or firms are 
frequently referred to as 'practices', it's not uncommon to hear the question as to whether one 
is working as an architect producing buildings (as opposed to, say, working as an academic, 
or studying) phrased as "Are you in practice?" or "Are you practicing”, and innumerable books 
and conferences, meetings, and other gatherings are devoted to the questions and problems 
of architectural ‘practice’. This is not the concern with practice taken up by this thesis, 
however. 
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11) made clear, and as Nicolini (2012) reiterated a decade later, there was and is “no 
unified practice approach”. This should not be mistaken for a fault. Rather, with the 
critical stance and cross-fertilization of ideas it engenders, it should be regarded as a 
positive characteristic of this body of work. 
Though my intent here is not to fasten to one particular manner of 
apprehending practice,6 Shove, Pantzar & Watson (2012) have developed an 
especially fruitful mode in so far as one’s research approach and topic is what 
Nicolini (2017) has labelled ‘genealogical’ (focused on the trajectories of particular 
practices and constellations of practices over time and space; how they emerge and 
change). I drew on this approach most extensively in the research reported here. 
Such a position requires vigilance in insuring that analytical moves undertaken, 
treating practices ‘as-entity’, do not slip into a reification of practices and forget the 
realities of ‘practice-as-perfomance’ (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, pp.7–8; 
Nicolini 2017, p.29). This particular schema, incorporating ‘materials’, ‘meanings’, 
and ‘competencies’, is valuable as an analytical tool by virtue of its specificity, in 
providing a useful orientation to the componential reality of practices (regardless of 
what ‘categories’ they may fall under) and direction in the identification of such 
components, but, also, by virtue of its generality, as a toolkit of concepts that does 
not get bogged down in an a-priori attempt at a ‘conclusive’ or comprehensive 
schema of components. Most specifically, though practice and knowing are not 
identical, this approach also provides for a useful model for apprehending knowing 
(see introduction to chapter 4). 
To take this ‘practice’ standpoint does not mean to frame architecture 
(whether apprehended at the scale of the congeries of activity within a particular 
project, within the spatial domain of offices, or in the broadest sense as a field of 
social life) as a practice but, rather, a practice-oriented approach positions 
architecture as a constellation of interconnected practices.7 A concern with the 
                                                
6 Pinning down a definition of practice, or attempting a comparative evaluation of various 
formulations, is beyond both the scope and concern of this study. Generally speaking, the 
approach taken has been to take on the multitude of ways in which practice has been defined 
using any and all as tools to orient and sensitise analysis, rather than systematically direct it 
or make attempts to justify a particular definition of practice via the work undertaken in the 
study. In this regard, it shares the position taken by Nicolini (2012), in his ‘toolkit’ approach, 
where he advocates that “much is to be gained if we learn to use these [practice-based] 
approaches in combination, rather than attempting a grand synthesis” (2012, p. 9). 
7 Distinguishing between a regime of activity that might be designated a ‘practice’ and that 
which might be otherwise designated a ‘practice bundle/complex/etc.’, and, indeed, between 
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‘successes’ of knowing in ‘architecture’ is, thus, to attend to the presence of the 
accomplishment of knowing in particular performances, to the presence of such 
performances in the complexes8 of practices in which architectural labour transpires, 
and to their presence and dispersion in the broader totality of the constellation of 
such complexes.  
Of the espoused advantages of the turn to practice in the social sciences,9 
two in particular are of most significance to this study. Firstly, it is the reformulation of 
an understanding of knowledge. This conception of knowledge will be addressed in 
the section below but, to comment briefly, is important in its move to understand 
knowledge as firmly rooted in performance and the flow of activity rather than being 
situated within a distinct realm of mental phenomena ‘within the heads’ of 
practitioners. Instead, knowing is understood as emergent in practice, incorporating 
and dispersed amongst the heterogeneous congeries of human bodies, actions, 
objects, and other entities there-in. In this is indicated the second affordance of 
practice theory relevant to this study, an attendance to the objects, artefacts, ‘things’, 
and material world in general, as a constitutive element of the social. 
This move of according a place to the ‘material’ within the social world is by 
no means unique to practice theory. This common ground with actor-network theory 
(ANT), for instance, has engendered especially fruitful encounters. Like theories of 
practice, ANT, and science and technology studies (STS) more generally (see, for 
example, Pickering 1992, 1995), has shown a sensitivity towards practice and 
performance (though, without necessarily according it the same ontological priority). 
                                                
‘smaller’ actions of which practices are composed, is not necessarily clear. The more 
important point is, perhaps, to perceive this ‘nested’ picture of regimes of activities, 
themselves composed of interconnected activities, forming part of and resources for larger 
regimes of activity, rather than making attempts to pin down definite boundaries. Instead, 
such boundaries, such as when previously distinct practices become so intertwined that they 
are considered as a single practice-entity (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, p.82), are a 
matter wrought in the ongoing performances of social life itself and it is to these (rather than 
those of the analyst) that it is most valuable to attend to. 
8 Practice-oriented approaches have offered numerous names for the greater entities formed 
in the joining together of practices, such as ‘bundles’, ‘complexes’, or ‘arrangements’, each 
articulating variations amongst the types of such congeries. In this thesis, architecture is 
conceived of as a complex of practices, in the sense of a relatively strong constellation of 
interdependent practices in contrast to a bundle of less cohered pattern of practices (Shove, 
Pantzar & Watson 2012, p.87).  
9 Those of note include dissolving the perennial problems of the relation between agency and 
structure and, in parallel, those of micro and macro social phenomena, the introduction of 
“new and different phenomena, objects of inquiry, questions and concerns” (Nicolini 2012, 
p.14), and an accordance with contemporary processual accounts of reality. 
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Given these congruities,10 especially regarding the place of objects, artefacts, 
‘things’, and the material in social life, numerous practice theorists have occupied a 
position on the border of practice theory and ANT, drawing on the valuable research 
and insights generated under the banner of each. It is this border zone that I most 
frequently utilize in this study. 
This turn to materiality seeks to reconceptualise “things and artefacts as 
social entities that play an active part in the generation, stabilisation, and 
reproduction of social order and sociality" (Preda 1999, p.349, emphasis added). 
Objects (like ‘handbooks’) and the material world are not something alternately 
causing or caused by, shaping or shaped by, an otherwise distinct and separate 
‘social’ world and social phenomena. They are, rather, a constitutive component of 
sociality, entities with which the social itself is composed (Latour 2000). In the case 
of practice theory, they are such as elements of practices; bodies, objects, artefacts, 
technologies, ‘nature’, and otherwise classified matter are vital and necessary 
components of the performances through which social life transpires (Reckwitz 
2002b). This conception of the social life of objects has engendered invaluable 
attention to various diverse types of matter and its place in social life, while 
simultaneously unveiling and unpacking the enormous diversity with which ‘the 
material’ contributes to the playing out of sociality (for an overview, see Pels, 
Hetherington & Vandenberghe 2002) - ‘objects’ are no unitary or simple phenomena.  
 
2.3 KNOWLEDGE 
Perhaps more than the preceding sections, attempting a clarification of or to 
stake out a position vis-à-vis ‘knowledge’ is to open up a can of worms. My intention 
in doing so is not to become bogged down in a mire of epistemological speculation 
but, rather, to put forward a working image employable in this study. In this section I 
endeavour to present and advocate for a particular conception of knowledge, though 
it might be reasonable to contend that such a task is one for epistemology. In 
                                                
10 ANT and theories of practice also sit within the family of social theories that subscribe to a 
‘flat’ ontology, that is, one that sees the social world as playing out on a single ‘level’ (of 
practices in the case of practice theories, of associations in the case of ANT) as opposed to 
those which conceive of a social world made of more than one ‘level’ or ‘domain’ with 
systematic relations holding between them, typically of micro and macro or individual and 
system/structure divisions (Schatzki 2016). Nicolini (2012, p.169) even labels Latour a 
“reluctant practice theorist”. 
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response to this the position I take is that the focus of the research questions are 
such that a definiteness or, at least, lucidity regarding the conception of knowledge 
underpinning the research seems requisite. Though, additionally, that if knowledge is 
the kind of phenomenon presented here, this conception renders what knowledge is 
a topic for sociological investigation, ‘empiricises’ it in a sense. 
Again, in this task it is the work of theorists of practice, and the insights made 
into the character of knowledge and its place in sociality, that I draw upon most 
frequently. This work elaborates on earlier formulations regarding the distinction 
between, to employ the Rylean (1963) frame, ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’ and 
the priority of ‘know-how’.11 In this, an image of human beings as some apparatus 
driven about by a stream of propositional cognitive goings-on is dispelled and 
replaced by a picture of subjects as primarily skilled bodies who, as Polanyi says, 
"can know more than [they] can tell" (2009, p. 4). 
The attentiveness directed towards, and elaboration of, this phenomenon of 
‘know-how’ (derived from a diverse origins, including Wittgenstein 1973; Heidegger 
2008; Merleau-Ponty 2002; and Polanyi 2009) and its primacy in regards to social 
action and to ‘explicit’, ‘propositional’, or ‘knowledge-that’, has been a formative 
position and ongoing focus of investigation for practice-oriented approaches. This 
practical, embodied form of knowledge in action has been crucial to conceptions that 
see it as a core pillar of practice.  
The position I take in this study is sympathetic to the general account of 
knowledge proposed by Hetherington (2011), and also Hyman (1999), who take this 
form of knowledge variously termed ‘know-how’, ‘tacit’, ‘embodied’, or ‘practical’ 
                                                
11 Ryle, endeavouring to construct an account of intelligent action (and of mind in general), 
argued for the primacy of what he termed ‘knowing-how’, over a propositional form of 
knowledge, ‘knowing-that’, that had been privileged by the ‘intellectualist’ epistemological 
tradition. According to this intellectualist tradition, “To do something thinking what one is doing 
is… always to do two things; namely, to consider certain appropriate propositions, or 
prescriptions, and to put into practice what these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. It is to 
do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice.” (Ryle 1963, p. 30). However, as Ryle 
makes clear, this would lead to an infinite regress; one must have the appropriate know-how 
to apply maxims or employ propositions, for example knowing what propositions or maxims 
are appropriate to a particular situation, and, if this knowledge is propositional, the same 
condition applies, thus the regress. Hence, Ryle argues that it is our know-how, our skills (that 
operate unhindered by some secondary proposition or ‘mental’ governance), that 
fundamentally underlie any intelligent action, and this form of knowledge is an ability to do 
things, a capacity, or a disposition (though, not in the sense of a ‘single-track’ disposition like 
a habit but, rather, a disposition that manifests in a heterogeneous corpus of actions).  
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knowledge to be indicative of the character of all knowledge; that is, to conceive of all 
knowledge as ability. This conception takes ‘knowledge-that’, or propositional 
knowledge, to be, fundamentally, a kind of ‘knowledge-how’; “all propositional 
knowledge is practical knowledge; which is to say, knowledge how to do this or that" 
(Hetherington 2011, p.xi). While acknowledging the correct apprehension made by 
Ryle in identifying the primacy of ‘know-how’, this effectively dissolves the lingering 
distinction between ‘know-how/know-that’ (where-by each is seen to be 
fundamentally distinct, generating, for example, questions about which founds the 
other) by proposing that all knowledge is knowledge-how,12 an ability. Knowledge is 
not representation, information, or belief or some other state or content of a mental 
domain; knowledge is something that is done.  
Hetherington (2011) labels his account of knowledge ‘practicalist’. However, 
notably absent from this account is practice itself. The character and complexities of 
practice, the manifold of orchestrated entities and actions through which knowledge 
transpires, is, comparatively speaking, somewhat slighted (though by the nature of 
disciplinary boundaries and conventions, not the author). In this regard, the work of 
practice-oriented theorists (e.g. Gherardi & Nicolini 2000; Nicolini 2011; Orlikowski 
2002, 2006) that have taken knowing to be “an ongoing accomplishment, constituted 
and reconstituted in everyday practice” (Orlikowski 2002, p.252) nicely complements 
Hetherington’s core intuitions, greatly extending and elaborating it with thicker 
descriptions of the nature of the practices in which knowledge-as-ability is to be 
found.13 Though it is not the role of the social researcher to stake out a general 
account of knowledge or become immersed in epistemology (as the branch of 
philosophy), in so far as their concerned is with tracing knowledge through social life 
                                                
12 This also being in contrast to those, such Stanley & Williamson (2001), that have sought to 
dissolve the Rylean distinction but by subsuming ‘know-how’ as a form of ‘know-that’. 
13 Whether or not this account of knowledge-as-ability would find broad acceptance amongst 
practice-oriented theorists, as a general account of all knowledge, is contestable. A 
dichotomy of ‘know-how’, tacit, embodied, and practical knowledge on the one hand and 
‘knowledge-that’, explicit, propositional, and discursive knowledge on the other is frequently 
reproduced in practice-oriented accounts of social life, but whether these are regarded as 
fundamentally different by the authors investigating or utilizing these notions is unclear and 
their use is, like most areas of ‘practice theory’, far from uniform. For the most part, it would 
seem that this is simply a case of it not falling within the interest or practical concerns of 
practice-oriented social researchers to go about staking out explicit positions on a general 
account of knowledge (at least, in the philosophical mode suggested). Certainly, when 
authors such as Nicolini (2011) assert knowledge and practice to be ontologically equivalent it 
appears that such a position would be entirely congruous with the picture of knowledge-as-
ability, such as that outlined by Hetherington (2011). Regardless, this, at least, empirical and 
analytical focus provides a point of commensurability for a useful dialogue. 
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an account of knowledge-as-ability usefully attunes the researcher to the fact that 
what is to be traced are abilities, capacities, competencies, action and the means 
through which these occur and travel. 
However, in addition to this value in orientation, if one takes knowledge as 
ability this effectively renders the question of what knowledge is an empirical 
concern. Why this is so is bound to where such a conception locates knowing or the 
knowing agent: distributed amongst a heterogeneous host of elements orchestrated 
in practice. Such a position is grounded in a larger picture of agency offered by both 
practice-oriented accounts and branches of STS, especially ANT. This understanding 
of agency is attuned to its ever dispersed and distributed character, amongst both 
elements that might conventionally be labeled ‘human’ and ‘non-human’. As in 
Pickering's (1993) account of the emergence of human and material agency in the 
‘mangle’ of practice, Callon & Law's (1995) account of the ‘hybrid collectif’, Michael's 
(2000) ‘co(a)gents’, and the prominent view in practice theoretical approaches that 
“agency is an attribute of heterogeneous arrangements” (Nicolini 2012, p.178), such 
pictures effectively displace notions that social agency might be simply located within 
singular loci of action and discrete autonomous, human, agents. It also, importantly, 
grounds a methodological position advocated by Latour (2005) where-in, in 
negotiating complex distributions and attributions of agency, one ought to abstain 
from bringing pre-determined agential sources to bear on any particular event. If one 
conceives of knowing in terms of ability and action then this picture of agency is of 
obvious relevance. It opens the possibility for replacing traditional conceptions of the 
knowing agent as autonomous subject (specifically, in the operations of an ‘internal’ 
mental world) with what Hetherington (2012) has called the ‘extended knower’, a 
heterogeneous host of human and non-human components orchestrated in 
accomplishing knowing action.  
Hetherington (2012, p.231) offers the case of knowing the temperature of a 
room; here “[t]he person-by-using-the-thermometer knows; the person-plus-the-
thermometer knows. That unity knows; it is the agent of the knowing”. That is, it is in 
the unity of person and thermometer in practice that the ability resides to, for 
instance, give accurate reports on the temperature of the room, or perhaps turn the 
heater down at the appropriate time. Knowing is, as action generally, distributed and 
dispersed; it is a process located in assemblages of ‘humans’ and ‘non-humans’. 
Furthermore, such ‘knowing assemblages’ extend beyond immediate scenes of 
action to the larger spatio-temporal network of entities and practices that are 
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otherwise mediated and translated into the particular scene of action; knowing is 
more properly located in nexuses of interconnected practices (Nicolini 2011).  
In this regard this conception of knowledge-as-ability there-by renders 
questions of knowing, and what knowing is, to be a fundamentally sociological 
question, in the sense of a question of association (Latour 2005), of the manner of 
composition of such knowing assemblages. If it is the case that “[k]nowledge, 
morality, craft, force, sociability are not properties of humans but of humans 
accompanied by their retinue of delegated characters” (Latour 1988, p.310) this then 
opens up a host of new entities, with new kinds of roles and doing new kinds of 
things, to the analytical frame when investigating knowing. 
In the context of this introduction to ‘knowing assemblages’, it is important to 
emphasize that this ability or capacity of knowing should not be regarded as static 
attribute of an entity (such ‘assemblages’), but as “an accomplishment repeatedly 
produced in and through social practices” (Nicolini 2011, p.605). To foreground this 
processual character, I employ the term ‘knowing’ (rather than ‘knowledge’) most 
frequently. For the same reason, the term ‘knowing assemblage’ is often used over, 
say, ‘extended knower’ (though, admittedly, the supposedly more processual 
connotations of the former are slight), foregrounding the verbal character of 
‘assemblage’ rather than possible connotations of a static edifice. 
Two further inferences are worthwhile drawing out here. Firstly, it is important 
to note the possibility for comparable though compositionally distinct instances of 
knowing. For example, someone making their way to a destination with map in hand 
compared to someone otherwise unaided. In the first instance one might be hesitant 
to ascribe ‘knowing the route’ to the walker, but, nevertheless, it would be more 
difficult to contest the proposition that in both cases ‘knowing the route’ has occurred. 
Importantly, the disparity in the composition of these two cases is not simply the 
addition of artefact (map) and subtraction of capacity on the part of the walker; the 
addition of the artefact is also an addition of competencies (i.e. the know-how 
involved in map reading, looking down to check the map at appropriate times, and so 
on) to the totality of elements orchestrated in practice. Secondly, and related to this, 
is the general diversity in the composition of knowing, both in kinds of elements and 
of their association. In other words, to espouse this ‘unitary’ view of knowledge (all 
as-ability) is not to reduce it, attempting to eliminate the distinctions perceived in its 
operation absolutely; rather, the opposite is the case. To re-frame knowledge in this 
manner is to open it up to greater diversity, acknowledging that not only does 
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knowledge come in forms that have an apparent weighting towards discursive action 
(what has been labelled ‘propositional’) or towards that of bodily, unconscious action, 
and all the gradients and variants otherwise identified by epistemologists or social 
scientists, but also that the entities of which knowing is composed and the subtleties 
of composition are as immensely varied. Knowing is no homogeneous phenomenon. 
Transpiring as it does through diverse assemblages of entities, human and 
nonhuman, in practice, and able to be constituted through innumerable variations of 
innumerable entities, knowing should be, rather, conceived as an incredibly varied 
performance. 
Finally, given this particular conception of knowledge-as-ability and the focus 
of this thesis, a further question presents itself regarding what it is to have, or for 
there to be present in action, knowing of something or other (i.e. of the user). If 
knowledge is an ability or capacity it is expressed, manifested, made present in the 
world through action, that is, in doing. Though, more specifically, knowledge is an 
‘adverbial ability’ (Hyman 1999); “knowledge is not the ability to do such and such 
things: it is the ability to do things _____ly” (Hyman 1999, p. 440). This _____ly 
manner is to do things such that a particular state of affairs, object, or matter of fact 
is the reason for action.14 In other words, what knowing is of is what is made effective 
in action. To know something is to make it the cause of (though, avoiding 
connotations of simple one-track cause-effect) or to make it the reason for (though, 
avoiding connotations of intellectualism) the rather heterogeneous, indefinite, and 
indeterminate array of actions that may possibly manifest knowing. Here, my 
intention is to indicate that knowing is a matter of agency, of extending the manner in 
which an object acts and produces effect via the intertwining of the agency of the 
knower and the known, emergent in practice. When knowing occurs in action, the 
known acts, exerts influence, through (or with) the knower. The point that I am 
pursuing here is that to investigate knowing of some thing or other is to trace the 
manner in which the agency of some state of affairs, some object (such as the user), 
is transformed, translated, or extended so as to be a source of effect in action (such 
as in architectural practice). 
Having sketched this picture of knowing, the pertinent task is not to determine 
the limits of extension of such ‘extended knowers’ or ‘knowing assemblages’ but, 
                                                
14 This formulation here diverges from, through draws on, Hyman, who otherwise would limit 
to ‘facts’ as the reason of action. 
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rather, to take this reality of extension, distributed-ness, and, importantly, variation in 
the composition of comparable assemblages as points of departure. To return to the 
initial formulation of the research questions, in the light of this preceding discussion 
on architecture, practice, and knowing, to ask how, in the particular case in which the 
handbook is involved, knowledge of the user is constituted in architectural practice is 
to inquire into the manner in which this complex of practices called architecture is so 
configured that compositions of elements in knowing assemblages are built. It is to 
inquire into what the elements of such compositions are, the associations wrought 
between them, their specificity and their historicity. Further, given the variety inherent 
within the nature of composing knowing, it is to ask how the particular context of 
practice bears on the kinds and character of knowing there-by constituted. 
 
2.4 METHODOLOGICAL CLARIFICATIONS 
When it comes to apprehending this particular object, the ‘handbook’, the 
salient matter is, to state the obvious, that books say things. Thus, expectedly, their 
discursive material was a core focus of the analysis I undertook in the research 
reported here. Though, this was undertaken on the premise that to say something is 
to do something, or, further, that it involves a triad of saying, doing, and being (Gee 
2011) and is to be entangled in practice. 
Texts are not an unfamiliar ally to social research. These may be texts 
generated by the acts of researchers themselves, such as interviews (either as vocal 
utterances and recordings, or transformed into transcriptions) or carefully crafted, 
completed, and returned questionnaires. They may also pre-exist the researcher’s 
project, such as census statistics, cola advertisements, personal diaries, or a 
previous researchers’ data and reports. Regardless of their source, such texts are 
frequently enlisted as material (‘content’) to be analysed so as to provide access to 
some otherwise absent, practically or inherently inaccessible, or not directly 
observable phenomenon (Krippendorf 2004, p.260) such as public opinion, 
consumer habits, the prevalence of particular values and conceptions of reality, or 
the operations of class structure. In whatever case, texts are often employed 
because of the manner in which they are seen to reflect, infer, or be representations 
of some phenomena of interest. They are valued for the access they give to these 
phenomena, and the researcher is concerned to, through properly enlisted modes of 
production or collection and techniques of analysis, ensure that the representation 
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and the inferences and interpretation drawn from them provide for an accurate 
picture of the social world. This manner of apprehending texts (though, not at all to 
imply it is invalid or lacking in value) is not the approach I primarily take here.  
Such an orientation is to consider texts as a ‘resource’ within social inquiry. 
Instead, this study means to apprehend texts first and foremost as ‘topic’ (Prior 
2003), to see them less as a projection screen and more as a component part of a 
machine.15 In so far as a text does representation, this study is primarily concerned 
not with that which is represented and the access given to it, but instead in the doing 
of the representation, the representing. What a text is doing, and what is done with it, 
is the analytical focus of this study. It is not the world beyond (but supposedly 
revealed within) the text that is of interest, but the world of the text itself, of which it is 
a constitutive part. This, of course, entails also employing texts in their capacity to 
provide representations of or access to some phenomenon or other (it is hard to think 
of any research which wouldn’t), but it is not what primarily drives the engagement 
with ‘handbooks’.  
Employing texts as ‘resource’ is usually accompanied by attempts to 
instrumentalise them within a particular methodology, as a component of a particular 
means to access the investigated phenomenon. On the other hand, taking texts as 
‘topic’ suggests and opens space for considering the appropriateness of using a 
multiplicity of methods in adequately apprehending the text at hand. This is the 
empirical orientation taken here; I employed a toolkit of methods to analyze the 
architectural handbook and construct an account of its place in the constitution of 
knowing within architectural practice. 
Broadly, the textual analysis undertaken within this research project can be 
divided into two primary modes and separate processes of analysis. Firstly, what 
would most appropriately be labelled content analysis and, secondly, that for which 
                                                
15 Orientations in social research frequently conceive of textual material as a kind of 
projection screen, onto which the shadows of some otherwise unobservable social entity are 
projected. The implication being that if one knows the manner of projection (and, perhaps, is 
aware of the occasional distortions provided by the screen), one may infer the nature of the 
projected phenomena from their shadowy semblances. In contrast to this stance, the 
conception of texts adopted in this study is more akin to seeing them as a component of a 
machine or fragment of an artefact to be reconstructed. In one case, the researcher is 
concerned with the operations of some absent phenomena and the manner in which they 
operate through the texts at hand, in the other the concern is, instead, with the operations of 
the text or the operations of which it is a part. 
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the term discourse analysis would be most appropriate.16 These two methods were 
directed towards two aspects of this knowing assemblage wrought about the 
handbook. Content analysis was employed primarily towards examining the 
dimension of mobility, while discourse analysis was the means predominantly 
employed in exploring those meanings ascribed to the use of the handbook within 
broader structures of significance. Given that the methodological procedures 
employed within this project were various, the most efficient means of describing the 
detail of the processes undertaken is separately, and this is done so in sections 4.2, 
4.6, and 5.1.  
Thus, this brief section on methodologies is not to describe at length the 
textual analysis tasks I undertook. Though these were the core research activity, an 
otherwise salient component remains to be addressed regarding the place of 
participant observation, ethnographic, or otherwise observation-based data 
collection. That is, given the underpinnings of theories of practice which place the 
observation of sites of action in-situ as predominant means for any examination of 
practices (Nicolini 2017), the position taken that knowing is best understood as ability 
or capacity for action, and the employment of text ‘as-topic’ with accompanying 
assumptions of its status as a constitutive element of and agent within social action, 
there would seem to be an imperative for a mode of research that is grounded in the 
observation, ‘in-situ’, of the knowing action involving the architectural handbook. 
Thus, that participant observation, or similar data collection activities, within 
architectural offices and amongst the practices of architects and the use of 
handbooks did not form part of this research project needs to be addressed. Firstly, 
on predominantly pragmatic terms, the timescale of the research project limited my 
opportunity to undertake productive observation-based research.17 This is not to say 
that, simply, within the time available such research activity could not have been 
undertaken. Rather, the limiting factor was the potential for novel knowledge to be 
produced given my existing status as a novice practitioner in architecture. That is, 
with the time and resources available, I determined that the number of sites that may 
be accessed, the length of time for which they could be accessed, and the kinds of 
                                                
16 Though, see, for example, (Prior 2008) on the blurred distinction between ‘content analysis’ 
and ‘discourse analysis’. 
17 The research was undertaken as part of a twelve to twenty-four month candidature for the 
degree of Master of Arts (Research). 
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activity (in both observation and participation) would not be sufficiently distinct 
relative to my extant activities in the world of architectural practice to be productive. 
Secondly, it is important to emphasize that such data is not absent from the 
accounts offered here. As outlined above (see §2.1), a growing body of literature has 
developed with accounts of architectural practice grounded in ethnographic, 
participant observation, or other observation-based methods of data collection. Thus, 
though my own experiences and observations do not figure directly in the accounts 
of architectural practice offered in this thesis, they are nevertheless employed in 
directing the collation, synthesis, and interpretation of this data otherwise reported in 
existing literature. 
Thirdly, the significance of the observation of practice in-situ for practice-
oriented approaches is not to entirely exclude the tenability of other modes of 
researching practice. Though with their own hazards, modes of researching practice 
that are oriented towards the ‘dynamics’ (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012) of practice 
or those that are focused on the manner in which practices form connections and 
larger congeries, what Nicolini (2017, pp.28–30) labels the ‘genealogical’ and 
‘configurational’ orientations respectively, remain valid avenues for apprehending 
practices and the social phenomena constituted there-in. These orientations to the 
dynamics of practice and the configurations of complexes, constellations, bundles, 
and otherwise named aggregations of practices are the primary orientations of this 
thesis. Additionally, this research was undertaken to explore the possibilities and 
limits for a project grounded in the analysis of textual and historical material informed 
by theories of practice, especially in so far as such a project relates to the practices 
of architectural history and theory and the potential import of such a mode into these 
disciplines. 
Finally, the omission of observation-based data collection in this research 
project needs to be framed in the context of the wider intent of the research activities 
that were undertaken. Though done with the intent of providing, in itself, an account 
of architectural practice, the textual and historical analysis was also guided by my 
overarching intent of establishing direction and identifying valuable sites for future 
research with a larger scope and centred on the observation of the practices of 
architecture in-situ. In tandem with this, my intent was also to evaluate the 
usefulness of the research methods employed for this task of providing direction and 
indicating fruitful spaces for further research. 
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THE ‘USER’ 
When sitting in on a meeting where a project is being discussed it quickly 
becomes apparent that architecture is, in large part, the jostling of a host of 
numerous and diverse agents seeking to define their relevance, or the relative 
strength of their voice, in the context of the project at hand and ensure their 
translation into built form. Exposure to such a scene quickly dispels the myth that the 
architect is the lone progenitor of the work of architecture, and sociological accounts 
of this process have worked to this effect through their descriptions of the host of 
people (Cuff 1992a) but, also, those ‘non-humans’ (e.g. Yaneva 2009b) found 
shaping buildings.  
These agents include not just those present around the table itself but also 
those absent but otherwise mediated (perhaps by spokespersons, or by documents 
or some other material means). Examples might include legislators, clients, 
shareholders, a loaning bank, the market and its state, fibre-cement and its durability, 
and, indeed, the ‘user’. One such form of mediation (or, seen otherwise, type of thing 
mediated) is what is called ‘knowing’ (or ‘objects of knowledge’), figured at the scene 
in ‘knowers’. The significance of making this statement is to cast this action, knowing, 
and these objects mediated by it amongst this scene of a host of other agents 
(otherwise present or variously mediated) working to shape architecture and with 
which, in a sense, it must contend. 
This goes on in any project,18 and the range of agents can be a rather 
heterogeneous bunch. Just who makes this cast that bear on the project, is defined 
as legitimate in their influence, and how, to what extent, and towards what they may 
exert this influence, is the result of the ongoing negotiations of the project and is as 
numerous as there are projects. The strength of agents, or some, to define which 
other voices are heard, also varies (and the particular strength of the architect is no 
little matter in this regard). Furthermore, as the practices of architectural production 
                                                
18 Even when the architect works relatively ‘alone’, a multitude of actors still jostle for position 
in her drawings. There are those objects of which we would usually say she ‘has knowledge 
of’. In their invocation in a project she draws upon the resources of stable definitions of 
significance and relevance, in which durable and mobile texts (such as those of canonical 
works of ‘theory’) play an important role. 
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change over time so too does that which might potentially be determined by this host 
of agencies alter.19 No voice is necessarily present or a given in the production of a 
building, or the definition of ‘architecture’, and its presence is always the 
manifestation of concerted work.20 It is in this context that the history of the user, as 
an ‘object of knowledge’ in architectural practice, must be understood.  
This chapter will explore some of the moments in the history of this object. My 
intent, however, is not to give a complete or even abridged history of the user; others 
have worked to stake out some of the contours of this history (e.g. Cupers 2013; Ellis 
& Cuff 1989; Forty 2004a; Hill 2003) and their efforts will certainly be drawn upon in 
the account to follow. Rather, the purpose here is to further elucidate just what, in the 
context of this thesis, the user is. That is, to specify more precisely what is meant by 
‘the user’ (i.e. what its particular characteristics are) but, also, what kind of thing is 
denoted by this term and, thus, to what this research is focused.  
As the sociological literature on the shaping and constitution of users in other 
areas of design and technology has shown, just what kind of thing the ‘user’ is is no 
simple matter (Oudshoorn & Pinch 2005; Wilkie 2010); their existence is materially 
and compositionally diverse and spans across spectrums of ‘conception’ and 
‘consumption’. In specifying, here, what kind of thing the user is my intention is to not 
to definitely lay down just want kind of thing the user is in general, but, simply, to 
indicate the phenomenon of interest. Put succinctly, by ‘the user’ the type of thing 
that is meant is an ‘object of knowledge’. One might be tempted to say ‘object of 
discourse’ (as, indeed, its discursive reality is salient) but this belies the fact that this 
thing’s constitution is beyond merely discursive enactment. This chapter will begin to 
unpack what an object of knowledge is in architectural practice, some of its salient 
characteristics, and its significance. 
 
 
                                                
19  For example, architects have not always produced precisely or extensively dimensioned 
drawings. As these practices and artefacts develop they, consequently, open up a ‘space’ 
within architectural production where-in those agencies that determine the shape of buildings 
may exercise influence on, say, the exact dimensions of a particular element that might, 
otherwise, have gone un- or underdetermined by the design process. 
20 Consider, for instance, (Cuff 1992a, p.92) remark that “in the design process participants 
can admit any issue for debate, can consider an issue at any level, and can turn any 
constraint into a design variable”. 
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3.1 THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE ‘USER’ 
It is worthwhile briefly clarifying my employment of this particular term, the 
‘user’, in this thesis. As might already be evident, it is employed to denote an object 
that is similarly denoted by a host of other terms including, for example, the 
‘occupant’, ‘inhabitant’, ‘human beings’, or simply ‘people’. This object being, roughly, 
those who use, occupy, inhabit, or otherwise go about populating, being in, and 
interacting with works of architecture and artefacts of the built environment, and 
figure in the process of architectural production as such. From this fairly simply 
proposition there are two implicit concerns that need to be addressed. Firstly, why is 
it justified to collate the aforementioned terms (and others) as denoting the same 
object, as sharing the same discursive space, as roughly equivalent, and so on? 
Secondly, why, of this host of terms, is this particular term, the ‘user’, employed? 
This first question is of particular pertinence given that a key facet of what the 
user is resides in the process of ‘collating’ (elaborated below). Thus, the aggregating 
of such terms is significant in as much as it (the act of analysis) is engaging in the 
same process that constitutes what the user is. Consequently, it is important that 
these associations are not solely an artefact of analysis. Their justification is 
grounded in the fact that they are wrought within the field of practice of architecture 
itself. That these terms ‘share ground’, or that a single object underlies them, is, 
obviously, evident when they are used interchangeably, but also clearly in the 
contentions that arise and arguments that are made for the use of one over another 
(e.g. Hertzberger 2005, p.28; Lefebvre 1991, p.386). Though, this is not to render 
these terms identical; the variations amongst them are significant. However, it is to 
identify that, despite their divergences, the common ground they share and the 
strength of associations between them is part of the constitution of the object that, in 
this thesis, is labelled the ‘user’. 
The aforementioned contestations over terminology usefully preface the 
question of why, in this thesis, I employ ‘user’ over, say, ‘inhabitant’ or ‘people’. This 
is not done on the basis of any leanings towards or favouring of the particular 
rendering of this object engendered by the connotations of the ‘user’. It was simply 
that ‘user’  was deemed to be the term most peculiar to the field of architecture and, 
thus, useful in foregrounding that it is this particular object, as it resides in the world 
of architectural practice, that is the topic throughout the thesis.  
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3.2 ‘OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE’ 
The outline of an ‘object of knowledge’ I give here is, expectedly, bound to the 
conception of knowledge given in the previous chapter. Generally, two entities are 
drawn out in the ascriptions made to ‘knowing’ action. This dyad is the ‘knower’ 
(frequently figured as a human subject) and the ‘known’ (Law 2000, p.349). This is to 
say, in such acts two portions of the knowing assemblage in which this action is 
composed are figured and ascribed a kind of agency. There is that which does the 
knowing and that which is the reason, cause, or source of the effect that is this 
action. The point to be made here is that, despite the figurations made, the ‘known’, 
the ‘object of knowledge’, resides, as the ‘knower’ does, and is constituted within the 
totality that is the knowing assemblage. Understanding their constitution is, thus, to 
examine the composition of such knowing assemblages. 
I have depicted the architectural project as a jostling of agencies, but this 
same process also plays out over an extended historical timescale. Here, objects of 
knowledge may progressively establish their position as an agent in architectural 
production as successful performances aggregate and ossify over time. Regarding 
this, the written text has particular significance. It stabilizes and ossifies such 
practices of negotiation in durable artefacts that transcend particular projects and 
define architecture and the process of design, and the actors that have a voice within 
it, in general. The process that goes on longer term in books, defining actors, their 
relevance, and their connections, mirrors that which goes on at the smaller scale 
around drawings and at meeting tables. The “habit” of the architect to write and 
discourse on their work (Briggs 1927, p.14) is, thus, not-insignificant. 
Such objects may, once defined21 as legitimate (and, perhaps, valuable or 
important) in architecture, become sites of particular intensity. Once present in the 
world of architectural practices, numerous enactments of such objects work to 
(re)define them, build upon them, and extend them. That objects of knowledge have 
no definite ‘bounds’ becomes evident in such instances. Rather, these objects are 
somewhat amorphous things, becoming multiple and variously articulated as sites of 
                                                
21 It is important to note that the manner of such definition may be discursive, as in the case 
of the importance of textual artefacts for rendering such corpuses of legitimate agents in 
architectural production, but also in the dispersion of modes of practice by primarily non-
discursive means. 
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contestation and innovation spring up in attempts to bring this object to bear on the 
production of architecture. 
Examples of such ‘objects of knowledge’ include beauty, the market, the 
zeitgeist or modernity, war, the genius loci, or harmony. Though, this amorphous and 
evolving character is notably evident in one of architecture’s most significant ‘objects 
of knowledge’, ‘antiquity’. Once the ruins of ancient Rome were ‘rediscovered’ they 
became, like a wellspring or a seam to be mined, a flurry of activity. This is well 
encapsulated in the activities of figures like Brunelleschi, who travelled frequently 
and far to encounter the Roman monuments. Brunelleschi, and others like him, 
worked with “wild enthusiasm” (Briggs 1927, p.144) in an effort to bring this object to 
bear on their architecture. Importantly, however, they did not simply travel to the 
ruins of Rome and ‘imbibe’ them, acquiring a capacity to render them effectual in 
their practice or leaving with novel knowledge now sitting within their heads. Most 
significantly, they made drawings; they translated these artefacts into radically more 
mobile inscriptions, and this object and knowing was folded into a complicated 
(Strum & Latour 1987) assemblage of human and non-human. Crucially, this 
translation, and ensuing construction of a knowing assemblage, was a transformation 
of these monuments into the world of graphic inscription already built within the world 
of architects.  
Such compositions joined with other definitions of ‘antiquity’, such as those 
found in the hallowed texts of Vitruvius, to constitute a diverse and changing object at 
the centre of the new architecture all’antica. Enactments of this object and continued 
attempts at its (re)definition served to generate novel problems, such as the proper 
proportioning of certain elements, that further fuelled architectural practice. Later 
efforts, notably aided by the printed book (Carpo 2001), went about redefining this 
object in the form of the systematized ‘orders’. Such was the significance of this 
particular articulation that they became less a component of this object ‘antiquity’ 
and, in a sense, took on a separate existence. Events in the centuries to follow, such 
as the rediscovery of the ruins of ancient Greece, and the products of the travels of 
the ‘antiquarians’, folded into the extant assemblage of ‘antiquity’ and served to 
continue its fluidity. 
Here, my intention is to foreground the picture of the changing indefiniteness 
of such objects. That is, not only is the host of agents that are to be found entangled 
in the architectural project a site of constant negotiation and redefinition, but the 
identities of these characters are themselves also fluid, frequently multiple, and sites 
	 33 
of contestation (on this 'messy' character of objects, see Law & Singleton 2005). 
Having given a more general description of what kind of thing the user is, the 
remainder of this chapter will turn to specific moments in the history of this object to 
further elaborate this picture.  
 
3.3 ASSEMBLING THE ‘USER’ 
As indicated in the discussion of terminology above, objects like the user do 
not come into being from nothing, ‘discovered’ or created, fully formed, as utter 
novelty. Rather, it is more appropriate to see this object, in any relatively coherent, 
unitary, or substantially effectual form, as a novel assembling of extant entities. Its 
history can be viewed as processes of aggregation and consolidation, establishing 
and furthering the agency of this object. One can, thus, also look to instances of what 
could be called ‘proto-users’, those elements from which the object of knowledge (or, 
the knowing assemblage in which it is constituted) is derived or composed. Thus, 
despite, as Cupers (2013, p.2) correctly identifies, being a predominantly twentieth-
century phenomenon, and the term ‘user’ itself being comparatively unknown before 
1950 (Forty 2004b, p.312), it is not entirely absent from the horizons of architecture 
prior to this. 
With the frame of the user at hand, one might be tempted to see, for example, 
references to ‘bodies’ scattered through Vitruvius' (2009) ten books, or perhaps, as in 
Ledoux’s ‘architecture parlante’, the recurrent concern with the appropriate 
architectural expression of the character of inhabitants, as iterations of this object. 
However, it is perhaps better to see them as, rather, ‘proto-users’, absent of “a 
discursive space in which otherwise disconnected practices… are drawn together” 
(Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, p.111). They lack the extension and intensity of the 
agency established in the coalescence of the particular figuration of the ‘user’, 
though, indeed, these, and similar cases, are elements drawn into this figuration 
following its emergence.  
An especially noteworthy ‘proto-user’ is, again, found within Vitruvius' (2009) 
books, as a component of what has come to be known as the ‘Vitruvian triad’. This 
schema posits three principles that define the work of architecture. Accompanying 
venustas, and firmitas is utilitas, that is, utility, or usefulness. ‘Use’ is of particular 
significance as an especially old and firmly embedded ‘proto-user’, but also in the 
manner in which it is translated. Vitruvius’ antique treatise became a founding 
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document of the renaissance, and this triad was reproduced in various forms (from 
slight variations on the triad, to sets of many principles derived but fairly distinct from 
Vitruvius’) in the numerous translations and derivations of this text in the following 
centuries some even placing utility in a position of primacy, as a greater fundament 
(as in the French 'usage'; see Kruft 1994, p.144). 
The demand that buildings should be designed according to 'use' doesn't 
necessarily imply the presence of the user. Rather 'use' in itself, that is, the activities 
or 'function' of a space can be apprehended independently of rendering the user as 
an object of knowledge. Architects are more then happy to speak of and deal with 
what Ellis & Cuff (1989, p.8) call “disembodied actions”, activities that “float free” of 
any apparent articulation of those acting.  
However, the obvious commensurability of use with the user provided the 
ground for the user to take up a position of firmly established legitimacy as an agent 
within architectural projects. This translation was particularly significant in so far as 
the comparatively obscure and parochial object of ‘use’ was replaced by an object 
that afforded a greater accordance with extant objects of the emerging human 
sciences. This can be interpreted in the context of the not-insignificant symbolic 
capital of scientific endeavour and the familiar imperative for disciplines to assume a 
scientific garb.  
This was, indeed, how this translation was instrumentalised in practice. An 
architectural practice’s orientation to those that ‘peopled’ buildings served to, in the 
early twentieth century, aid the architect’s attempt to recast their identity as one of 
‘social expert’ and, thus, especially adept at dealing with the task of mass housing 
(Kuchenbuch 2016a). Likewise, the formation of environment-behaviour studies in 
the 1960s and its alliance with architecture, in tandem with the growing disciplinary 
status of the social sciences in America, provided ground for architects to make a 
grab for the mantel of ‘scientific’ expertise (Sachs 2013). Related to the place of the 
user in enacting the architect’s identity as ‘social expert’ was the emergence of a 
specific architectural practitioner type after World War II for whom, in contrast to the 
practitioner types of ‘the artist’ and ‘the professional’, the user was their core concern 
(Blau 1984, p.9). Given architecture’s status as ‘knowledge-based’ profession, it is 
part of the significance of knowing that they work to manifest this knowing in their 
practice (Alvesson 2001), and every novel object of knowledge, however minor, is 
the re-definition of the profession and, thus, existentially pertinent for the practitioner. 
	 35 
That modernists “waxed eloquent” (Kostof 1989) about building inhabitants 
and progressively aligned themselves with the human sciences should not be 
misapprehended as a simple movement of knowledge from centres of ‘knowledge 
production’ to architectural practice. Though they may appropriate terminology and 
objects, it would be inaccurate to assume that the assertions architects make and the 
users otherwise enacted in practice are grounded in or derived from an appropriated 
‘scientific’ domain. In the years of early modernism, for example, despite functionalist 
doctrines and the central position of ‘man’ or the ‘user’ in modernist rhetoric (e.g. 
CIAM 1970), the work of these architects was, as Riemer (1941, p.865) noted, “most 
often based on intuition or vague speculations about the living habits of those social 
groups which are to be accommodated” rather than, for instance, being informed by 
sociological accounts of social reality. In more contemporary contexts, (Cuff 1992a, 
p.85) has noted that when it comes to assertions like “the social grouping in a dorm 
should not exceed 20 people” the foundations are uncertain. Blau (1984, p.85) 
similarly identifies that, regardless of apparent ‘social awareness’, the contradiction 
between a strong belief in ‘architectural determinism’ (that buildings directly 
determine the values, needs, and preferences of inhabitants) and the attempt to have 
those same user values, needs, and preferences direct architecture suggests 
architects lack of receptiveness to social research findings.  
The user also transformed into something novel as the architect became both 
“socially and administratively” distanced from the eventual inhabitants of their 
buildings by the requirements of the production of prevalent building types 
(principally mass housing) following WWI and WWII (Lipman 1969, p.197). Such 
buildings were no longer for the clients commissioning them and who might 
traditionally occupy an otherwise contending identity of ‘client-user’ and, thus, directly 
object to the architect’s attempts at ‘knowing the user’. This notion of the absence of 
an objecting user is important; what may be an apparent need to ‘replace’ a user now 
absent from the meeting table with a knowing assemblage in which the ‘user’ is 
constituted as an object of knowledge is, equally, an opportunity for architects to take 
up a novel space for action as spokesperson. However, relying on intuition and 
reflecting on their own lifestyles fell short, on the basis of being social distant from 
these new, predominantly working-class, ‘users’ relative to those clients with whom 
architects had previously shared a comparable social background (Lipman 1969, 
p.197; Riemer 1941, p.865). 
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Additionally accompanying the world wars and their aftermath was the 
meeting of the scientific and social imperatives of architecture with the conditions of 
austerity and wartime efficiencies. Precipitating from this was the prominent 
articulation of the user as ‘scientifically’ grounded “exact or optimal norms” (Garcia 
Ferrari et al. 2008, p.53), providing a basis for a mode of architectural production that 
was maximally standardisable, efficient and, thus, capable of being integrated with 
the climate of post-war reconstruction efforts. Significant, relative to this, is the 
coincidence of the term ‘user’ itself with the rise and wane of the welfare state and its 
building programmes (Forty 2004a, p.312). 
 
 3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Here, the overarching theme is that, in the orchestration of knowing amongst 
the jostling agents of the architectural project, and the constitution of the user as 
‘object of knowledge’, the agency figured as the architect is modulated or even 
‘bolstered’. When the architect speaks (and designs) they do so with the voices of  
‘objects of knowledge’ marshalled behind them. Importantly, though, the architect 
mediates these and is, thus, rendered a kind of ‘spokesperson’. One might frame this 
in terms of what the architect, in such practices, gains, or what are the uses, effects, 
or benefits of knowing, or manifestly knowing, being ‘allied with’ or ‘spokesperson for’ 
the user. The answers to these are varied, as varied as the modes of knowing the 
user. They might include the capacity to enact an identity as a ‘people-concerned’ 
architect, to bolster an understanding of their work as supporting “the underprivileged 
class” (Forty 2004b, p.314), or perhaps to convince others they are not solely direct 
by “’crude’ financial considerations” (Lipman 1969, p.195). Alternately, it might be a 
manner in which the architect’s services are given market value,22 or, by simply 
increasing the objects of knowledge wielded by the practitioner, it may serve to 
reinforce their status as ‘knowledgeable professional’ (be that an end in itself, an 
obliged professional ethos, or a conscious means for increasing market control). 
This, in itself, is maybe not of immense significance. However, what is 
noteworthy is that the user as an ‘object of knowledge’ effectively displaces other 
                                                
22 One needn’t look far in the marketing material or websites of architects to see that avowals 
to practice a ‘user-focused’ or ‘people-centred’ architecture have evident value in the market 
for services. 
	 37 
alternate ‘user-ish’ agencies from the architectural project, such as those who might 
claim to be the user. This is especially so when the enactment of the user as an 
object of knowledge takes on a scientific garb that provides the ground for defining 
such knowing as better than users can ‘know themselves’. This was, indeed, the 
case, and took on an even more potent articulation, when, as Kostof (1989) notes, 
users didn’t simply not know what they needed but didn’t know what they should 
need, and any objections simply became teething issues in acclimatising to the new 
modern architecture. This is additionally significant in so far as alternate modes by 
which the user may bear on architecture may, in fact, even be a “threat” to the 
architect, particularly their status as ‘author’ (Hill 2003, p.3). 
As Latour (2005, p.101) notes, objects other than people are far more 
recalcitrant and liable to object more veraciously to attempts to speak for them. We 
are generally far more likely to exert influence over this particular object than, say, 
the thermal mass of bricks, and find it less likely to object when its voice is obscured. 
Hence, investigating this manner in which the character of knowledge of this object 
might be influenced by the manner of its mediation appears particularly pertinent. 
The chapters to follow address this matter in the case of the knowing assemblage 
wrought about the handbook. 
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MOBILE KNOWING 
Given that architecture, an interconnected constellation of practices, is a 
multi-sited phenomenon, spatially dispersed as architectural offices, a concern with 
how knowing the user comes to be incorporated into architectural practice is, 
somewhat obviously (perhaps even tautologically), a question of mobility or the 
manner in which this knowing ‘travels’. Within the conception of knowing underlying 
this thesis this is, thus, a question of how the ability for knowing action is established 
in the composition of ‘knowing assemblages’ in dispersed sites of practice. This, 
thus, entails inquiring into how, and to what extent, a particular knowing assemblage 
is composed such that it is rendered mobile and, in this regard, ‘successful’. 
Of particular value for this task is Shove, Pantzar & Watson's (2012) 
framework for apprehending the dynamics of practice. This is a conception of 
practice as composed of distinguishable elements and their interrelations, and, 
though practice and knowing are not entirely identical, their ontological equivalence 
(Nicolini 2011) provides the basis for this conception of practice usefully contributing 
to an account of knowing, particularly regarding mobility. The key insight here is that 
there is a distinction to be made between “elements – which can and do travel – and 
practices, viewed as necessarily localized, necessarily situated instances of 
integration (which do not travel)”. (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, p.39). Similarly, 
‘knowing’ or ‘knowing assemblages’ do not travel, but the elements of which they are 
composed do.1 
                                                
1 Here, however, an apparent difficulty in appropriating this ‘elemental’ picture of ‘practice’ to 
‘knowing’ arises, in the respect that the scheme drawn by Shove, Pantzar & Watson (2012, 
p.23) posits ‘competencies’ as one of three primary elements of practice, and under which 
they subsume various forms of know-how, background knowledge, and understanding. 
Apparently, this picture, contrary to the assertion above, seems to place ‘knowing’ as one of 
those mobile elements of which practice is composed. The response taken here is that, with 
some clarification, this does not, thus, make these contradictory positions. Firstly, it, rather, 
brings to surface the fact that, in the first instance, analytical moves are made (validly), to 
treat elements as if they had “a life of their own” (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, p.44), 
which bracket the composed nature of elements themselves and the manner in which they 
are constituted in the integration of practice, for the purpose of providing useful tools for 
analysing practice. There is also, however, a possible divergence in conceptions of 
knowledge, especially given the multitude of knowledge-related terms that are employed in 
practice-based approaches. As regards this, it might be useful to make some kind of 
provisional distinction between ‘knowing’ and ‘knowledge’ on the one hand and 
‘competencies’, ‘know-how’, ‘skills’, and ‘capacities’ generally in terms of their relation to an 
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Thus, in investigating the mobility of this mode of knowing the user, looking to 
the composition of the knowing assemblage wrought about the handbook, its 
elements and their relations, is the first step. To clarify, my purpose here is not to 
provide an absolutely complete picture of this assemblage, in all its minutiae, or to 
determine the limits of its extension. Rather it is to identify in this assemblage and its 
extension those aspects regarding its mobility that may bear useful insights into 
understanding the particular character of the success of this case of knowing. This 
chapter begins this task with an examination of the ‘content’ of handbooks, where I 
report on the results of content analysis into their particular renderings of the ‘user’ 
and the manner in which this content is linked to architectural matters. This provides 
the basis for analysis where I situate this knowing assemblage, and its manner of 
composition, within the complex of practices in which architectural labour transpires, 
and posit that particular distributions of competencies and delegations of labour 
amongst the elements in this composition provide the ground for its ‘mobile’ 
character and, in tandem, shape the character of the knowing accomplished. 
 
4.1 HANDBOOK CONTENT 
In the knowing assemblages within which books figure, the ‘content’ of these 
artefacts is of obvious importance. Whether named ‘discursive material’, 
‘representations’, ‘semiotic content’, ‘inscriptions’, or otherwise, the stuff ‘in’ books 
(and that they do this ‘containing’) is clearly a salient component of the action they 
are orchestrated within. The first half of this chapter addresses this content of the two 
primary texts analysed, the current English editions of Architects’ Data (Neufert & 
Neufert 2012) and Architectural Graphic Standards (American Institute of Architects 
2016), in as much as it relates to the object of interest, the user. I report on an 
examination of the representation or construal of this object made by these texts. 
Given this, it is important to emphasise that such an effort (alone) does not amount to 
                                                
object of knowledge, i.e. in terms of a knowing ‘of’ (this being, thus, a matter of ascription but, 
also, a matter of analytical focus). But also of significance is that knowing can be pictured as 
itself composed of other knowing, a kind of nested picture (e.g. knowing how to draft an email 
may be composed of my knowing how to operate a keyboard, navigate emailing software, 
knowing how to write generally, and the spelling and grammar check software on my 
computer), and we might thus think of the later as those more elemental and less 
problematically ‘unitary’ instances of knowing or know-how. Explicating these ideas in their 
entirety here is, however, not tenable. Though, hopefully, their indication clarifies any 
apparent contradictions identified and provides stable enough ground for the account offered. 
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a description of the ‘knowing the user’ these artefacts take part in. Knowledge neither 
simply is nor is it located within the inscriptions found in books. However, their 
significance within the particular assemblage in which books figure, and within which 
knowing is constituted, warrants close attention and provides a useful starting point 
for examining this broader knowing assemblage.  
After quickly thumbing through Architects’ Data and AGS, the impression of 
the representation of the user one might likely receive would be that in which, at the 
fore, is this object’s spatial extension and dimensionality, its position as a Cartesian 
body in space and location relative to other similarly extended and dimensioned 
bodies, and involvement in movements and activities that are likewise spatially 
extended and dimensioned. This is of particular significance given that, on some 
reports, (e.g. Anderson 2002; Buse et al. 2017; Frascari 1987; Imrie 2003) it is this 
rendering of the user that might very well be expected to be predominant given any 
familiarity with architects and architecture. The first task in the analysis I undertook of 
Architects’ Data and AGS was, then, to go beyond such initial impressions and 
enquire into their construal of the user in a more systematic manner, there-by 
ascertaining a more complete and accurate impression of this representation.  
 
4.2 CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODS 
Architects’ Data and AGS are both hefty tomes; Architects’ Data runs to five 
hundred and ninety three pages in its current (fourth) English edition, and the current 
(twelfth) edition of AGS totals one thousand and sixty two. Not only are they large, 
they are also diverse in content; standard brick bonds, the height of church altars, the 
rearing of pigs, the width of beds, the diameter of urns, the turning circle of 
aeroplanes, typical variants in conservatory design, the transportation capacity of 
elevators, standard construction details for basement walls, conventional concrete 
formwork practice, and under-floor air-conditioning ducts are all found in their pages. 
If one’s interest is in a single object the immediate task is, thus, to extract the content 
that pertains to this object in particular. 
This first task, identifying all the occurrences or invocations of the user within 
Architects’ Data and AGS, necessitated defining the bounds of such an ‘occurrence’ 
so that these might be identified, recorded and further analysed. For this purpose, the 
‘natural’ units of the texts were employed: the short paragraphs, dot points, or similar 
divisions of text above sentence level. What made a unit an instance of an 
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occurrence of the user was defined, firstly, as that within which an identified group of 
terms occurred (including ‘user’, but also ‘people’, ‘human’, ‘inhabitant’, or other 
recognised synonyms both general, e.g. ‘occupant’, and particular, e.g. ‘nurses’). 
These recognised synonyms are unified by (and new, more specific, synonyms 
encountered in the text were brought under this categorisation by) a common family 
of characteristics which it is sensible to attribute to them, but which it would not be 
sensible to attribute to other entities that may 'use' or 'occupy' (etc.) spaces or 
buildings, such as institutions or organisations (e.g. tall, walked, mortal, average 
resting heart rate). Also recorded were more 'implicit’ occurrences. That is, content 
on matters of the user but where recognised terms (‘user’, ‘people’, etc.) are not 
present in the segment of text. The determination of such an 'implicit' occurrence was 
based on: 1) the structure of the text, that is, where the organisation of material 
renders it to be of the user (e.g. sections on "Building Biology" that begin with a 
definition of this in the terms of the "human" in a manner that renders the material 
within the section as representations of the user despite, perhaps, being absent of 
user designations in particular instances); 2) previous salient definitions made earlier 
in the text (e.g. later assertions regarding "movement areas" that were earlier 
explicitly defined in terms of the user); 3) attributes and actions (see below) that were 
previously ascribed to the user and are reasonably assumed to be attributes and 
actions of this object, rather than some other entity (e.g. "walking/walking distance", 
"emotional response", “social interaction”, "sight/vision"). 
These analytical moves, bringing together a number of terms as denoting a 
common object and of identifying ‘implicit’ occurrences of these, were performed with 
the full awareness that this was, in fact, that same activity of association that was 
being investigated, the composition of this object of knowledge, the user, in 
architecture (as outlined in §3.1).  Consequently, so as to assure these were not 
solely moves of the analyst, care was taken to ensure that any associations that were 
taken up were those that were made, at least once, within the text itself, and not 
purely an artefact of the analysis. 
In this way, the entirety of the text of both handbooks was coded for ‘user-
related’ content. Additionally, tabulated text presented as separate figures within the 
body of both handbooks was coded in the same manner. As a result of this process 
of extracting user-related linguistic content, 421 occurrences were identified in 
Architects’ Data and 591 in AGS. Table 1 below provides some examples. 
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Revolving doors are made in several different designs. Some are 
adjustable, e.g. when the number of users is large, particularly in the 
summer, the panels can be folded into the middle to allow people to go in 
on one side and out on the other simultaneously. (Neufert & Neufert 2012, 
p.115) 
A human being requires the most space at handrail height, and 
considerably less at foot height. The stair width here can be made 
narrower in favour of a larger stairwell. (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.122)  Architects’ 
Data 
High cupboards and shelves should be suitably positioned relative to the 
working areas and should be comfortable to reach. Worktops placed at the 
correct height for the relevant activity can make kitchen work considerably 
easier. (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.154) [this instance illustrates an ‘implicit’ 
occurrence, where-in ‘reach’ and ‘comfortable’ are sufficiently linked with 
otherwise explicit occurrences of the user to justify this text being 
recorded] 
Passenger elevators: Used to convey people from floor to floor. Elevator 
cars are available in standard and custom designs. (American Institute of 
Architects 2016, p.650) 
Closers with delayed-action features give a person more time to maneuver 
through doorways. They are particularly useful on frequently used interior 
doors such as entrances to toilet rooms. The ADAAG requires a closing 
speed of at least three seconds; ANSI requires five seconds. (American 
Institute of Architects 2016, p.587) 
Architectural 
Graphic 
Standards 
In a typical roofing assembly, the waterproof membrane (built-up, modified 
bitumen, or single-ply) is applied over the insulation, which is on top of the 
substrate and/or structural deck. The membrane in this situation is 
exposed to temperature extremes, as well as wear and tear from people 
walking or working on the roof. (American Institute of Architects 2016, 
p.492) 
Table 1: Example 'user occurrences' in Architects’ Data and AGS 
 
This material provided the basis for further coding to examine the character of 
these representations of the user. This task was broken up into recording material to 
two categories. Firstly, the ‘action’ in which the user was embroiled by the text, 
including both that for which the user was the agent and as the patient/target, and, 
secondly, the ‘attributes’ otherwise ascribed to it. Recorded under the category of 
‘action’ were the verbal groups in which the user was involved, but also any 
nominalised or adjectivised action in which the user was implicated. The category of 
‘attributes’ covered the remainder of characteristics ascribed to the user in an 
occurrence. This schema was intentionally broad and simple, to simplify this process 
of analysis and avoid becoming tangled in metaphysical questions entailed in coding 
material to a more numerous and nuanced set of categories (for example, Hallidayan 
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‘process types’; see Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). In practice, this simplicity 
presented no issues for analysing and recording material. Thus, the first segment in 
Table 1 above would result in the recorded attribute of “large number” and recorded 
actions of “go in” and “go out” (where the user is agent) and “allow” (where they are 
patient). In the case of Architects’ Data 538 attributes, 584 actions where the user 
was agent, and 151 where the user was patient were recorded, with 605, 1040, and 
194 recorded for each in AGS.  
 
4.3 A ‘SPATIAL’ USER 
With this corpus of attributes and action gathered, a firmer ground for 
ascertaining a more complete and accurate account of the construal of the user 
offered by Architects’ Data and Architectural Graphic Standards was available. 
Immediately evident was that the representation of the user within this linguistic 
material is certainly more complex and diverse than a simple reduction to, or 
overwhelming predominance of, the aforementioned ‘spatial’ object that one might 
initially expect. Present in both texts are a host of attributes and actions that suggest 
diverse aspects of those people that dwell within buildings. For example, their 
emotional and cognitive dimension (attributes like “feeling of safety” or “impulses”, 
approximately 5.4% of attributes collected from Architects’ Data and 6.9% from AGS, 
and action like “recognition” or “concentration”, approximately 7% of action collected 
from Architects’ Data and 5.7% from AGS), sensory dimension (attributes like “field of 
vision”, approximately 2% of attributes collected from Architects’ Data and 8.8% from 
AGS, and action like “hear” or “see”, approximately 10.1% of action collected from 
Architects’ Data and 10.0% from AGS), and social interaction (attributes like 
“responsible for care” or “mostly independent of outside help”, approximately 2.6% of 
attributes collected from Architects’ Data and 1.8% from AGS, and action like “taking 
meals together” or “conversation”, approximately 10.3% of action collected from 
Architects’ Data and 5.0% from AGS).2   
It is hard to conceive of any object more familiar and of which representations 
are more frequently encountered than human beings. That, thus, the representations 
aggregated within texts as sizeable and diverse as contemporary architectural 
                                                
2 These illustrative categories, and the attributes and actions counted under them, are not 
intended to be mutually exclusive (though they are, in the results, primarily so).  
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handbooks extend beyond those ‘spatial’ aspects (that might otherwise be 
prominent) should not be too surprising. One might be hard pressed to accuse their 
rendering of the user to be absolutely reductionist or impoverished, as one might 
expect to be a possibility given occasional accounts or indications of architect’s 
conceptions of human beings. Nevertheless, there does remain an apparent skew 
towards those ‘spatial’ aspects of the user in the corpus of attributes and actions. 
In determining the weighting of this corpus of attributes and actions towards 
the user’s ‘spatial’ aspects, four categories were employed for counting items. These 
categories were ‘movement’ (example attributes and actions including “turn”, “cross”, 
or “circulating”), ‘spatial position or location’ (e.g. “in front of the enclosure”, “distance 
from neighbour”, or “arrangements”), ‘bodily dimensions’ (e.g. “131cm”, “average 
height”, or “stride length”), and ‘bodily posture’ (e.g. “reach”, “seated”, or “taking off 
and putting on coats”). Subsuming attributes and actions under these categories was 
not determined solely by reference to the word groups or phrases themselves but in 
also referring back to their context in the text, in order to confirm their meaning.3  
The counts recorded for each of these categories is given in Table 2 below. 
As an approximate percentage of the total attributes, actions (user as agent), and 
actions (user as patient) recorded those of this ‘spatial’ character were, for Architects’ 
Data, 22.3%, 23.9%, and 16.6% respectively (or 22.4% of both categories of action 
combined), and, for AGS, 14.7%, 33.9%, and 12.9% respectively (or 30.6% of both 
categories of action combined). 
Asserting an apparently ‘skewed’ character of a representation is, of course, 
fairly meaningless without some other comparative material (Krippendorff 2004, 
p.202). Ascertaining an otherwise ‘true/r’, ‘more correct’, or ‘more 
comprehensive/more representative’ representation, or a representation more 
congruent with how things ‘really’ are, in order to demonstrate the character of 
another, is, of course, problematic. As, likewise, is attempting to pin down a ‘norm’ 
that one might employ as a standard for comparison (Fairclough 2003, p.143), 
                                                
3 A smaller number of attributes and actions were also subsumed under these categorisations 
that were not as evidently or explicitly (based solely on the recorded word group or phrase) 
‘spatial’ but which, based on the context of their use, were otherwise implicitly so. An example 
case being the action “carrying loads” which may not obviously fall under the categories of 
‘movement’, ‘spatial location or position’, ‘bodily dimensions’, or ‘posture’ but which, given its 
context “With a 100 cm step width, people carrying loads have sufficient room for movement” 
(Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.126), is evidently a matter of it being significant in so far as it alters 
the bodily dimensions of the user. 
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especially in the case of representations of human beings on account of, again, the 
sheer number and diversity available. Rather, a more appropriate aim is to compare 
some particular representation with otherwise distinct representations (with no more 
of a claim to a more correct or representative status) to, at least, bring out the relative 
specificity of each.  
 
Architects’ Data Architectural Graphic Standards  
Attributes Action 
(agent) 
Action 
(patient) 
Attributes Action 
(agent)  
Action 
(patient) 
Movement 3 96 12 4 297 12 
Location/Position 19 5 9 20 11 9 
Bodily 
Dimensions 
94 11 3 64 12 3 
Bodily Posture 4 28 1 1 33 0 
Total 120 140 25 89 353 25 
Table 2: Frequency of 'spatial' attributes and actions indentified in ‘user 
occurrences’ in Architects’ Data and AGS 
 
Richard Neutra’s writing provides useful material for this task. Firstly, on 
account of his status as a practicing architect, like Neufert and Ramsey and Sleeper, 
active at roughly the same time as these authors. Further, for his similarly noted 
emphasis on knowing the user (in his case involving questionnaires, observation, and 
a brand of psychosomatic analysis) (Lavin 2004) and as a noted forerunner of 
contemporary branches of ‘human-oriented’ architecture (Robinson 2015). Finally, 
his book, Survival Through Design (Neutra 1969) was penned at a similar date 
(though, not a ‘handbook’). Employing the same methods as above, from a sample of 
five of the short essays in this book, 79 ‘user occurrences’ were compiled and 265 
attributes, 191 actions (agent), and 88 actions (patient), were identified, of which 
approximately 2.6%, 6.2%, and 2.3%, respectively, were of a ‘spatial’ character. 
Though a small sample and simple comparison, this, at least, serves to give some 
indication of the particular character of the handbooks’ ‘user’. 
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 4.4 PICTURING THE ‘USER’ 
However, the user is not solely represented in Architects’ Data and AGS 
within linguistic content; it is additionally present in graphical material. Furthermore, 
the representation within this graphical content might justifiably be regarded as the 
more salient and significant, given its relative significance of linguistic content within 
handbooks. A simple comparison of the amount of space accorded to figures over 
blocks of text on the pages of the handbooks reflects this. More precisely, a sample 
of forty randomly selected pages from each text revealed 66% of space in Architects’ 
Data, and 70% in AGS to be given over to figures. Extensive sequences of pages 
composed more-or-less solely of figures, with text serving principally to preface 
these, are a frequent within AGS. The text and figures within Architects’ Data are, 
generally, more integrated, but the relative significance of the graphical material is 
evident in a recurrent emboldened figure references (e.g. →❸) that continually shift 
the reader towards the graphics on the page. The writing is terse, elliptical where 
possible, and, indeed, as Gropius (1936) indicates in his review of the first edition, 
somewhat superfluous.4  
The prominence of this graphical material is especially significant, and more-
or-less expected, given its importance for architects. The architect’s disposition to 
disregard the linguistic content of texts in favour of graphics is longstanding and well-
acknowledged, and can be witnessed, since the advent of the printed image within 
books, in the tendency for the excision of text in favour of greater graphic material in 
publications, be they simple ‘books of orders’, elaborate folios, journals, or online 
magazines. A remark made in a 1878 issue of The American Architect and Building 
News, that only a “small minority… reads and inwardly digests the full text” of 
architectural publications and the remaining majority simply “derive their impressions 
of a book not from reading it, but from turning over the pages merely for the sake of 
the prints” (AABN 1878, p.199), could be mistaken to have come from innumerable 
moments in architectural history, including our own. One might fairly safely assume 
that Neufert was consciously aware of privileging graphical material and of the 
significance of this in the context of architectural practice; he notes of his work that 
“[de]scription is often reduced to the absolute minimum and supplemented or even 
                                                
4 “As the illustrations are self explanatory the book is useful even for those who don’t speak 
German” (Gropius 1936, p.174). 
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replaced with illustrations wherever feasible” (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.26). In the 
case of Ramsey and Sleeper, however, we can be sure of the fact that this figured in 
their authorship of AGS: 
[Architects] like to read drawings. Their trained eyes can see and 
comprehend a page of drawing much faster than they can a page of printed 
words, and from my experience, I know that they enjoy looking at drawings 
much more than they do reading. (Sleeper, cited in Johnston 2008, p.144) 
Consequently, determining how the user is rendered in this graphical material is 
pertinent. As in the case of the linguistic material analysed, the bounds of a single 
occurrence was determined by the natural division of numbered figures. Such 
occurrences are fairly evident in some cases, those that are most figural or figurative 
(in the artistic sense of the term), where the human figure is easily spotted (as in 
Figure 1 below). However, those in which the depiction of the user is relatively 
abstract are less obvious, but still discernable (as in Figure 2 below). Additionally, 
there are cases where the user is represented more ‘diagrammatically’, and in these 
instances is identified, more-or-less, solely by annotations (as in flow charts, bubble 
diagrams or similar). Occurrences under each of these categories of ‘figural’, 
‘abstract’, and ‘diagrammatic’ representation were identified and recorded, and 
resulted, from Architects’ Data, in 308, 13, and 11 instances respectively, 78, 4, and 
4 from AGS.5 
I then coded these occurrences according to six categories with a focus on 
the ‘spatial’ aspects of the user. These recorded instances where the user’s body 
was dimensioned, and, also, where the user’s activities were dimensioned. Figures 
were also coded as to whether the depiction entailed the illustration of the manner in 
which the dimensional or spatial realities of either the user’s body or their activities 
(two separate coding categories) determined the dimensioned characteristics of a 
building (see Figures 3 and 4) or, likewise, determined any other un-dimensioned 
characteristics of a building (these may be dimensional characteristics, such as the 
height of a window, but where specific dimensions are not given within the drawing, 
or they may be otherwise non-dimensional characteristics of a building, such as a 
particular material).  
                                                
5 As noted in §4.2 above, tabulated text also numbers in the range of figures provided in the 
handbooks. These occurrences were also identified and recorded but, as noted previously, 
treated along with the other linguistic material within the body of the text. 
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Figure 1: "Lounge Chairs, Tables, and Shelving Layout" from AGS (American 
Institute of Architects 2016, p.868). Reproduced with courtesy of Wiley. 
Copyright © 2016 by John Wiley and Sons, Inc.  
 
 
Figure 2: “Geometrical determination of the listener curve” from Architects’ 
Data (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.198). Reproduced with courtesy of Neufert-
Stiftung, Germany.  
 
 
	 49 
 
Figure 3: “Lavatories” from AGS (American Institute of Architects 2016, p.57). 
Reproduced with courtesy of Wiley. Copyright © 2016 by John Wiley and Sons, 
Inc. 
 
 
Figure 4: “Installation heights for loft windows” from Architects’ Data (Neufert 
& Neufert 2012, p.102). Reproduced with courtesy of Neufert-Stiftung, Germany. 
 
Table 3 below gives the recorded number of occurrences that were coded to 
each of the aforementioned six categories where the ‘spatial’ aspects of the user 
were manifest. The total number of occurrences for which any of these categories 
were recorded was 258 for Architects’ Data, making this 77.7% of the total 332 
recorded graphical occurrences of the user. The total number of occurrences for 
which any of these categories were recorded was 68 for Architectural Graphic 
Standards, making this 79.1% of the total 86 recorded graphical occurrences of the 
user. 
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 Architects’ Data Architectural Graphic 
Standards 
Dimensioned Body 64 28 
Dimensioned Activity 33 10 
Dimensioned Building 
Characteristic (from Body) 
157 31 
Dimensioned Building 
Characteristic (from Activity) 
61 13 
Undimensioned Building 
Characteristic (from Body) 
11 7 
Undimensioned Building 
Characteristic (from Activity) 
22 6 
Table 3: Frequency of ‘spatial’ aspects in graphical occurrences identified in 
Architects’ Data and AGS 
 
Of further significance is the foregrounding of the ‘spatial’ aspects of the user 
in those occurrences in which it is more-or-less solely the user that is depicted. Such 
occurrences, usually confined to the early sections of the book addressed specifically 
to the user, totalled 34 in Architects’ Data and 17 in AGS. Of those in Architects’ Data 
32, approximately 94.1%, of these featured either the body or activities of the user 
dimensioned, and 100% did so in AGS. Figures 5 and 6 are fairly typical of such 
occurrences. 
 
 
Figure 5: “Space required for various body postures” (“Kneeling”, “At the 
desk”, and “Stretching”) from Architects’ Data (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.29). 
Reproduced with courtesy of Neufert-Stiftung, Germany.    
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Figure 6: “Measure of man: front view” from AGS (American Institute of 
Architects 2016, p.14). Reproduced with courtesy of Wiley. Copyright © 2016 by 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 
 
 4.5 THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE ‘SPATIAL’ USER 
Beyond simple frequencies, there is, additionally, an evident hierarchy in the 
representations of the user within the handbooks, bound to the privileged positioning 
of certain semiotic content. Those early sections of the handbooks that specifically 
introduce and address the user place a spatial rendering of this object at the fore, 
both in the ordering and quantity of material. In Architect’s Data (2012, pp.26–29), a 
half-page depiction of a man (see Figure 7), limbs outstretched and proportioned, 
followed by a sequence of two full pages solely of figures on “Body Measurements 
and Space Requirements”, accompany an opening section on “Man as Measure and 
Purpose”. The case is much the same in AGS (American Institute of Architects 2016, 
pp.4–18), where a section specifically introducing “Human Factors” is dominated on 
all fourteen pages by the recurring graphic of dimensioned figures of various ages, 
then of a variety of statistic percentiles of adults, while the first subsection of text 
addresses “Anthropometrics and Ergonomics”. The apparent primacy, priority, and 
self-evidence of the ‘spatial’ rendering of the user also manifests in occasional 
passages of the sort that make the point that “[t]he human being, however, is not just 
a living creature that needs space. The emotional response is no less important” 
	 52 
(Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.26). The structure of such assertions positions the ‘spatial’ 
reality of the user as a given, and not necessary to be actively asserted relative to 
other characteristics. 
 
 
Figure 6: Untitled image from Architects’ Data (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.27). 
Reproduced with courtesy of Neufert-Stiftung, Germany. 
 
4.6 CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODS  
However, this study is not simply concerned with such representations in 
themselves, it is concerned with the knowing of which they are a part. To continue 
this task of apprehending the composition of this knowing assemblage, attention 
must be turned to action, specifically the action that this semiotic content is 
orchestrated within in architectural labour. Persisting with this primary examination of 
user-related ‘content’, and given an orientation to the knowing action transpiring in 
practice, one feature of occurrences of the user identified within Architects’ Data and 
AGS is especially notable. The following extract provides a useful illustration:  
	 53 
Emergency exits 1.0 m wide per 150 people using them. (Neufert & Neufert 
2012, p.175)  
The aspect of interest here is that the invocation of the user is bound to a 
prescription, specifically, a prescription related, expectedly, to matters of architecture 
and building. In other words, and more broadly, user-related content is not present 
within the handbook simply as ‘bare fact’, ‘information’, or ‘data’ solely on the user, 
but is additionally discursively bound to matters of architecture and building. This is of 
particular interest relative to a concern with the action these texts are embroiled in, in 
that it implicates the content on the user in a particular regime of action: that which 
would precipitate the prescribed architectural reality - the width of an emergency exit. 
Of interest, then, are the types of architectural and building matters that, within the 
handbooks, are bound to or associated with matters of the user. This directed the 
second round of content analysis undertaken. 
Using the same ‘user occurrences’, I first established a set of three broad 
categories of ‘linkages’. Firstly, those in which no explicit linkage was made between 
the user and architectural or building matters were recorded (labelled ‘Type 1’),6 
these were the most infrequent (33 in Architects’ Data, and 12 in AGS). Secondly, 
those occurrences where the user was bound to specific matters of architecture and 
building (labelled ‘Type 3’), such as the dimensions of a hallway, the number of WCs, 
or the particular ambience of a room. These were the most numerous instances, 
numbering 629 in Architects’ Data and 941 in AGS. Finally, I established an 
intermediate category of linkages for those which bound the user to matters of 
architecture in more general terms (‘Type 2’), including where the user figured 
(prominently or in part) in definitions made of particular building types or components, 
as conditions or aims to be met, considerations or factors to be included in design, or 
criteria by which architectural realities might be judged. This intermediate category 
recorded 137 instances in the case of Architects’ Data, and 260 in AGS.  
 
 
                                                
6 Though, to say the text makes no linkage at all would be incorrect, as its presence within the 
text itself discursively binds it to matters of architecture. 
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 Architects’ 
Data 
Architectural 
Graphic 
Standards 
Specific Length, Width, or Height 183 157 
Specific Area 37 2 
Specific Volume 1 0 
Specific Number 3 0 
Unspecific Length, Width or Height 24 64 
Unspecific Area 12 11 
Unspecific Volume 0 0 
Rates of Length, Width, or Height 8 0 
Rates of Area 27 0 
Rates of Volume 5 1 
Rates of Number 40 17 
Rates of Mechanical Operation 9 2 
Type of Room or Space 55 40 
Object, Element, Fitting, or Similar 84(65) 149(126) 
Quality of Object, Element, Fitting, Room, or 
Space 35 176 
Multi-Element System 11 34 
Material or Construction Method 13 65 
Spatial Arrangement 39 116 
Consult or Adhere to Other Standards or 
Documents 18 95 
Consult Additional Professionals 1 4 
Consult Additional Stakeholders 2 1 
Typical, Exemplar, or Case Study Design 22 7 
Table 4: Frequencies of identified categories of ‘linkages’ between the user and 
matters of architecture and building in Architects’ Data and AGS 
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It is this strongest category of linkages (‘Type 3’) that are of most interest, 
given the action they implicate. Such linkages can be regarded as essentially 
prescriptive, though the manner this prescribing is wrought discursively varies, 
including, for example, more direct imperatives or less direct prescriptions via 
appraisals of certain architectural realities over others. Thus, I established a set of 
categories, emergent from the linkages compiled, to determine the range of types of 
matters of architecture that were bound to or prescribed on the basis of matters of 
the user. These categories are listed and their frequencies tabulated in Table 4. 
 
4.7 ‘DRAWING CONGRUENT’ LINKAGES 
During coding, and on determining (and reflected in7) the final set of 
categories of ‘linkages’ and their frequency, the overarching characteristic of interest 
that became evident, in the context of elucidating the knowing assemblage in which 
they figure, is what will be called the ‘congruence’ of these linkages (that is, of the 
matters of architecture and building they specify) with architectural drawing. That is, 
the linking of matters of the user to particular matters of architecture and building 
that, by virtue of the nature of architectural drawing practices and conventions (forms 
of two-dimensional orthographic projection, including plans, sections, and elevations, 
principles of scale, line drawing, symbolic conventions, and the techniques and tools, 
such as paper, pencils, pens, rules, computers screens, keyboards, and mice, used 
to achieve these), are simply, clearly, or ‘self-evidently’ translated into lines on a 
page (or computer screen). The means at hand in the production of architectural 
drawings are such that the assertion that, for example, the user necessitates that 
“[e]ntrance recesses should be at least 1.25 m (better 1.50 m) wide and approx. 1.00 
m deep, so that two people can wait comfortably and protected in front of the door” 
(Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.146) bears more-or-less obviously on the act of drawing 
(e.g. making a line of a certain length, employing a scale rule, or applying 
dimensioned lines to a figure) and of confirming a drawing’s accordance with such a 
prescription. In contrast, asserting that the user necessitates, say, ‘a homely 
atmosphere’ leaves, comparatively, a fairly evident ‘gap’ in terms of exactly how this 
                                                
7 For instance, “Quality of Object, Element, Fitting, Room or Space” is the catchall for linkages 
that were of qualities not directly congruent with drawing (i.e. not those otherwise highlighted 
as such – “Specific Length, Width, or Height”, etc.) that might be further categorized if the 
focus was otherwise. 
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might bear on the marking of a sheet of paper or perhaps plotting a line on a 
computer.  
It is important to note that any translation of discursive material into some 
other form of non-discursive action is not without requisite know-how, and this is the 
case also for the aforementioned ‘drawing congruent’ material. The use of the term 
‘self-evident’ to describe these is not to indicate the absence of this effort or 
competency of translation but that it (always relatively) needn’t require (or require 
much) reflection to achieve. This also implies a ‘self-evidence’ for someone (i.e. with 
a particular set of competencies), in this case, architects, and this will be elaborated 
in the discussion to follow. 
This frame of ‘drawing congruence’ (specifically, architectural drawing) 
provides for specific interpretations of each of the matters of architecture and building 
to which the user is bound within the handbooks. My suggestion is not that such 
linkages are either congruent or not with drawing, rather that they are as such in 
different ways and to different extents or to more or less ‘directness’. In Table 4 
above, the most congruent linkages are emphasised in either bold or italics. Firstly, 
there are those most strongly ‘drawing congruent’. “Specific Length, Width, or 
Heights” or “Rates of Length, Width, or Height”, for instance, clearly bears simple 
translation into architectural drawing, given the core act of making lines of a given 
measured dimension (with various artefacts for this specific task, such as scale rules) 
or annotated dimension, the principles of two-dimensional projection and scaling 
(affording that depicted elements, in the act of drawing, are dimensioned by virtue of 
being place on the two-dimensional plane of the drawing), and graphic conventions 
for the annotation of dimensions of depicted elements. This is similarly the case with 
“Specific Area”, “Specific Volume”, “Rates of Area”, and “Rates of Volume” (given, 
perhaps, some simple calculations). Relative to these are those categories of 
“Unspecific Length, Width, or Height” and “Unspecific Area” which, though not as 
‘immediately’ translatable into drawing, retain the same logic and congruence as 
those which make linkages between the user and specific lengths, widths, heights, or 
areas of elements. “Spatial Arrangement”, likewise, falls within this same ‘logic’ of 
spatiality congruent with orthographic projection. Then, there is the category of 
“Material or Construction Method”, deemed ‘drawing congruent’ on the basis of the 
comprehensive corpus of symbolic conventions within architectural drawing for the 
specific purpose for indicating materials or methods of construction.  
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“Object, Element, Fitting, or Similar” was also noted for its ‘drawing 
congruence’ on the basis that it is more often than not that such linkages were 
accompanied by a drawing (either linked via in-text references, proximity, or 
prominent earlier sections featuring numerous depictions of a particular object or 
element) dimensioned and depicted as per the conventions of architectural drawing. 
Additionally, the most generic types of such objects, elements, and fittings have, like 
materials, standard conventions for their depiction in architecturally drawing (which, 
furthermore, are provided comprehensively at the beginning of Architects’ Data). 
These instances, linked to drawings or generic elements for which there are 
established conventions, totalled 65 for Architects’ Data and 126 for AGS.  
Additionally noteworthy is that standards, and the other documents the reader 
is referred to from the handbooks, similarly typically make linkages in a ‘drawing 
congruent’ manner. Systematically surveying these documents was not within the 
scope of this research, however, and, thus, though a linkage worth noting (especially 
given the frequency in AGS), they were not classified as ‘drawing congruent’. 
This is not to say that the rest of the categories identified are ‘untranslatable’, 
‘undrawable’, or only problematically translated. Rather, that they are less 
immediately so. That is, the ‘gap’, crudely, the additional ‘steps’ required to reach the 
drawing is greater and thus, additionally, perhaps less certain in its outcome (that is, 
more dependent on the ‘translator’). 
These most ‘drawing congruent’ linkages, combined with instances of 
prescribed ‘Objects, Elements, Fittings, or Similar’ linked to drawings, numbered 454, 
approximately 72.2%, of the total 629 ‘Type 3’ linkages identified in Architects’ Data, 
and 542, approximately 57.6%, of the total of 941 ‘Type 3’ linkages identified in AGS.  
However, more importantly, the binding of the user to practices of drawing is 
not solely by virtue of the ‘drawing congruence’ of the linguistic material. As already 
emphasised, the handbooks are themselves eminently graphic. Indeed, given any 
familiarly with these texts, the frame of ‘drawing congruence’ immediately elicits the 
image of a figure simply being copied directly from page to paper, rather than the 
character of the linguistic material. The user is, thus, bound to practices of drawing 
simply by being linked to actual drawings, in the handbooks, ready to be appropriated 
and transposed, (as noted for ‘Object, Element, Fittings, or Similar’ linkages). 
Whether they be copied out (to varying extents of accuracy or fidelity) from the page 
of the book to the drawing board, or even traced over with a sheet of trace, they, as 
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Vossoughian (2015, p.681) identifies, “almost invite plagiarism”. The user is linked to 
this manifestly and intentionally ‘copy-able’ drawn matter by either references from 
within linguistic occurrences of the user (i.e. figure references, as outlined above) or 
by their graphic presence within the drawn material itself. With this frame, the 
apparently less frequent drawing congruence of the linkages of AGS can, instead, be 
seen as this material simply already having been translated into drawing itself. In the 
words of Ramsey and Sleeper themselves, “[t]o translate the facts most quickly for 
those accustomed to making and using drawings, we chose the graphic form of 
presentation” (Ramsey & Sleeper 1932, n.p.).  
 
4.8 THE ‘DRAWN’ USER 
Given the prominence of this ‘drawing congruence’ of the occurrences of the 
user within Architects’ Data and AGS, it is pertinent to return to the ‘spatial’ 
rendering, or foregrounding of the ‘spatial aspects’, of the user. In the context of the 
prior discussion, the ‘spatial’ character of this rendering could justifiably be labelled 
its ‘drawing congruent’ character. That is, the evident ease with which one translates 
these particular aspects (spatial extension and dimensionality, its position as a 
Cartesian body in space and location relative to other similarly extended and 
dimensioned bodies, and involvement in movements and activities that are likewise 
spatially extended and dimensioned) into prescriptions of matters of architecture that 
are of the aforementioned ‘drawing congruent’ character and, therefore, the 
congruence of this particular body of semiotic content with practices of drawing. This 
asserted ‘ease’ or ‘self-evidence’ of translatability is apparent in, for example, those 
figures in Architects’ Data (see, for example, Figure 5) where there is an uncertainty,8 
a slippage of sorts, as to whether what is depicted are the dimensions of people in 
various postures and undertaking various activities, or the prescribed dimensions of 
space required or recommended for accommodating such postures or activities (and, 
indeed, if there is a difference). To reiterate this slightly differently, this ‘spatial’ user 
is, simply, the ‘drawn’ user, specifically architecturally drawn. Their translation into 
‘drawing congruent’ prescriptions of architectural matters or acts or drawing is, thus, 
relatively simple; they are of the same ‘language’, the “language of the draughting 
room” (Ackerman 1932, n.p.). 
                                                
8 To clarify, this is not to suggest that it is irresolvable or un-decidable as to which is depicted, 
but simply that a contention would not be unjustified. 
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This is a suitable point to emphasise the affordances of the practices of 
architectural drawing both as a component of prescriptive projects but, also, of 
descriptive tasks. That is, practices otherwise employed to direct the erection of 
bricks and mortar need only minor modification (perhaps the addition of a instrument 
of measure and accompanying skills) to transform them to, for example, produce 
inscriptions of the Temple of Paestum. Architectural practice culminates in notably 
massive and immobile structures. Of importance, therefore, regarding the change 
and reproduction of this practice, is the corpus of objects into which these structures 
are inscribed and through which they travel. However, to frame both the preceding 
point on the ‘drawing congruent/spatial’ user as well as the discussion to follow, just 
as by the fact that drawings capture “only certain aspects of the physical world” and 
there-by “limit the types of object architects usually design” (Hill 2003, p.25; see also 
Latour & Yaneva 2008) so too does it limit (or, at least, shape) the kinds of objects 
known and knowing made. 
In this ‘drawing congruence’ of the occurrences of the user and their 
accompanying ‘spatial’ character are implicated two important aspects of 
architectural labour and the knowing assemblage wrought about the architectural 
handbook. Firstly, (as has, perhaps, already been implied) the significance and 
centrality of drawing practices within the totality of practices of architecture is 
evidently reflected in these texts. Secondly, closely related, the location of the use of 
the handbook within the spatio-temporal array of practices in architectural offices is 
also discernable. To continue elaborating the composition of this knowing 
assemblage, I turn to these two aspects in the next section. 
 
4.9 THE LOCUS OF DRAWING 
That Architects’ Data and AGS cast the user and its relation to architecture in 
terms that approach and revolve about the locus of drawing is, perhaps, not 
unexpected, given drawing is so “deeply intertwined” (Ivarsson 2010, p.172) in the 
nexus of practices that is architecture. Drawings and the production of drawings hold 
a central position within the site of the architectural office and the process of 
architectural labour. This is so for the contemporary configuration of architectural 
practice and in terms of the broader history of the modern iteration of the architect. 
At this point, it is important to make a brief aside to clarify the temporal scope 
of the account I offer. As the foregoing analysis makes clear, the focus here is the 
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current contemporary iterations of the handbook. Though, it is important to note that 
these are temporally extended and ongoing projects (both over eight decades) and, 
indeed, it is as such that they are understood in the account of the knowing 
assemblage presented (I would argue, necessarily so). However, this presents 
immediate issues given the premise that to construct this account is to analyse the 
composition of this knowing assemblage in the context of the complex of practices 
that is architecture. That is, this complex of practices is no static entity. As anyone 
familiar with architecture will recognise in the follow material, drawing is no longer 
limited to paper and drawing boards. Architects are now just as likely to copy-paste 
CAD details than to draw them. Though it may appear at times in the descriptions of 
practice to follow that I ‘flatten’ the historicity and variations in drawing practices, this 
is far from my intention and, hopefully, not the result. Rather, my intention is to point 
to those persistent general aspects and note that, though drawing practices have 
varied over the history of this knowing assemblage, it is these persistent aspects that 
are drawn into the account offered. 
Firstly, the architectural drawing is that in which and towards which 
architectural labour coalesces, primarily. The work of the architect can be seen as, in 
large part, an effort of bringing together (and, in part, defining), ‘juggling’ (Latour & 
Yaneva 2008, p.84), the diverse ‘factors’, ‘concerns’, or otherwise framed agencies 
that bear on the project into some kind of resolution, employing transformations into a 
variety of mediums and finally concretised in the architectural drawing. Iedema's 
(2001) description of ‘resemiotization’, where outcomes of negotiations are rendered 
into increasingly obdurate and less-contestable forms culminating in the drawing and, 
thereafter, the physical building itself, evidences this. Likewise, Oak's (2009) 
describes architects’ persistent attempts to cast conversations and attempted 
resolutions met with clients in terms congruent with drawing or in acts of drawing 
themselves. Drawing/s provide a locus around which interactions (between architect 
and client, architect and consultants, or amongst office member) are articulated, and 
a vehicle with which their results are concretised, mediated, and carried on from 
meeting tables (Cuff 1992a, pp.185–188; Ewenstein & Whyte 2007, 2009). 
Furthermore, exchanges between members of an architectural office are mediated 
via various modes of drawings. Sketches or ‘diagrams’ (Brown et al. 2010) are 
disseminated from up the hierarchy and direct the genesis  and development of 
designs (and demarcate, maintain, and mediate the status of seniors). These 
undergo attempts at transformation, developed and redrawn by other practitioners 
into ‘harder-line’ mediums (whether involving harder pencils, pens, rules, and lines 
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with definite measurements, or the unavoidable definiteness and precision of the 
CAD interface and print-out) (Ewenstein & Whyte 2007, pp.702–703; Kornberger, 
Kreiner & Clegg 2011, p.145) to be returned to their source, only to be sent back 
overlaid with and accompanied by additional sketches and annotations, in a cyclical 
process of ‘mark-ups’ transactions and recurrent transformation in mediums across 
paper, rolls of trace, computer screens, and print-outs (Ewenstein & Whyte 2009, 
pp.24–25) where-in this emerging collection of artefacts, the ‘design’, is progressive 
ossified and stabilised. Finally, the stages of labour within a project are clearly 
punctuated and demarcated by the issuing of collections of specific types of drawings 
to certain recipients, including clients, consultants, planning and development 
authorities, and builders. 
Secondly, the drawing is especially significant as that with which architectural 
labour is primarily mediated beyond the walls of the architectural office. Simply put, 
architects are not on site pouring concrete and hoisting rafters; if they act on the 
production of built artefacts it is predominantly via the mediation of drawing. The 
system of conventions and ‘precision’ of these artefacts (along with the competencies 
of those on the building site) provides for the architect’s absence; they needn’t be (at 
all times) on-site and directing work or providing interpretations of these inscriptions. 
Though, these are not the sole means of mediation, specifications (terse written 
documents that accompany drawings) also leave the office, and architects also make 
calls, emails, and visits to sites as negotiations continue. However, these, again, 
notably centre on and reference drawings. 
Finally, efforts to define the figure of the ‘architect’ wrought during the Italian 
renaissance were bound to the production of drawings and its capacity to set the 
architect of from the labour occurring on the building site, allowing them to act at a 
distance, and defining them and their ‘intellectual’ activities as distinct (Forty 2004b, 
p.30). Indeed, to some builders of the early 19th century, it was merely the ability to 
draw that “set [the architect] apart from his humbler colleagues” (Upton 1984, p.118) 
and on this basis that some, such as Samuel McIntire and Asher Benjamin (Reiff 
2000), who could raise their skill in drawing could retire from the building site to the 
title of ‘architect’. Similarly, the first step that a craftsman aspiring to architecture 
could take in the early twentieth century was indoctrination into the practice of 
drawing, perhaps via tuition in a mechanics institute or vocational school, and there-
by secure an entry level position in an architectural office (Johnston 2005). The 
drawing’s demarcating status continues into the present (Brown et al. 2010, p.535), 
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though more frequently incorporating familiarity with CAD programs rather than skills 
with pen and rule. 
It is in this context that the ‘drawing congruent’ character of the architectural 
handbook, and its ‘content’ of the user, must be understood. A concern with the 
accomplishment of knowing the user within architectural practice renders this status 
of drawings and drawing practices of immediate significance, given that the 
predominance of such drawing practices (or, their position in the ‘chain’ of action in 
architectural projects) entails that knowing action, to be effectual ‘architecturally’, 
need to (most likely) be translated, by some means or other and at some point, into 
acts of drawing.  
At this point, it is pertinent to draw a distinction between there being ‘knowing 
of the user’ transpiring within an architectural office or an architectural project and 
there being ‘architectural knowing of the user’ (for want of a better phrase). The later 
being action that translates into built artefact, in which case, as indicated, translation 
into the terms and form of the drawing is a primary imperative. In this frame, there is 
a gulf between an utterance like “people don’t like not having their own space” being 
made at a meeting table and the movement of bricks and mortar. The connection 
between them is not a given or necessary in such a way that simply the occurrence 
of the former within the walls of an architectural office would justify claiming that the 
user is there-by ‘known’ in the course of or incorporated into architectural production 
any more than a market report playing on the radio near the drawing board can be 
said to. Simply being able to ‘talk-the-talk’ is not sufficient (Duguid 2005, p.113). 
Thus, actions, or material like ‘raw research data’, are only efficacious (relatively) 
within extant assemblages of architectural practice when accompanied by the 
capacity for them to be translated into drawing or if, otherwise, presented in the 
project already translated in a form “more relevant to designers” (Fawcett 1996, 
p.13), which is to say, in the language of drawing or in a form practitioners are more 
adept at translating. Thus, it is significant that matters of the user are already ‘within 
the handbook’ cast in terms of drawing.  
Given this, an important consideration is the specific place that the use of the 
handbook takes in this spatial-temporal array of practices that constitute architectural 
labour: predictably, it is embedded within practices of drawing. The following section 
will provide a picture of this position of the handbook. 
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4.10 BOOKS ‘AT-HAND’ IN DRAWING 
A characteristic of the handbook that is somewhat mundane, and obvious or 
even tautological given the definition proposed, is also an especially important 
feature of the knowing assemblage of which they are a part: these artefacts are 
situated within the flow of architectural practice itself in the spatial domain of 
architectural offices, ‘at-hand’, ready and available for the architect when they 
encounter their “daily problems” (Ramsey and Sleeper, cited in Johnston 2008, 
p.146). Architects’ Data and AGS are to be found, dog-eared and annotated, 
inhabiting desks, and open at drawing boards, as one of the elements manifestly 
embroiled in architectural labour. As  Johnson (2000, p.xv; see also Walker 1951, 
p.vii) attests, “[e]very architect loves it, wears it out, and keeps it within arm's length” 
(emphasis added). These handbooks positions are evident in titles considered for 
AGS, including “Thumbtack Data for Architects” (Ramsey and Sleeper, cited in 
Johnston 2008, p.146) - thumbtacks being used to fix drawings to drawing boards. To 
clarify the significance of this proposition it is useful to, first, turn to a comparison 
(albeit in broad brush strokes) of the ‘handbook’ with what might be called a 
‘typically-used’ book (remembering it is by use that the ‘handbook’ is defined). 
In so far as the composition of knowing is concerned, the operation of the 
‘typically-used’ book forms the ground for the image of texts as a kind of intermediary 
between 'knowing practitioners', and their typical interpretation as 'vessels' containing 
some knowledge ‘content’. Despite potentially bearing on architectural production, it 
figures in practices that are otherwise adjacent or removed from architectural labour. 
The scene is, rather, one of an undistracted, reflective reader, quiet with book in 
hand. Principally, they are part of practices focused on ‘practitioner production’: 
simply, learning practices. The core of such practices is the ‘communion’ of reader 
and text itself, not the production of architecture. The event that occurs is an 
apparent transfer of the material of the book, ‘re-inscribed’ into the form of the 
dispositions and competencies of the, now learned, reader. Thus, these artefacts, 
though physically absent from the performance of architectural labour nevertheless 
may come to bear on practice via the mediation of the learned, ‘knowledgeable’ 
practitioner. This is rather distinct from the operation of the handbook’s more-or-less 
‘direct’ bearing on architectural labour. 
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Rather than producing architects, the handbook is, instead, embroiled in 
producing architecture, alongside architects and the host of other actors. That is, the 
handbook is not used to (that is, necessarily9) produce ‘a practitioner that knows' that 
"three people next to each other require 1700mm", but to elicit the action of inscribing 
the graphical equivalent of “1700mm”. This divergence in the use of the handbook is 
immediately evident in how odd it would be to see Architects’ Data or AGS simply 
being read cover to cover (“Why are you reading that?” might be expected). Rather, a 
predictable scene of events would be one of seeking out the handbook (this, itself, 
punctuating and embedded within a longer stream of action), locating an appropriate 
portion of the text, before returning to the previous stream of action where-in an 
action prescribed is then performed.  
However, the handbook isn’t a part of simply any of the practices of producing 
architecture; specifically, they are embedded within producing drawings. Within 
architectural offices, they are to be found in the throws of action at the drawing board 
(or computer), embroiled in “the rush of getting out drawings” (early reviewer cited in 
Johnston 2008, p.179). When things are done and knowing transpires with the 
handbook it is primarily through acts of drawing.10 Most significantly, the operation of 
this knowing assemblage wrought about the handbook is to be identified, and 
distinguished from its absence, by virtue of the addition of an artefact to the corpus of 
elements already present at the drawing board - this being, obviously, the handbook 
itself. The reason this otherwise absent artefact being added to the host of characters 
at drawing boards (architects but also drawings, paper, pens, tee squares, scale 
rules, sketches, meeting notes, computers, keyboards, mice, software, emails, and 
more) is so important for the composition of this knowing assemblage is because, in 
this addition, the ‘work’ that takes place at drawing boards is consequently distributed 
                                                
9 The caveat ‘necessarily’ is required as it is certainly not inconceivable, or even unlikely, that 
an architectural practitioner may very well, after several times of having to look up, then a few 
of having to ‘double-check’, the required hallway width for two people passing one another, no 
longer require the employment of the handbook. That is, such is the frequency of the need to 
enact this, or some other, knowledge that they are able to enact this themselves, without the 
handbook. Indeed, this might be the case for numerous portions of content within the 
handbook. The important point, however, is that such a state of affairs is not necessitated by 
the operation of the handbook itself. 
10 This is not to say that one would not ever find Architects’ Data or AGS taking part in any 
other practice in an architectural office. For instance, it would not be odd for it to be employed 
during a meeting in the same way that Ewenstein & Whyte (2009, p.24) describe an engineer 
consulting a copy of Economic Concrete Frame Elements, “to get further information on 
requirements for beam depth, deflection, etc.”, in order to move the discussion in a meeting 
along. However, in this instance, it is worth noting the centrality that drawings maintain even 
within meetings and conversations. 
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amongst a different and greater number of elements in practice. This also entails a 
(re)definition of these elements, the relations amongst them, and the competencies 
they bring to orchestrations of knowing the user. 
 
4.11 THE ARCHITECT-AS-TRANSCRIBER 
As practices vary across space and time, the elements of which they are 
composed and the character of these elements shift and change, reconfiguring other 
elements and the total composition, the relations between them, and the manner in 
which action is distributed amongst them. The shifting location of competencies 
amongst entities, for instance, is neatly illustrated by Watson & Shove's (2008, 
pp.77–78) example of door painting. Where previously the practice of repainting a 
door required a fairly complex set of competencies from practitioners (removing the 
door from the frame, painting panels in the right sequence, and in the correct manner 
and time such that the coat was even), with the development of fast-drying non-drip 
water paints these competencies shift from the painter to the technology of the paint 
itself. 
Examining the elements of this knowing assemblage and the distribution of 
knowing action amongst them, the first point to note is that, for the most part, the 
elements of drawing practice remain more-or-less the same, compared to where the 
handbook is absent). That is, no new materials (apart, of course, from the handbook 
itself) are added to the practice, relatively speaking,11 and those that remain (paper, 
pens, scale rules, and so on) persist virtually unchanged. That which is significantly 
redefined is that all-too-salient element, ‘the architect’, and the contours of this 
definition are visible in the character of the handbook. 
In this reconfiguration of practice, and the knowing assemblage composed 
within, there is evidently ‘less’ required of the architect in ‘knowing the user’. In the 
language of actor-network theory, work has been ‘delegated’ to the handbook, and, 
as Latour (1994, p.229) suggests, “every time you want to know what a non-human 
does, simply imagine what other humans or other non- humans would have to do 
                                                
11 Compared to a redefinition of elements in drawing practice that centres around the addition 
of a much more dramatic novel element (though, in this case, not specifically related to 
knowing) such as, for instance, CAD software, entailing a host of other material elements, 
‘stuff’, including computers, keypads, mice, wiring, printers, technical support staff, and so on. 
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were this character not present”. In this delegation to the handbook, which now sits 
ready for use on the shelf or temporarily weighing down paper, the architect, most 
notably, no longer needs to be able to retain or recall the ‘content’ otherwise 
inscribed and residing in the handbook that they may knowingly act on the basis of. 
This capacity is, instead, replaced by the attunement of the handbook’s capacity to 
store this material with the architect’s capacity to locate it within the handbook and to 
identify opportunities in the flow of work when such content is required. Nor are 
architects required to have the ability to meet the imperative to translate this content 
into the form of acts of drawing because, as illustrated, the user is bound to matters 
of architecture in a form already translated into drawing, or in terms congruent with 
drawing, by the handbook. Instead, in the composition of this knowing assemblage 
wrought about the handbook, the capacities required of the architect are principally 
those concerned with the employment of the artefacts of drawing (whether of the pen 
and paper or mouse and computer screen type) and relocating drawings (whether 
appropriated with greater or lesser fidelity or originality, or copied more-or-less 
directly, perhaps simply with a sheet of trace or copy-pasting CAD details from digital 
editions) and drawing congruent prescriptions from the page to paper or screen. In 
sum, in this knowing assemblage, the architect is defined as, primarily, a faithful 
transcriber.  
In this ‘prescription’, the particular distribution of competencies (Akrich & 
Latour 1994; Latour 1994) wrought in the assemblage of the handbook, a significant 
portion of the ‘work’ of knowing is delegated to the handbook. Indeed, the belief that 
such a delegation was necessary, given that the “modern store of factual matter is 
too complex and extensive” (Ackerman 1932, p.v) for the lone capacities of the 
practitioner, grounded their justification. Consequently the agency of the architect-
and-book can be understood to displace the alternate agency that might otherwise 
figure as the ‘lone architect’, where comparable action of ‘knowing the user’ 
apparently emanates from (and knowledge ‘resides in’) an individual knowing 
subject. It may also, however, be seen to displace the extended knower that resides 
in the collective chatter of the drafting room or the ‘architect-researcher’ making quick 
excursions into the world (maybe with tape measure in hand) to collect ‘data’. 
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4.12 MOBILE ASSEMBLAGES 
It is now appropriate to reframe this in terms of the aspect with which this 
chapter was prefaced - mobility. To reiterate, the mobility of knowing assemblages is 
to be addressed in terms of the mobility of their constituent elements. Knowing (and 
practices), as situated performance, does not travel. Its dispersion across space and 
time and colonisation of domains of social life is via the movement of their 
components and the maintenance of their inter-linkages in the moments of recurrent 
performance (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012).  
The obvious starting point regarding the mobility of this knowing assemblage 
is its most salient element, the handbook, and the fairly mobile character of this 
artefact itself. It is, relatively speaking, quite compact (though, maybe not for a book), 
durable, stable, and (characteristic of printed matter) easily reproducible. This is, 
however, a simple, ‘logistical’ sense of mobility. The affordances of this artefact in 
being able to be transported over space (especially compared to, say, a person) are, 
of course, important. However, it is a more nuanced picture of mobility that is 
required, and this entails the conditions of reception of this artefact in potential sites 
of knowing. 
A valuable image of the movement of knowledge is one of ‘abstraction-
reversal’ (Shove, Pantzar & Watson 2012, p.48) or ‘codification-decoding’ (Duguid 
2005, p.113) where situated knowing is transformed into matter that circulates. The 
correlate to this is that such ‘abstracted’ knowing must, then, be ‘unpacked’ at its site 
of reception. This image and the connotations of its terminology, of knowing in an 
original state undergoing a process of transformation, movement, then another 
process of ‘reversal’ (requiring appropriate know-how related to this process at the 
site of reception) to return it to or reproduce an original state, may be deceptive and 
is, at least, incomplete. This is not to say that this does not happen but, in so far as 
‘mobility’ is concerned, it is not the only story.  
Take, for example, what one might think of as a paradigm case of 
codification, the recipe-book. Here, a cook’s know-how in, say, baking a cake, is 
translated into the form of relatively succinct discursive material, in an artefact that is 
reproducible and relatively mobile. This, however, is a case where the process is not 
merely one of ‘abstraction-reversal’ where an original mode of ‘knowing how to bake 
a cake' is reproduced identically in a different site. This is because one does not 
necessarily acquire a recipe-book to read it and learn it ‘by-heart’. Instead, it is just as 
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common (perhaps more common) that it sits dormant on a bookshelf until the 
occasion arises for baking a cake, when it is then brought into the practice of baking 
itself, and the baker-book perform in tandem.  
Though one might, perhaps over time and frequent use, be able to then carry 
out this performance without the recipe-book, it is characteristic of the recipe-book 
that one needn’t. In other words, this is not a process of reproducing knowing via a 
process of ‘abstraction-reversal’ but of constructing a novel mode of knowing entirely, 
of translating an original mode of knowing into a variant that involves a different set of 
elements, notably the guiding instructions of the recipe, the know-how on the part of 
the baker to read a recipe (not simply comprehension but also, for example, knowing 
to skim through the text first, and follow the steps in sequence), along with other 
capacities not codified in the recipe-book but which are assumed of the recipient 
(sifting flour, for example). The purpose of this short illustration is to emphasise that 
the movement of knowing that the handbook is part of is not of this ‘abstraction-
reversal’ type, but of the dispersion of requisite components. The question of 
‘reception’ is, then, not one of having the appropriate capacities to ‘reverse’ this 
artefact, the handbook, back into some other form of original knowing, but of 
ensuring the presence of the requisite components of the knowing assemblage with 
which it may compose knowing the user.  
Any knowing assemblage incorporating so-called ‘codified’ elements require 
those competencies that render them utilizable in action. Though codification can be 
remarkably powerful, giving “any competent users of a language access to 
knowledge codified in that language”, and especially mobile (logistically), those other 
elements, competencies, on which it relies for the composition of knowing are often 
relatively immobile, or ‘sticky’ (Duguid 2005, p.114). Hence, the significance of 
‘codified’ material that draws upon extant distributions of capacities, that is, where 
“practice precedes it” (p.113). Such is the significance of the ‘drawing congruent’ 
character of the handbook. The distribution of competencies involved in the 
performance of this knowing assemblage delegates work to the handbook and its 
affordances in such a way that the requisite competencies on the part of the 
architectural practitioner are, more-or-less, those native to and shared with the 
practice of drawing. This, in combination with the fact that drawing is a core practice 
to the architectural project and, thus, well distributed across the dispersed sites of 
architectural labour, means that the components for the composition of this knowing 
assemblage that complement the (‘logistically’ mobile) handbook itself, are well 
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dispersed and, consequently, this mode of knowing the user is rendered mobile and 
is successfully accomplished and reproduced in architectural practice. It is mobile 
relative to not only, say, some comparable mode of knowing where the handbook is 
absent and its ‘work’ delegated to the practitioner (where they are solely responsible 
for remembering, recalling, and translating this material into drawing), but also 
relative to an iteration of the handbook where the ‘content’ is not pre-translated into 
the space of drawing and this task is left to other additional (and perhaps not as well 
distributed) elements in the performance of knowing.  
 
4.15 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, I suggest that the knowing assemblage that is wrought about 
the handbook achieves a mobility grounded in specific distributions of competencies 
(particularly the delegation of labour to more logistically mobile artefacts – the 
handbook) in tandem with prescribed elements being predominantly native to core 
drawing practices (notably, the drawing competencies the ‘architect-as-transcriber’), 
thereby utilizing extant and well dispersed potential sites of knowing within 
architectural labour and reconfiguring and embedding within these rather than 
establishing new practices entirely. Consequently, the distribution of components 
required for the composition of this knowing assemblage is ensured and provides the 
ground for the spatio-temporal dispersion and reproduction of successful 
accomplishments of knowing the user. This is reflected in the character of this 
knowing, in so far as this embedding necessitates a congruence with the realities of 
the site of reception, drawing practices, and the elements found there (to be drawn 
on in the composition of knowing assemblages). In this case, this manifests as the 
‘spatial’ rendering of the user in the shift towards congruence with drawing. 
To clarify, my suggestion is not that architects, nor the authors of either of 
these texts,12 are a kind of graphical dope only capable of thinking in, translating, or 
appropriating a certain type of graphical content, contrary to the implications of 
                                                
12 Neufert, in fact, made investigations into somewhat less than drawing congruent qualities of 
users; his 1942 Der Mieter hat das Wort study surveyed ‘dwelling wishes’ of Berliners 
(Kuchenbuch 2016b, p.32). However, notably, the results were framed not primarily as a 
directive for architectural practice but, instead, what was to be influenced by it; the conclusion 
was that it revealed an “enormous educational challenge” (Kuchenbuch 2016b, p.32). 
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Banham's (1996, p.298) assertion that architects are “unable to think without 
drawing”. If one takes a cursory glance through architectural projects or writing, it is 
evident that the sources that architects draw from are diverse; architects are adept 
appropriators and translators. However, what is particularly significant about this 
graphically centred knowing is its mobility and stability beyond any particular centre 
(i.e. the appropriations alluded to are usually fairly idiosyncratic, local, and particular 
to certain projects and people).  
An expectable contention might be that the identified ‘spatial’ aspects of the 
user are simply the most ‘architectural’ aspects of this object, that not everything or 
every aspect of a thing is architecturally relevant, and these happen to be the most 
architecturally relevant aspects and, thus, are prevalent in these texts. My conjecture 
here is that, rather, this is to mistake a question for an answer. Instead, I propose 
that the reason for these being apparently ‘architectural’ characteristics requires 
explanation (that is, relevance is no inherent characteristic), and the explanation I 
offer is that they are bound to the contingent complex of practice through which 
architectural labour transpires, particularly (but not limited to) the centrality of drawing 
to this nexus and the realities of composing this particular knowing assemblage in 
which the handbook takes part. 
Suggesting that the realities of the practice complex of architectural labour 
bears on the shape of the ‘knowing the user’ orchestrated with the handbook 
immediately engenders the question of by what mechanism this occurs. This is 
clearly a matter of authorship, and the answer is bound to the position of the authors, 
Neufert (later the Neufert Foundation) and Ramsey and Sleeper (later the AIA), 
within this practice complex. This is to say that, as both experienced practitioners and 
educators in prominent educational institutions, they were themselves elements of 
this complex and, thus, bearers of the competencies and dispositions of their position 
defined as an element there-of. These embodiments of the practice complex there-by 
mediate this reality in the shaping of the handbook and, thus, manifests in the 
character of the semiotic content assembled on the user and the manner it is bound 
to matters of architecture and built form. 
Obviously, we can no longer visit the offices of these authors to paint a finer 
picture of how they wrote these texts. However, some material that recorded this 
process, indicates the manner in which, for instance, Ramsey and Sleeper filtered 
and translated existing documents into forms of a more distilled and graphic (drawing 
congruent) character (Johnston 2008, pp.160, 176). Of particular significance is that 
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these were texts that were ‘assembled’, in many cases resembling an act of 
bricolage rather than invention or creation. It is in this manner that, again, the extant 
architecture practice complex can be seen to bear on the shape of these artefacts. 
That is, these authors, in accumulating material on the user, did not have simply any 
infinite range select for inclusion but, rather, drew upon material (texts, inscriptions, 
etc.) that were embedded and circulated within the network of practice (by one 
means or another), with those most prominent and numerous being, predictably, 
those most generally congruent with this network. 
This is not to say that it was solely the realities of the status of drawing for 
which Neufert or Ramsey and Sleeper were the mediator in the authorship of their 
books, or, in other words, to position this as the sole determinate of the shape of 
these texts and of the user within them. For instance, the project of standardization is 
equally important, and those same ‘spatial’ aspects of the user, particularly their 
quantifiable character, are similarly significant in their accordance with 
standardization. However, the point here is to identify the place of drawing practices 
as one particular, and important, determinant regarding the mobility and success of 
this mode of knowing the user. 
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NOT-QUITE-ARCHITECTURAL KNOWING 
As yet, the account I have provided of this knowing assemblage, in which 
handbooks figure, has only dealt with its material elements (things, such as books, 
people, and paper) and competencies (noting their shifts and distribution). However, 
also wrought in this assemblage, and equally necessary for the accomplishment of 
knowing and its reproduction, is a host of meanings ascribed to the use of the 
handbook. This chapter focuses on a specific set of meanings, those that position the 
use of the handbook as of a ‘secondary’ kind of labour and, I posit, engenders its 
stability (unproblematic and uncontentious status) within broader structures of 
significance - a ‘schism’ of architectural labour demarcated by the agency of the 
architect. Furthermore, I propose that this broader schism itself provides for a more 
general stability of this knowing assemblage, averting an otherwise problematic 
status of this agency of the architect-and-book relative to projects of closure within 
the practice complex of architecture. To elucidate this, I turn to the longer history of 
the handbook genre and this knowing assemblage and its entanglement in the 
emergence of this schism. The previous chapter made a provisional bracketing of the 
history of this knowing assemblage in an effort to provide an overview of the manner 
of its composition. The current chapter instead seeks to draw out its historicity.  
The consideration of this longer history of ‘handbooks’ and the agency of 
architect-and-book will be provided in the second part of this chapter. It begins, 
however, with an examination of the results of discourse analysis that identify the 
characteristics of Architects’ Data and AGS (along with additional contemporary 
handbooks) that manifest the specific ascriptions of meaning that situate the 
handbooks within and reproduce the structures of significance in which architectural 
labour transpires. 
 
5.1 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS PROCESSES 
The germ for the frame employed in the examination of the historicity of the 
knowing assemblage wrought about the handbook emerged from an initial 
investigation I made to identify the kinds of meaning that were orchestrated in the 
accomplishment of knowing the user and knowing generally. This entailed, firstly, 
examining the kinds of meaning ascribed to the handbook and its use and, further, 
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broader construals of architectural labour and the figure of the architect. It was 
through this process that I identified the discursive reproduction of a particular reality 
of architectural labour as a potentially fruitful focus for examining how elements of 
meaning were vital to the accomplishment of knowing involving the handbook. 
When analysing the meaning and significance of the use of a particular 
discursive artefact there is a somewhat obvious place to start. Where-as other 
artefacts, say, a hammer, may, on their own, be relatively ‘mute’ on the topic of the 
significance of their use, discursive artefacts may be comparatively up front on the 
issue. They are (or can be) themselves a site for the discursive negotiation of their 
own significance. This is, indeed, the case for the handbooks analysed, and is where 
the discourse analysis I undertook began. 
This task necessitated a reorientation towards the handbooks in the form of 
analysis that might more appropriately be labelled discourse analysis. That is, to 
reframe the handbooks as text, in the specific sense of a discursive act, as an 
instance of ‘language-in-use’ (Fairclough 2003; Gee 2011). In this was entailed a 
refocus towards the particular linguistic means employed to construe the world and 
the world thus construed or constructed in and with this discursive act. This is stated 
relative to the textual analysis, described as ‘content analysis’, outlined in chapter 
four. Though, as Prior (2008) identifies, any strict division between these two modes 
of analysis becomes difficult in the thick of the reality of texts and analysis.13  
The mode of discourse analysis employed drew on the understanding of 
language (and resources for apprehending linguistic features) offered by Halliday’s 
Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014). Fairclough 
(2003) and Gee's (2011) directives on discourse analysis (underpinned by SFL) were 
the touchstone for the work undertaken. This orientation to text is noted for its 
congruity with understandings of sociality that emphasis the primacy of practices 
(Nicolini 2012, p.199). Though this chapter deals with the discursive content of the 
handbook and its history somewhat separately, the research process itself was, as 
Gee (2011) suggests, one of an oscillation between text and context. 
This task also entailed a focus on particular portions of these volumes. Along 
with handbooks being a site for the discursive negotiation of their own significance, 
                                                
13 This is especially the case given this ‘content’ being of interest, and specifically framed, in 
its embroilment in action. 
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analysis is further aided by the fact that such negotiations are concentrated in 
particular portions of these texts, those introductory and prefacing chapters and 
general front matter that serve this very purpose. Thus, the first task was to compile 
such sections for analysis.  
As Architects’ Data and AGS are long and ongoing publishing projects, their 
numerous editions provided scope for the analysis to extend to handbook-use-
construing sections of earlier editions. On the results of initial discourse analysis I 
also decided to extend the analysis to include further modern handbooks. Though, 
this additionally raised the question of exactly which other handbooks. Firstly, being 
‘exhaustive’ was not tenable, not for the number of texts but for the fuzziness of the 
boundaries of the genre. As previously outlined, this genre of texts is defined, in the 
context of this research, as those that are to be found ‘at-hand’ in the event of 
architectural labour itself. Most importantly, for the present discussion, is the 
‘fuzziness’ of this definition, given that it is grounded in the kind of use to which an 
artefact is put rather than the kind of content within it; one text may be ‘handbook’ to 
one user, or at one point in time, and not to another. Hence, an ‘exhaustive’ study 
would be problematic if not untenable.  
The texts included were, thus, a sample of what might be considered 
‘handbooks’. The criteria of selection were, roughly, three-fold. Firstly, a number were 
selected on the basis of comparable commercial success to Architects’ Data and 
AGS. These were those with similarly extensive publishing histories, numbers of 
editions, sales figures, and references within the world of architecture and 
architectural discourse (including emerging from established and popular architecture 
periodicals). Time-Saver Standards, The Metric Handbook, and Planning; the 
Architect’s Handbook were, for example, included on this basis. Secondly, the 
‘everyday-ness’ or range and applicability of content served as a criterion. That is, 
books which, in their espoused breadth and character of content, bear on 
architectural labour with a particular frequency, in contrast to, say, handbooks 
focused on ‘libraries’ or ‘timber construction’ which are, thus, employed on the 
occasion of certain projects or when certain materials are utilized. This criterion was 
established on the basis of a similarity to the primary texts, but also because this 
characteristic (potentially bearing on and embroiled in a extensive range of 
architectural labour) was relevant to the structures of significance and meanings 
identified as of particular interest (see §5.3). Finally, the simple pragmatic criterion of 
physical availability made for an effective means of delimiting a corpus of texts. 
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Availability in accessible libraries partially determined the titles and editions included 
in the discourse analysis undertaken. In total, 45 books were analysed.14 
 
5.2 THE DISCURSIVE REPRODUCTION OF A ‘SCHISM’ OF LABOUR 
Having compiled the sections from these handbooks, I distilled them further 
by extracting material that addressed the use of the handbook, the activity of 
architectural labour, or the figure of the architect. Within this material I examined 
common lexical families that were bound to the handbook and its use. Manifest in 
these segments of text where the significance of the handbook and its use is 
construed is a commonly recurring family of ascriptions. Though ‘necessary’, 
‘indispensible’, or ‘essential’, and ‘exhaustive’ or ‘comprehensive’ in its operation, 
providing a ‘full range’ of material applicable to ‘any project’ and ‘all building types 
and sizes’, it is also merely a ’first step’ or ‘approximation’, a ‘starting point’, or a 
‘foundation only’, and just the ‘elements’, ‘fundamentals’, ‘buildings blocks’, of a 
‘general’, ‘basic’, and ‘reduced’ character. Such characterisations of the handbooks 
and their use are consistent in the titles sampled.15 From this position, I identified a 
recurrent feature particularly relevant to understanding the accomplishment of 
knowing the user with handbooks: an underlying construal of architectural labour that 
provides the context in which these ascriptions bound to the handbook and its use 
                                                
14 The list of books included in the analysis were: Architect’s Data in its 4th (Neufert & Neufert 
2012), 3rd (Neufert & Neufert 2000), 2nd (Neufert 1980), and 1st (Neufert 1970) editions; 
Architectural Graphic Standards in its 12th (American Institute of Architects 2016), 11th 
(American Institute of Architects 2007), 10th (Hoke Jr. 2000), 9th (Hoke Jr. 1994), 8th (Hoke Jr. 
1988), 7th (Packard 1981), 5th (Ramsey & Sleeper 1956), 4th (Ramsey & Sleeper 1951), and 1st 
(Ramsey & Sleeper 1932) editions; Metric Handbook in its 5th (Buxton 2015), 3rd (Littlefield 
2008), 2nd (Adler 1999), 1st (Tutt & Adler 1979) editions, and its 3rd (Sliwa & Fairweather 1970) 
edition under its AJ Metric Handbook title; Time Saver Standards in its 7th (Watson, Crosbie & 
Callender 1997), 6th (Callender 1982), 5th (Callender 1974), 4th (Callender 1966), and 3rd 
(Architectural Record 1954) editions, and 4th (De Chiara & Crosbie 2001), 3rd (De Chiara & 
Callender 1990), 2nd (De Chiara & Callender 1980), and 1st (De Chiara & Callender 1973) 
editions of Time Saver Standards for Building Types; The Architect’s Guide (Rogers 1877) in 
its 1st edition; The Architects and Builders Handbook in its 18th (Kidder & Parker 1947), 17th 
(Kidder & Nolan 1921), 15th (Kidder 1908), and 14th (Kidder 1905) editions; Details of Building 
Construction in its 4th (Martin 1914), 3rd (Martin 1908), and 1st (Martin 1899) editions; Planning 
(Mills 1985) in its 10th edition; The Architect’s Portable Handbook in its 4th (Guthrie 2010) and 
3rd  (Guthrie 2003) editions; The Architect’s Studio Companion in its 5th (Allen & Iano 2012), 
4th (Allen & Iano 2007), and 3rd (Allen & Iano 2002) editions; Architect’s Pocket Book in its 5th 
(Hetreed, Ross & Baden-Powell 2017), 4th (Baden-Powell, Hetreed & Ross 2011), and 2nd 
(Baden-Powell 2001) editions; The Architects’ Handbook (Pickard 2002) in its 1st edition; and 
Materials, Structures, and Standards (McMorrough 2006) in its 1st edition. 
15 Reproduced, to varying extents, in all bar one of the handbooks (Architect’s Pocket Book). 
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make sense. The example extracts in Table 5 serve to illustrate the character of this 
material that is of interest. 
In contrast to this, it is better just to hand students the elements of 
architecture, as is done in this Architects' Data, where I have attempted to 
reduce the building blocks of design to the essentials, to schematise and even 
to abstract in order to make imitation difficult and force students to produce 
form and content from within themselves. (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.xiii)  
If, however, as is intended here, creative architects are given only the tools, 
then this compels independent thinking so that they weave all the 
components of the current commission into their own imaginative and unified 
construction. (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.26) 
Architects’ 
Data 
…the intention of saving the practising architect or designer the effort of these 
basic investigations, so that sufficient time and leisure can be devoted to the 
important creative aspects of the commission. (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.26) 
…a resource so complete in its technical data that it let our creativity run free. 
(American Institute of Architects 2016, p.xv) 
AGS 
To translate the facts most quickly for those accustomed to making and using 
drawings, we chose the graphic form of presentation, purposely devoid of all 
design in the decorative sense. (Ramsey & Sleeper 1932 n.p.) 
Architects’ 
and 
Builders’ 
Handbook 
In this revision the author has had in view: 1st. A reference-book which should 
contain some information on every subject (except design) likely to come 
before an architect… (Kidder & Parker 1947, p.xi) 
The 
Architects’ 
Handbook 
...concentrates more on the overall character of buildings, and not on 
excessive detail or too much technical information. Although we have 
deliberately avoided comment on the design qualities of buildings, the fact 
that a building is included indicates that we consider it makes a positive 
design contribution. (Pickard 2002, p.vi) 
Details of 
Building 
Construc-
tion 
In the matter of design the author wishes to put in a disclaimer. Nothing is 
further from his intention than an attempt to dictate in a question of design, but 
it has been necessary to use design in order to show construction. (Martin 
1914 n.p.) 
Metric 
Handbook 
Of course, the Metric Handbook does not seek to guide architects in terms of 
aesthetics and poetics; rather it seeks to provide them with the essentials 
from which to undertake a design. It is a foundation only. (Littlefield 2008 n.p.) 
Planning …it does not deal with the criteria for aescetic or architectural solutions to 
design problems (Mills 1985 n.p.) 
Time Saver 
Standards 
...the material presented is primarily offered to give basic or general data for a 
particular building type... There is absolutely no attempt to dictate or even 
suggest aesthetic or definitive design solutions to any building type. The 
architectural designer must have complete freedom to exercise his or her 
creative abilities. With the handbook's solid functional basis, this goal can be 
achieved more successfully. (De Chiara & Callender 1980, p.xv) 
Table 5: Extracts illustrating the discursive reproduction of the ‘schism’ of 
architectural labour in handbooks 
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This broad construal of architectural labour is what, in this thesis, I refer to as 
the ‘schism’ of architectural labour, where, simply, this activity is understood to be 
divisible, or generally of two kinds or portions. One, relative to the other, is 
preliminary, subsidiary, necessary though basic, facilitating but incomplete, and even 
potentially obstructing (though, to be ameliorated by the handbook). There is a clear 
hierarchical relation between a segment of activity that is auxiliary, supporting or 
serving, and generally lesser than an otherwise privileged and served, more 
important, more essential (in the sense of ‘of the essence of’), or simply more 
architectural. Importantly, within this schism of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ activities, 
the handbook and its use are firmly positioned as ‘secondary’. 
An especially important part of this schism is the specific demarcating 
criterion underlying this division. This demarcation is grounded in defining as 
‘primary’, most architectural, those activities in which the agency of the architect is 
most predominantly and manifestly exerted. These are those ‘creative’ or ‘expressive’ 
capacities and acts intertwined with ‘ideas’, ‘imagination’, ‘reasoning’ and other 
goings on ‘in the mind’ or generally ‘within’ the figure of the architect and manifesting 
in the core of ‘creative work’ or something called ‘design’, where often those most 
‘aesthetic’ and ‘poetic’ aspects of the project emerge. In this, the architect works as a 
‘free’ individual, ‘independent’, and in ‘their own way’, though ‘assisted’ and ‘provided’ 
for by the handbook so that they may ‘save time’ by availing themselves of the 
necessary evil of ‘secondary’ labour to be able to focus on the ‘primary’ activities in 
which their creativity is expressed. 
This schism is evident in the extracts provided above, though, notably, at no 
point in the texts is this division of architectural labour explicitly asserted; a 
proposition to the effect of “architectural labour has two portions; a more ‘essential’ 
and ‘architectural’ portion, and a necessary but otherwise ‘secondary’ or ‘auxiliary’ 
portion (of which this handbook is part)” is never made. This means of construal of 
this reality, as implicit behind other assertions, is of particular significance in so far as 
it confers an air of evidentially, given-ness, uncontentious-ness, and incontestability 
(Fairclough 1992, pp.120–121). 
Again, these are eminently graphic texts and, indeed, the construal of this 
schism is multimodal (Iedema 2003). Of particular interest is the variance in graphical 
mode employed in the construal of these two domains of activity. Given these 
handbooks are of, and primarily concerned with, this ‘secondary’ domain, they, 
expectedly, address this ‘primary’ activity minimally. Of note, however, is the brief 
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section on “Design” included in the current forth edition of Architects’ Data (Neufert & 
Neufert 2012, pp.42–45). Here, a single set of fifteen drawings address ‘design’ 
(accompanying an occasionally florid description by Neufert on the design process 
and its ‘birth pains’) and are rendered in a free-hand sketch style (see Figure 8). 
These are notably distinct from the otherwise precise and technically drafted figures 
that fill the other sections of Architects’ Data, there-by articulating a distinction 
between these two domains of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ activities. In these 
apparently ‘free-hand’ images is the evocation of a manifest ‘author’ wielding the pen. 
In addition to clearly coming from someone’s hand, relative to the other figures in the 
text, the graphical mode of this small set of drawings are also closer to the mythical 
‘back-of-napkin’ sketch of the master architect or fervently produced esquisse 
fashioned from the imagination in solitude (Draper 2000) that so typifies, and are 
idolised as, manifestations of the creative architectural act and expressions of 
genius.  
 
 
Figure 7: “Volumes in the structure”, “Open and enclosed bodies”, “Room 
plan/cavities in volumes”, “On columns”, “Hollow”, and “Plateau”, from 
Architects’ Data (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.43). Reproduced with courtesy of 
Neufert-Stiftung, Germany. 
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The prominence of this variance in graphical mode tied to distinct spheres of 
labour has been noted earlier in the description of the movement of drawn matter 
between members of architectural offices; sketches and ‘mark-ups’ from senior 
‘design’ staff to junior members and draftsmen, who pass ‘hard-line’ technical 
drawings in the other direction (see §4.10).   
Though other handbooks may not address ‘design’ and the ‘primary’ domain 
of architectural labour as explicitly as the variance in graphical mode over separate 
sections in Architects’ Data, their figures still work otherwise to construe the 
significance of the architect’s agency. The types of orthographic projections used 
within the handbooks are significant in this regard. Notably absent or minimal, as 
Emmons (2005, p.12) also identifies, are elevations and ‘stylistic’ or ‘aesthetic’ 
characteristics (broadly conceived). This is of particular significance in so far as the 
building façade (for which the elevation is the conventional mode of depiction) has 
frequently been (and is often today) understood as a principal ‘canvas’ for the 
expression of the creative capacities of the architect. Their absence in these texts 
can be understood as the aversion of impingement on the domain of the architect’s 
agency. Similarly, the paired-back and, at times, almost diagrammatic qualities of the 
drawn matter avoid any potential appearances of prescribing particular ‘stylistic’ or 
‘aesthetic’ qualities seen to be part of the ‘primary’ domain of architectural activity 
where the architect’s agency is at work.  
 
5.3 STABILITY WITHIN THE ‘SCHISM’ OF ARCHITECTURAL LABOUR 
Consequently, within this dyad, the handbook, its use, and the knowing 
assemblage within which it is orchestrated are necessarily relegated to ‘secondary’ 
status. The agency composed in this assemblage, manifestly distributed as it is 
amongst architect and book, clearly does not accord with a reality of architectural 
labour that situates the free exercise of the creative capacities of the architect at its 
core. The necessary and frequent undertaking of architectural labour that slights the 
prominence of the architect’s agency, like knowing the user with the use of the 
handbook, is, thus, rendered unproblematic by the deceptively simple ascription that 
it is of a ‘secondary’, not quite as architectural, status and, thus, not problematic in 
this displacement of the agency figured as ‘the architect’. The reproductions of these 
ascribed meanings and of this schism within the handbooks thus serve to ground the 
stability of the knowing assemblage of which they are part. 
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This discursive reproduction of the ‘schism’ of labour has partially figured in 
some of the exiting literature that has addressed contemporary handbooks. However, 
a focus on a more narrow “radical separation in architecture between functional fact 
and aesthetic expression”, as Emmons & Mihalache (2013) posit, displaces a 
perspective that sees the schism within the handbooks as part of an historically 
broader and significant frame entailing more general divisions within architectural 
labour bound to the agency of the architect and with divided domains not necessarily 
figured as ‘functional’ or ‘aesthetic’.16 Additionally, Weckherlin (2007) identifies the 
apparent antagonism between the operation of the handbook and prevalent notions 
of ‘authorship’. However, the mechanisms by which such an artefact is stabilised in 
practice are somewhat slighted, simply alluding to architects ‘play[ing]-down’ and “not 
mention[ing] its use” (2007, p.155). 
The predominance of the architect’s agency, which forms a key component of 
this schism of labour, is salient and pervasive enough that it has been well 
represented in literature on architecture. This is the myth of the ‘hero’ architect 
(Bentley 1999; Saint 1983). The ‘genius’ (Vesely 2004), engrossed in a sometimes 
obscure activity of ‘design’ while “alone, at the drawing board” (Cuff 1989, p.188), 
and whose “creative powers” are held aloft (Imrie & Street 2011, p.135). This ‘design 
creativity’ is, indeed, the “master value” of practice (Blau 1984, p.58). This goes 
hand-in-hand with the proudly-held image of the architect as ‘artist’ (Esherick 1984, 
p.27; Mallgrave 2015, p.9). This, and the “long-held, often false, assumption that arts 
is the product of individual creativity”, being the basis for the importance of architect’s 
conception of themselves as the ‘sole author’ of architecture (Hill 1998, p.22). How 
the hegemony of this agent, ‘the architect’, is reproduced and figures in the particular 
case of the knowing assemblage wrought about the ‘handbook’ is where this thesis 
contributes to this literature.  
This schism within architectural labour mirrors and is closely intertwined17 with 
the division made between architecture and other occupations and processes, less 
‘creative’ (Cohen et al. 2005) but equally necessary for the production of buildings, 
                                                
16 That is to say, the architect’s agency, their ‘genius’, is equally liable to be exerted in 
‘functional’ as well as ‘aesthetic’ matters. It is important not to conflate the exertion of agency, 
or the 'creative' or 'expressive', with the aesthetic. Though, it might be tempting to do given its 
connotations of the 'artistic', and there-by of the 'aesthetic'.  
17 ‘Intertwined’ is meant in the sense of the commonality in some of the sites and resources 
for the reproduction of these two realities. 
	 81 
though supposedly separate and distinct from architecture (between ‘conception’ and 
‘realisation’). This, what is often called architecture’s ‘autonomy’ (in contrast to a 
reality of ‘heteronomy’, Larson 1993; see also Till 2009), has also drawn on 
figurations of the ‘architect-as-artist’ and (as will be indicated in the discussion to 
follow) shared a parallel history. The position taken here is, however, that the schism 
within the labour of ‘architects’ is distinguishable, and worthwhile distinguishing, from 
this. 
The account provided in this chapter adds to the literature that has worked to 
describe these divisions between the “creative side” and the “nuts and bolts” 
(interviewee in Cohen et al. 2005, p.782) of architectural labour, as manifest in the 
architects’ negotiation of ‘residual matters’ such as the adherence to rules and 
regulations and their perception as “ephemeral, even incidental, to the creative 
process of design” (or even in detrimental to it) (Imrie & Street 2011, p.20), the 
assignment of more “prosaic” matters to subordinate staff (Brown et al. 2010, p.353), 
or the architect’s perennial complaint that they don’t get to do enough ‘design work’ 
(Blau 1984; Cohen et al. 2005, p.783). 
However, in addition to the stability wrought for the mode of knowing the user, 
and action (‘doing architecture’) generally, with the handbook via its ascription of 
‘secondary’ status within this structure of the schism, it is the reproduction and 
continued presence of the schism itself which also underlies a more general stability 
and unproblematic status of this agency of architect-and-book. The conjecture I 
pursue in the analysis to follow, and that elicited and informed the investigation of the 
longer history of this knowing assemblage of the handbook, is that these construals 
made by the handbooks, of a schism of architectural labour demarcated by the 
agency of the architect, are not the reflection of some necessary, universal, or 
inherent characteristic of architectural labour but are, instead, instances of the 
discursive reproduction of a particular contingent, constructed, and historically 
emergent reality. I propose that this schism is the outcome of a history centring on 
the emergent possibilities for the appropriation of architectural labour, in which the 
broader genre of ‘handbooks’ itself played a significant role. 
 
5.4 THE ‘ARCHI-TEXT’ 
Turning to briefly examine this history, two points need to be noted. Firstly, 
the ‘handbooks’ in this view are a broader genre of texts than those so far discussed 
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under the name of ‘contemporary’ or ‘modern’ handbooks. The definition (a common 
‘at-hand’ character) employed in this thesis brings a host of diverse texts under its 
umbrella, given a longer historical context these include so-called ‘pattern-books’, 
‘copy-books’, ‘books of the orders’, and so on. 
Secondly, the focus will shift (as, to an extent, it already has) from a 
predominant concern with that action describable as ‘knowing the user’. Rather, the 
interest will be on action more broadly. Broader still than (though including) that 
action categorised as ‘knowing’, to consider how action in most general terms, ‘doing 
architecture’, is accomplished with ‘handbooks’. Those ascriptions of meaning, 
attributions of agency, and general structures of significance in architectural practice, 
explored in the sections to follow, form part of the performances of both the more 
specific case of action, ‘knowing the user’, as well as the most general ‘doing 
architecture’. 
The history of interest here is not the history of the architectural handbook, it 
is the history of a specific agency, of a particular mode of ‘doing architecture’. This is 
that agency, that ‘knowing assemblage’, manifestly distributed amongst practitioner 
and text.18 Following Michael's (2000) suggestion, one might make the analytical 
move of figuring this agency as a kind of ‘co(a)gent’, for the purpose of tracing its 
trajectory, and employ the seemingly all-too-convenient hybrid term ‘archi-text’. 
Important to note is the variation in the composition of agency brought under the 
umbrella of this term ‘archi-text’. It, as illustrated below, is not simply the 
orchestration of book and ‘architect-proper’ in practice, but also subsumes those 
performances of ‘architecture’ that transpire in assemblages composed of, for 
example, landed gentry, builder, skilled craftsman, and book. The commonality 
underpinning this categorisation being, despite variations in the number or type of 
other entities embroiled in action, the presence of the book embedded within the 
performance of architectural labour. A comprehensive and in-depth historical account 
of this artefact and figuration of agency would easily take the length of a 
monograph.19 Rather, this chapter just serves to indicate some of the contours of this 
                                                
18 To clarify, this is not to limit the ‘extents’ or distributed-ness of this agency to these two 
figures (practitioner and book), but to note that it is amongst these two that it is manifest as 
distributed or extended. 
19 Indeed, something close to such a project is found in Reiff's Houses from Books (2000), 
and this work, along with the invaluable bibliographic and historical work of Archer (1985), 
Harris (1990), Hitchcock (1976), Park (1961), and Wittkower (1974), has greatly aided the 
historical picture sketched in this chapter. 
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history, intended to provide enough illustration to elaborate the broader thesis 
pursued.   
 
5.5 DOING ARCHITECTURE WITH BOOKS 
A viable site to stake out a beginning of this history is the emergence of those 
printed architectural books of the 16th century that followed the advent of the printing 
press in the 15th. At the hands of architects, Serlio’s, Vignola’s, Blum’s, and Shute’s 
books aided in disseminating the new architecture all’antica across Europe. Such 
texts, and their innumerable translations, reductions, and plagarisations, along with 
the agency of the ‘archi-text’, only increased in the following centuries (for the 
situation in Britain, for example, see Harris 1990).  What was done with these books, 
or what of architecture was rendered doable with them, varied. Some, ‘books of the 
orders’, provided, with increasing developments in espoused ‘ease’ of application 
(including systems of ratios or tabulated measurements, and also illustrated 
decorative elements to copy) a means by which, book at hand, the architect could be 
sure their work would accord with the inalienable fundaments that were at the centre 
of the renaissance and were for centuries the “absolute criteria for design in 
architecture” (Harris 1990, p.23) – the ‘orders’.20 Alternately, they also served simply 
as repositories of designs (in varying modes of the time) that could, in whole or part 
and with varying fidelity, be translocated from page to drawing. Prints from the pages 
of Serlio or Palladio’s books, or later ‘archaeological’ studies, reproduced in brick, 
stone, and timber abound across Britain, Europe, and the US (Reiff 2000). In some 
cases, the books themselves took on the role of the architect’s drawing, referenced in 
specifications and contracts (Reiff 2000, p.50).  
These book were not the emergence of an entirely novel agency; the 
embroilment of texts in the architectural labour had been established well prior (see 
n.24 below). However, they were most certainly the assembling and proliferation of a 
thoroughly renewed or revitalised iteration of this agency. The book, of course, 
became a radically different technology with the invention of the printing press. This 
                                                
20 These being, roughly, a system of treating the “’column-and-superstructure’ unit” 
(Summerson 1966, p.9) according to certain rules of proportion and ornamentation, 
articulated in five modes of the Tuscan, Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, and Composite (though, this 
number varies from a minimum three, Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian, to a host of numerous 
other supposedly invented or discovered orders). 
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history has been treated extensively (see, for example, Eisenstein 2005; Febvre & 
Martin 1976) and needn’t be belaboured here. What does need to be emphasized is 
that this novel reality did not immediately precipitate the proliferation and veracity of 
this agency, bound to its establishment as a tenable and legitimate mode, nor its 
problematic status that emerged with this. These both emerged slowly, historically 
speaking. 
Processes establishing the tenability and legitimacy of this mode by which 
one might ‘do architecture’, where the architectural book performed a central and 
salient role, included, firstly, the sheer volume of such books produced, in both 
number of items and titles. Increases in production were often tied to building booms, 
such as after the Great Fire of London, (Harris 1990, p.409) and such attempts to 
translate portions of architectural practice to the pages of texts served to enact and 
progressively ossify the notion that such a translation was both possible and 
legitimate. 
A major site for establishing this legitimacy was, obviously, architects’ 
adoption of these books as a commonplace artefact in practice. The reproduction 
and movement of ruins translated into inscriptions superseded the otherwise 
essential movement of bodies across Europe to sites of antiquity, and engendered a 
great demand for the printed book.21 They provided an effective, indeed essential 
(Reiff 2000, p.5), means for those wishing to take up the new architecture all’antica 
(or, in later eras, the mode of the day). The manifest employment of handbooks in 
the work of architects of Inigo Jones’ calibre (Reiff 2000, pp.11–13) serves to 
underscore its viability as a mode of practice, and one could assume recourse to 
books would be even more essential for “lesser lights” (Reiff 2000, p.15). Indeed, 
possessing books could be leveraged as assurance of the quality of architectural 
services, as is evidently so in the case of an architect from Williamsburg in 1777 
advertising the fact that he has at his disposal imported “Books of Architect” (cited in 
                                                
21 This is, of course, a simplification of the situation. It is not to say that the advent of the 
printed book suddenly grounded travels to the Mediterranean or other sites in Continental 
Europe to a halt. Practitioners, though they had this novel means of access to the moments of 
antiquity, still continued to add to this by travelling to various sites and witness these artefacts 
‘in the flesh’, and compare them to those printed materials they had acquired (as in Inigo 
Jones’ marginal notes on Palladio). Such travels did, however, take on a different character in 
the ensuing centuries, becoming, in many cases, a gentlemanly ‘right of passage’ rather than 
practical necessity (i.e. the ‘Grand Tourists’); as Gwynn (1766, p.65) quips, “where is the 
necessity of this parade of going to Rome, is there a building, or even a fragment of a building 
in Greece or Italy, of which we have not accurate draughts and measures?”. 
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Park 1961, pp.120–121). Towards the end of the 18th century, Chambers (1791, 
p.38) articulates the self-evidence of the viability, and potential benefit, of the use of 
books by dismissing the notion that one might judge a design method by the ease of 
remembrance when “it is easy to have recourse to figured drawings, or to prints”. 
That is, it is perfectly reasonable, even advisable, to rely on the affordances of 
artefacts to delegate, at least some, architectural labour.   
However, also furthering the tenability of this mode of producing architecture 
were the successes of particular compositions of ‘archi-text’ where the figure of the 
‘architect proper’ was notably absent. These included an emerging class of 
practitioners made of well-to-do amateurs, landed gentry, and dilettantes. These 
figures took up architectural work with the aid of a growing number of books, and by 
employing skilled craftsmen and contractors to fill in the ‘gaps’ in their competencies 
on the matters of building. Those able to afford the, initially, fairly expensive texts 
discussed them with, and lent them to, those more adept in construction (Reiff 2000, 
p.7).22 The successes of such assemblages gradually accumulated from the mid 16th 
century onwards, such that when Gibbs, in 1728, offered his book to service those 
who “in the remote parts of the Country” could “find little or no assistance for 
Designs” (Gibbs 1728, p.i) this was not some novel invention but, rather, a well-
established mode by which architecture was performed. 
Additionally, the emergence of more affordable books in the early eighteenth 
century (Reiff 2000, p.21) established the ground for ‘architect-less’ iterations of the 
‘archi-text’ incorporating figures like builders and craftsmen. This was of particular 
significance in so far as this iteration of the ‘archi-text’ was able to occupy a domain 
of architectural labour in the frontier of newly established colonies. Such 
assemblages wrought about the handbook provided for a situation in which its 
operation was, in some ways, ‘necessitated’ by the absence of ‘architects-proper’. 
Operating in these geographies as necessity nevertheless served to strengthen their 
tenability, particularly as they enabled the articulation of fledging cultural ambitions 
(for which the US is the paradigm example) (Kostof 1995). 
                                                
22 Instances of such compositions include, in the late 16th century, John Thynne in Longleat 
assisted by craftsmen and his steward John Dodd, Sir William Cecil in tandem with mason 
Roger Ward and steward Peter Kemp (Wilton-Ely 2000, p.181) , and Sir Edward Pytts and his 
mason John Chaunce (Reiff 2000, p.7). These well-to-do practitioners also played an 
additional vital role in the production of the books on which this mode of practice was 
founded, as in the case of the Duke of Northumberland sending John Shute to Italy, there-by 
providing material for Shute’s treatise (Reiff 2000, p.7). 
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However, it is worth noting, that making any easy distinction between 
‘architect’ and ‘non-architect’ at this point in the history of the profession (up until the 
mid to late 19th century at least) is shaky at best. The situation is rather, to use 
Johnston's (2008, p.60) term, a shifting “continuum” of diverse practitioners, including 
dilettantes, landowners, craftsmen, builder-designers, and so on, making claims to be 
undertaking ‘architectural’ work. It is this reality that is closely bound to and grounds 
the aforementioned tandem emergence of the ‘problematic’ status of the handbook 
and the agency of architect-and-book. I turn to outline this instability in the following 
sections. 
 
5.6 PROBLEMATICALLY DISTRIBUTED AGENCIES 
As the agency of the ‘archi-text’ proliferated, contestations to the place of the 
handbook within architectural labour worked to establish its instability as a mode of 
performing architecture. The crux of this problematic status is evident in qualms like 
Gwynn's (1766, p.67) that “Almost every one now, who can but make shift to draw 
neat lines, and is furnished with a few books to borrow from, sets up for an architect, 
his productions are dignified with the term invention, and, with many, pass current as 
such”, or Mylne’s (Publicus 1760) mocking despair that “a carpenter can convert 
himself by the help of a Palladio Londinensis lying on his bench, into an architect”. 
This reaction to the ‘archi-text’ is not limited to the 18th century when handbooks were 
especially prominent, however. Serlio’s books, for instance, were denounced by 
Lomazzo (cited in Carpo 2001, p.117) who proclaimed that “truly Sebastiano Serlio 
has made more dog-catchers into architects than he has hairs in his beard.” The 
point to be made, though, is that the increase in both the production of books and the 
production of architecture ‘of the book’ served to only intensify their ‘problematic’ 
status. 
As indicated, this mode of ‘doing architecture’ entailed compositions that 
included characters orchestrated in practice other than the ‘architect proper’. This 
was no accident; they were often explicitly addressed to “Gentlemen, as well as 
Masons, Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, Plasterers, Painters, etc., and all others 
concern’d in the several Parts of Building in general” (Langley 1727), or those of 
“ordinary capacity” (Schuym 1687). These artefacts worked to, in part, define and 
provided a resource to enact architecture in such a manner that it opened its 
undertaking up to a broader range of practitioners, principally via delegation of labour 
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to the artefact. Whether one understands what action is being delegated as (like in 
the case of the user) the knowing of some object or as, more broadly, simply doing 
architecture a la mode, in both cases what is clear is that some greater-or-lesser23 
part of architectural labour was translated such that what might otherwise be 
undertaken by a single, more apparently unitary, figure could be performed amongst 
the manifestly distributed agency involving practitioner (or multiple practitioners) and 
text. 
Though the particular delegation of competencies distributed amongst book 
and practitioner provides a basis for its successful dispersion amongst ‘architects’, so 
too does it translate at least a portion (if not a large portion) of architectural labour 
such that it is enact-able by ‘non-architects’ (for example, those in adjacent 
disciplines and occupations, including engineers, builders, and craftsmen, but also 
dilettantes). Simply put, if architectural labour (or, at least a portion of it) is more-or-
less employing a book (‘copying’, in its simplest form), a fairly simple technology to 
wield, then ‘doing architecture’ seems not so closed to ‘non-architects’. This is, 
clearly, the same aspect of ‘mobility’ explored in the discussion of the contemporary 
handbook in chapter four, that same aspect on which the ‘success’ of the artefacts 
was supposedly, in part, grounded. The divergence in this case of these earlier 
handbooks being that this same ‘mobility’ renders the handbook and its use 
problematic. 
Returning to Watson & Shove's (2008) example of DIY door-painting provides 
a useful case to illustrate in what sense the handbook becomes ‘problematic’. Here, 
the technology of water-based paint, as in the case of other DIY technologies, and its 
re-distribution of competence (shifting from practitioner to paint) required for painting 
a door (compared to earlier oil-based paints) works to open up the range of 
practitioners, ‘DIY-ers’, who may take up this practice. This practice thereby, on this 
basis, becomes notably more ‘mobile’. However, the most significant ramification of 
this, in the context of this discussion, is the almost inevitable appropriation of labour 
from otherwise skilled trades-people. Similarly, the ‘dog-catchers’ brought into the 
world of architecture by the proliferation of handbooks might make a claim on the 
capacity to produce ‘architecture’, opening up the possibility for the appropriation of 
architectural labour. This, obviously, becomes problematic in so far as labour is 
                                                
23 Generally greater, given the dominant mode in which architecture of the day was defined, 
such as in terms of the orders. 
	 88 
appropriated from those who might be deemed (or deem themselves) ‘architects 
proper’, and in as much as there are those who wish to prevent this, in other words 
who wish to engender the closure of this practice complex. 
My intent here is not to say this practitioner was an architect, this one wasn’t, 
or this practitioner was in this instance ‘doing architecture’, and this one wasn’t 
(perhaps was a mere charlatan, or maybe performing some similar though distinct 
and lower activity). Indeed, such an aim would be highly problematic, especially in so 
far as what architecture is emerges from negotiations such as these. My interest is 
not in making attributions but, rather, in those which are given. Whether or not 
someone with Palladio Londinensis on their desk was ‘actually’ an architect is not of 
interest. Rather it is of interest that whatever they were doing was a problematic site 
in terms of the attribution of ‘architecture’.  
It is important to emphasise that this ‘problematic’ status (that is, subject to 
contestation) is no inherent or necessary characteristic of this agency of architect-
and-book or its proliferation.24 It is only so in as much are there are those who wish to 
engender the closure of this complex of practices, this itself being an historically 
emergent process, what might generally be called ‘professionalization’.  
The professions are the focus of a substantial body of sociological work, 
entailing both numerous (and contesting) attempts to provide general accounts of 
their nature (e.g. Abbott 1988; Larson 1979) as well as particular case studies, such 
as of architecture (e.g. Kaye 1960) and the history of its particular professional 
institutions, associations, councils and boards of registration, educational institutions 
and examinations, and legislation, with which it has leveraged professional status. 
                                                
24 It is also worthwhile noting that the conditions of a prominent delegation of labour to texts 
and ‘closed’ field of practice and protection of labour do not necessarily elicit a problematic or 
unstable status for texts and a mode of architectural practice in which they play a salient role. 
This is well illustrated by the case of the architects of Ancient Egypt. Here, architectural 
practice of the highest order centred on the adherence to the prescriptions of sacred texts. So 
much so that, in declaring his status as an architect, Senmut boasts that he "had access to all 
the writings of the prophets”, and the close relationship of architect and book was even 
articulated in the identity of Seshat, goddess of both architecture and writing (Kostof 2000, 
pp.5–6). However, the salient characteristic in this situation is the status of the books 
themselves. They are a technology distinct from that kind of the modern era, far less 
numerous (with printing absent) and highly guarded (simply inaccessible to other would-be 
practitioners). Thus, a practice tightly bound to the employment of books was not problematic, 
due to the impossibility for appropriation, and could even be understood as, in complete 
reversal of the contemporary manifestation, something defining of architectural practice. The 
case of the medieval guild system and the closely guarded ‘lodge-books’ offer a comparable 
example. 
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Here, there is not the scope, nor is it the place, to examine in detail the dynamics and 
various iterations of the professionalization of architecture or of professions in 
general. It is, however, important to note that similar processes discussed in this 
chapter also play out within other professions. Those identified as the delegation of 
labour to artefacts, or technological innovation or ‘commodification’ of knowledge, are 
identifiable in, for instance, the case of legal forms and the jurisdiction of legal 
professionals (Abbott 1988, p.146). Within the context of a process where the closure 
of a jurisdiction of labour is central, an artefact and mode of producing architecture 
that is accessible to “anyone who can but read English” is, obviously, problematic. 
The core matter is to whether professions are able to render such dynamics a benefit 
(providing for routinisation and saving efforts in some tasks) rather than a threat or 
reduction to their jurisdiction. Here, I propose that this ‘schism’ of architectural labour 
is a key mechanism in this task. 
What is, then, interesting is why, a few centuries after those unstable 
iterations of the handbook and its use, more contemporary manifestations, through 
which knowing the user is accomplished via a comparable assemblage involving the 
delegation of labour to the artefact, are otherwise stable and unproblematic. The 
contention I pursue in this chapter is that the freedom of these books from 
contestation, or being derided for “enslav[ing]” architects (Jackson 1921, p.48), is not 
so on the basis of any kind of fundamental difference in the content or mode of 
operation of their contemporary iterations. Rather, the change is in the mechanisms 
for averting the appropriation of labour. These include those ‘institutional’ 
mechanisms typical of professions, the control of licensure, education, and 
appellations, but also broader structures of significance sustained within the practice 
of architecture that, furthermore, underlie and support the sense of these institutional 
mechanisms – that is, the schism of labour. The following section elaborates on the 
operation of this schism and the significance of the particular articulation there-of 
wrought within architectural practice. 
 
5.7 ENACTING THE ‘SCHISM’ OF ARCHITECTURAL LABOUR 
Any practice or complex of practices has more or less defining components 
(perhaps certain materials, products or outcomes, or temporal scope and 
sequencing, in the case of practices, or particular practices and their salient materials 
and products in the case of complexes). More accurately, it has those that are 
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enacted as such in practices, where the practice or complex is identified. This is to 
say that there is nothing inherent to particular components that make them more or 
less defining, rather, this develops in the contingency of the practice or complex’s 
history. The strength of this distinction varies amongst different practices and 
complexes, such that some have evident core-periphery or primary-secondary 
structures, with core or primary components or characteristics accompanied by 
components that, though nevertheless essential or recurrent, are regarded as 
otherwise auxiliary or secondary. 
This characteristic of practices and complexes is of particular importance for 
those that are closely guarded or attempt closure (e.g. ‘professions’, where this 
closure is the endeavour to establish and control a sphere of labour). In such cases, 
it can be employed as a resource in establishing and maintaining this closure and 
delimiting those that can take part in a practice or complex. By emphatically enacting 
this primary-secondary distinction, along with the means of demarcation, it provides 
for the possibility of some activity from which the practice or complex is constituted to 
be performed (this ‘secondary’ or ‘peripheral’ activity, perhaps being that most liable 
to appropriation) without enabling claims to performances of practices or involvement 
in complexes to be made, on the basis of their being more ‘fundamental’ action from 
which identifications of performances are founded. The means by which this ‘primary’ 
action is demarcated is, obviously, of particular significance. A means of 
demarcation, such as the employment of scarce resources in performances, can 
serve to significantly limit the access of those who might take part.  
To reiterate slightly, there is nothing inherently less ‘architectural’ about some 
activities and entities over others. Rather, this categorization is founded on the 
contingencies of practice and, in this case, the possibilities for averting its 
appropriation. Criteria defining what is understood to be ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’ shift 
and change as the practice complex, its broader context, and the possibilities for 
appropriation (such as, but not limited to, novel technologies and material delegation) 
alter. Thus, we can look to specific modes of demarcating this primary-secondary 
schism (and, thus, ‘architecture’ generally) as a particular, historically contingent, 
mode. Given this, the architect’s agency is, though historically contingent, an 
especially significant criterion.  
This thesis has foregrounded the distributed character of agency. However, in 
social life, agency is also attributed and ascribed (Michael 2017, p.69), as it is here in 
the case of the architect to certain 'primary' activities. What the characteristics of 
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these activities are is, in the context of this paper, of less significance than the fact 
that it is established that some form of activity is or may be so ascribed. This capacity 
for ascribing the action transpiring in practice to a single figure, a locus of agency, is 
utilized in enacting a reality in which some components of architectural practice are 
of this character and emanate from the exertion of the agency of the architect. Thus, 
by construing a domain of primary labour as that in which the agency of the architect 
is exerted is to define the practice complex in terms of what, simply by definition, 
cannot be appropriated from a particular practitioner; being an architect and doing 
architecture are, thus, rendered inseparable, and control over labour then goes, 
more-or-less, to those who control appellations (this, in the case of professions, 
being practitioners themselves). The significance of this criterion, amongst the 
shifting possibilities for appropriation and the desire to avert it, is clear; it is a kind of 
apotheosis, or last resort (depending on your standpoint), and that it, once 
established as a legitimate possibility for defining architecture, became prominent, a 
sine qua non, is unsurprising. The numerous sites, contemporary and historical, 
where the architects-agency-demarcated schism is enacted can be seen as 
resources by which architectural practice averts impingement by alternate agencies. 
This particular mechanism, the schism, thus preserves a ‘space’ for the 
handbooks within the ‘secondary’ domain of practice. This is significant, given that an 
attempt to expel the handbooks from practice entirely would be a somewhat unlikely 
if not untenable resolution, considering the successes of these artefacts. Likewise, in 
this context, the avowed necessity of the contemporary handbooks (Ackerman 1932) 
should be noted; such a structure provides for the accommodation of this ‘necessity’ 
without the undermining of professional jurisdiction (i.e. there is otherwise ‘more 
architectural’ work to be done).  
To clarify, I am not suggesting that this schism finds its source in the 
discursive content of the handbooks. It is certainly not its ‘origin’, though it is one 
particular site for its reproduction, one of many sites over a long period of time, that 
have served to enact and ossify this particular reality, on the basis of which it may be 
occupied by artefacts such as the handbook (and the agencies wrought about them) 
and ensures their stability. What is being suggested, regarding the relation of the 
handbooks to this schism’s origin, is that the longer history of the handbook genre 
was most certainly a part (one of the technologies and practices that problematized 
architectural practice via possibilities for appropriation) of the conditions that 
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established the value of these structures of meaning and significance (and the 
various means to enact them discursively and non-discursively). 
Additionally, it is important to emphasis that the suggestion is not that, given 
the ‘problematic’ condition of the emergent possibilities for the appropriation of 
labour, this ‘resolution’ simply sprung forth from history and precipitated more-or-less 
instantaneously in the field of practice. Rather, it is, again, a temporally extended 
process where-by progressive enactments of this reality, and further innovations in 
means for this enactment, ossify (that is to say, become more stable and frequent in 
their reproduction) over time. Nor should such structures of meaning and significance 
be seen to be entirely novel and emerging ‘in response’ to such conditions. Instead, it 
is best to see its emergence as the progressive assembling, reconfiguration, and 
reinforcing of extant resources and fields of significance at hand into novel 
formations. These sites for the reproduction of this reality of architectural labour as 
divided, demarcated by the agency of the architect, are numerous. The remainder of 
this chapter will outline some particularly salient instances of these. 
Beginning with the handbooks, though not the progenitors of this schism, 
there is a sense in which they can be seen to be, perhaps, innovative compared to 
the work they do to, more-or-less, simply reproduce this schism itself. This is in the 
specificities of the ‘division’ of architectural labour they make, that is, what kinds of 
action (kinds of knowing and known objects) are to be categorised as ‘secondary’, 
and, thus, found within the pages of the handbook. This is of particular significance 
relative to the object of knowledge at the centre of this study, the user. The fact that 
the handbooks, thus, situate it within this ‘secondary’ domain of knowing action may, 
in a sense, engender its ‘stability’ (along with the use of the handbooks generally) but 
this may also, by virtue of the status ascribed to it, work against its ‘success’ (this will 
be addressed further in the concluding chapter). 
However, the significance of the architect’s agency, as underpinning this 
schism, is discursively enacted in a more pervasive manner within the interpersonal 
grammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014) of these texts. To analyse the interpersonal 
dimension of language is to examine it as interaction, specifically as exchange 
(Halliday & Matthiessen 2014, p.134). Within this dimension, or ‘metafunction’, of 
language the identities of the interactants and their relations to each other and the 
exchange are fashioned. An outline of the identity of the architect enacted in the 
handbook is well illustrated in a sample clause like “Corridors and routes longer than 
15 m must have a passing place for two wheelchair users of at least 1.80 m width 
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and depth” (Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.22). It, firstly, is important to note that it is 
tasked with the elicitation of action, engendering a certain state of affairs, rather than 
simply exchanging information; it is a ‘proposal’ rather than a ‘proposition’, in 
Halliday’s terms (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014, p.139). Further, this action, that which 
would bring about the prescribed architectural reality (i.e. a certain width of corridors), 
is evidently to transpire via the reader (the architect) and with their obedience. As the 
foregoing chapters have described, such is the general character of these texts. They 
are not simply ‘bare fact’ or ‘information’ to be exchanged, but are embroiled in the 
elicitation of action (specifically, architects drawing). 
That this ‘command’ is not realised in the ‘grammatically congruent’ (Halliday 
& Matthiessen 2014, p.701) mood of the imperative (“Make corridors and…”) is 
particularly significant. Bare imperatives are relatively scarce within the handbooks.25 
Though, when they do appear they, notably, highlight the status of adjacent elliptical 
clauses as less explicit commands (e.g. “Bicycle passage width 1.80m; also provide 
cross-aisles”; Neufert & Neufert 2012, p.383). Instead, a host of linguistic resources 
are employed to negotiate this orchestration of action without the relatively ‘direct’ 
and evident impingement on the agency of the addressee by the imperative. The 
character of written texts are such that realising commands are, because of the 
‘distance’ between writer and reader, somewhat distinct from those means employed 
in spoken interaction (Thompson & Thetela 1995). Common forms like “Could you 
please…” are somewhat inappropriate for written texts, especially texts like the 
handbook where an authoritative (techno-scientific) status is to be maintained.  
Some of the more general means employed within these texts include the use 
of the modalised declarative (“[Subject] must have…”), a form of ‘grammatical 
metaphor’ (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014, p.701) there-by ‘softening’ the explicitly 
directing nature of the command as articulated by the imperative. In doing so, the 
clause acquires the ‘flavour’ of the declarative’s congruent function (a statement) and 
there-by enacts the reader as receiver of information rather than simply follower of 
command. More importantly, though, the structure of this declarative opens up the 
functional position of the subject in the clause (otherwise an implicit “you” in the 
                                                
25 A larger quantitative analysis of the proportion of clause types and linguistic features was 
deemed unproductive relative to the general descriptions offered here. However, such a 
mode of analysis offers a potentially valuable site for future research, especially in so far as 
interesting results may be garnered on the shifting enactments of the ‘architect’ within texts 
over architectural history. 
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imperative). Thus, although the action prescribed must transpire through the 
architect, the position of the subject can instead be occupied by an entity otherwise 
involved in the action (i.e. “Corridors and…”). Consequently, the action is 
represented in a manner that slights the projection of the agency of the architect (and 
its evident subordination) in the text. The sum of these grammatical features typical 
of the contemporary handbook thereby ensures that the architect enacted in the text 
is a ‘free agent’. 
Thus, to reframe this analysis slightly, the problematic status of the manifestly 
distributed agency of the architect-and-book is not only negotiated in the ascription of 
a ‘secondary’ status within a schism of labour. Additionally, linguistic resources are 
employed such that, in so far as the architect has to engage in the ‘necessary evil’ of 
this less-than-architectural activity, they are enacted as, at least, not simply the slave 
of the text. 
The specificity of this character is immediately evident from even a cursory 
comparison with some of the earliest handbooks and their treatment of that core 
topic, ‘the orders’. Here, extended passages of the kind “Divide the height of Scapus, 
into 3 partes… Then draw downe… Then measure from…” (Shute 1912) are 
frequent, and notable not just for their comparatively untempered imperatives but, 
also, for directly addressing the act of drawing itself (rather then indirectly through 
those ‘drawing congruent’ matters of architecture). 
Though the discursive content of the handbooks has been foregrounded, they 
also, perhaps primarily, work to enact these realities of architectural labour non-
discursively. Its inclusion in those ‘secondary’ activities of architectural labour 
designates them as such by virtue of the distinct corpus of elements orchestrated 
(i.e. the inclusion of the handbook). This works in tandem with the division of labour 
within architectural offices, the handbook’s distribution serving to demarcate such 
divisions. A hierarchy in temporal sequencing is also enacted by the acquisition and 
use of the handbook. The employment of the handbooks as a ‘time saving’ device in 
‘secondary’ labour that is temporally ‘squeezed’ (Southerton 2003) serves to enact 
the privileged status of other ‘primary’ activities (‘design’) for which time is saved (or, 
espoused to be). 
Moving beyond the handbook, an especially notable site for the reproduction 
of this schism of architectural labour is, as just alluded to, the structure of labour in 
architectural offices. A salient division of labour, embodied in a hierarchy of office 
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members, serves to enact this schism. This is a long-standing characteristic of 
architectural practice. Early iterations include the division of labour between master 
and pupil. Whether the more formal variation of articled pupillage found in full force in 
Victorian Britain (Briggs 1927, p.352) or the ‘architectural families’ of the Italian 
Renaissance (p.163), the system is one of a principal creative agency, to whom 
authorship is ascribed,26 assisted by a host of individuals in tutelage and providing 
labour in the form of the production of drawings, models, and other materials to aid in 
exerting this agency. This role of those individuals assisting architect-designers was 
further articulated and defined in the late 19th and early 20th century where a 
distinction was more firmly established between those working producing drawings 
and similar products for the principal designer with the expectation of progressing to 
the status of architect (‘architects-in-training’), and those for whom ‘draftsman’ was 
their career, often mapping onto broader class divisions (Johnston (2008).  
Though two divided classes of practitioners are less evident in contemporary 
large-scale firms, where numerous roles and specialisations accommodate hundreds 
of employees, this schism of labour still persists in so far as there are those in whom 
principal ‘creative’ agency is primarily located and a host of members who support 
these in diverse ways. So ingrained is this structure that, even in offices that actively 
disavow this division, it nevertheless persists. Brown et al. (2010, p.535) describe 
such ‘silent hierarchies’ in conditions where junior members are “generally occupied 
with more mundane tasks associated with, for example, documentation, project 
management and contracts, and claimed ignorance of the ‘the deeper theories’ that 
drove the directors”. It is those same tasks deemed liable to be partly delegated to 
artefacts and being undertaken by a more manifestly distributed agency (and, thus, 
incongruous with the architect-as-creative-agent) that are delegated to supporting 
practitioners. The distribution of artefacts serves to demarcate these divisions 
(Bechky 2003); ‘CAD-monkeys’ with their computers and rendering software, or 
assistants shuffling through development controls. Though, to see these only as 
‘tokens’ would be mistaken. Rather, they are the co-ordination of artefact and 
embodied know-how and dispositions. 
This schism in labour is extended in the delegation of such ‘less-than-
architectural’ labour outside the office itself, to external consultants hired to, for 
                                                
26 This was the case even when ‘design’ work was indeed assigned to supporting staff, the 
“ghosts” of architectural offices (Briggs 1927, p.380). 
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example, ensure regulation compliance (Imrie & Street 2011, p.147) or provide 
sustainability certification, and further ossified in the establishment of the professional 
roles and organisations for this labour. Similarly, separate creative ‘design’ labour 
and ‘production’ divisions within firms may be further articulated in the co-ordination 
of two or more architectural firms to complete a single project, with one firm providing 
the principal ‘design’ labour and a second the (far less prestigious) labour required to 
bring the design to and through construction phase (Cuff 1992b).  
Perhaps equally significant as a site for the reproduction of this schism is 
architectural education in its institutionalised form. The standard structure for units of 
study in university level programmes is of core ‘studio’ design units (Cuff 1992a, 
pp.44–45), the “Queen Mother” (Esherick 1984, p.27) of architectural programmes, 
most frequently given a higher weighting of hours, and accompanied by a number of 
varying additional units covering topics such as building technology, communication 
techniques, and architectural history, drawn on in the design work undertaken in 
studio units. Such studio units, with their “emphasis on individual achievement” 
(Larson 2016, p.77) and exclusion of other matters for the nurturing of “creative 
freedom” (Imrie & Street 2011, p.130), are the site for the enculturation of 
practitioners and the embodiment of this division of practice and the importance of 
creative agency into the dispositions of novice architects and their resultant 
understanding of their work.  
That a primary defining characteristic of the practice of architecture is the 
exercise of a creative, expressive, ‘artistic’ capacity, or a unique agency realised in 
the more obscure portions of ‘design’, is such a pervasive notion that its contingency 
needs to be emphasized - it is not necessarily the case that ‘architecture’ is such and 
is the result of active construction. Though the overwhelming predominance of the 
architect’s agency as sine qua non of architecture is relatively more novel, this is, 
however, not to say that sites for enacting this manner of defining architecture 
generally were previously entirely absent. One can locate its presence, at least in the 
history of the modern iteration of the architect, at the beginning of the Italian 
renaissance when the figure of the architect emerged from the structures of the 
medieval guild. A notable articulation of this is in the early proto-discipline of 
architectural history. Here, architects were dealt with amongst and in the same 
manner as artists, with the emphasis on the creative and expressive agency of the 
individual that this entailed. This manifested in the primary mode and product of this 
historical practice, the artist biography, of which Vasari’s Lives is paradigmatic 
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(Leach 2010, pp.19–23). Though modes of conducting art history varied over the 
centuries, this rendering of the architect-as-artist (and of architecture as expressive 
or creative product of this agent) wrought within historical work on architecture 
persisted in such mundane sites as the fact that (until relatively recently) architectural 
historians were educated within schools of art history (Anderson 1999, p.284).  
Contemporary iterations of this image are now perhaps most prevalently 
those articulated in lay discourse, and include the perpetuation of the myth of the 
‘hero-architect’ (Cuff 1992a, p.1) in its more recent title the ‘starchitect’, the lone 
creative genius pursuing their unique vision. The paradigm case continues to be 
Howard Roark, the protagonist from Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead. The reproduction 
of this myth is all the more important in as much as it provides a resource, particularly 
in tandem with ‘iconic’ architectures, to be employed in the pursuit of capital (Sklair 
2005). 
The construction of this reality of architectural labour that has been labelled 
the ‘schism’ of practice should be understood as the slow accretion of and innovation 
in novel sites for the enactment and reproduction of this reality. Sites include those 
outlined above, but also innumerable other venues, both discursive and non-
discursive: the continued prominence of the architect-as-author and the explanatory 
unifying ‘idea’ in the genre of the ‘building review’; the fetishisation or otherwise 
inflated significance of the sketch (e.g. rendered as purchasable commodity) in which 
the ‘creative genius’ of the architect is apparently manifest; brochures advertising 
university programmes to prospective students; the architectural competition (see 
Larson 1994); the proliferation of exhibitions and architectural collections within art 
institutions (e.g. MOMA); architectural prizes and awards (the highest, the Pritzker, 
notably being awarded to individuals, rather than firms); but also, as Larson (2016, 
p.60) keenly notes, the work of sociologists who unwittingly reproduce the architect-
as-artist and ignore the less romantic domains of the profession. It is on the basis of 
the extended constellation of these innumerable venues that the structures of 
significance that provide the basis for the stability and, thus, successful 
accomplishment of knowing the user with the handbook are sustained. 
 
5.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Building on the account offered in chapter four, this chapter has posited that 
also wrought in this assemblage, and equally necessary for the accomplishment of 
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knowing, is a body of ascribed meanings and its place within wider structures of 
significance found in architectural practice. A specific segment of this domain of 
ascribed meaning and significance provided the focus for the analysis of the 
contemporary handbooks and history of these artefacts. This was the reality of 
architectural practice identified as a ‘schism’ of labour, where-in activity is divided into 
a hierarchy of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ on the basis of the demarcating criterion of 
the exertion of the architect’s agency, and in which the handbook and the knowing 
assemblage of which it is part is cast in a ‘secondary’ status and, there-by, more-or-
less unproblematic within this broader structure of significance. 
In turning to the historicity of the agency wrought about the handbook I 
positioned this schism as the outcome of a history centring on the emergent 
possibilities for the appropriation of architectural labour, in which the broader genre of 
handbooks itself played a significant role. I posited this schism emerged from this 
history as a means by which architectural labour is protected from appropriation, 
such as by ‘non-architects’ with the aid of the problematic figurations of agency of the 
architect-and-book. Its persistence into contemporary practice and its character is 
such that it necessitates the knowing assemblage of the contemporary handbook 
acquires a status as ‘secondary’ labour, subsidiary to that action in which the agency 
of the architect is manifestly exerted. The reproduction by the handbooks of this 
structure of significance in which they (and artefacts and modes of action like them) 
are rendered stable and unproblematic in the practice complex of architecture is, 
thus, a mechanism by which they contribute to establishing the ground for their own 
stability as artefacts and the successful accomplishment of knowing the user. 
The facet of this account to be emphasised is that the accomplishment of 
knowing in architectural practice is made on the basis of the establishment and 
stabilization of more general modes of action that are wrought over an extended 
periods of time and innumerable scenes of action. The ‘integration of knowledge’ is 
never simply the movement of some discrete or autonomous entity into a sphere of 
practice where it is then ‘employed’ or ‘applied’, but is the construction of 
assemblages through which knowing action transpires. Even the most ubiquitous 
artefacts and apparently mundane action of knowing are only so on the basis of work 
that establishes the viability and stability of such action. Often, as in the case of 
knowing the user with the handbook, this involves the extension or modulation of 
extant configurations of practice which themselves have a specificity and historicity 
that bears on the character of the knowing accomplished, such as the kinds of 
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meaning ascribed to it. In this case, this is so in the ‘secondary’ status ascribed to 
‘knowing the user’ accomplished with of the handbook, within a broader schism of 
architectural labour. 
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CONCLUSION 
Socrates… went on to say: “Tell me Euthydemus, what kind of 
goodness do you want to get by collecting these books?”  
And as Euthydemus was silent, considering what answer to give, 
“Possibly you want to be a doctor?” he guessed: “Medical treatises 
alone make a large collection.” 
“Oh no, not at all.” 
“But perhaps you wish to be an architect? One needs a well stored 
mind for that too.” (Xenophon 1923, p.275) 
 
 
As Socrates’ brief characterisation indicates, these three characters, the 
architect, the book, and knowledge, have long been intertwined. In this thesis, I have 
examined this trio in the context of their entanglement with a fourth character, the 
‘user’. This final chapter will recap the conclusions made within the body of the 
thesis, before synthesising and elaborating these while drawing out implications and 
potential ground for further research. 
The research I undertook as the basis for this thesis was directed by the aim 
of investigating how ‘knowing the user’ is accomplished with the architectural 
‘handbook’, and how such accomplishments are made generally present or spatio-
temporally dispersed in their reproduction throughout architectural practice. This 
question has been addressed by casting it in terms of a specific conception of 
knowledge-as-ability (Hetherington 2011) and of the composition of ‘knowing 
assemblages’ in practices, outlined in section 2.3. The core of this study comprised 
examining the composition of this knowing assemblage wrought about the handbook: 
analysing its elements, the associations orchestrated between them, its specificity, 
and its historicity. In doing so I also attend to how establishing such successes in 
accomplishing knowing, within this specific context of practice, bears on the particular 
character or shape of the knowing accomplished. This, additionally, was framed by 
the parallel question of what it means (that is, the ramifications, implications, and 
effects wrought) for such ‘knowing the user’ to be accomplished in architectural 
labour. 
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This last question was addressed first, in general terms, within chapter three. 
Introducing what the ‘user’ is and drawing on selected moments from its history 
served to elucidate what it means for an ‘object of knowledge’ to be constituted within 
architectural practice. I framed such a process in terms of the crowd of jostling 
agencies found within architectural projects, situating knowing and ‘objects of 
knowledge’ as embroiled within such a condition and, itself, a matter of agency. On 
this basis, I asserted the pertinence of investigating the manner in which the knowing 
of this somewhat less recalcitrant object, the user, may be shaped by this condition, 
given the apparent bearing of the agency of the architect and their mediating as 
‘knower’. 
In chapter four, I began the account of the knowing assemblage wrought 
about the contemporary architectural handbook, working from the results of content 
analysis and with a focus on the dimension of ‘mobility’. The picture of this 
assemblage included handbooks and architects (specifically ‘architects-as-
transcribers’), but also pens, scale rules, paper, and drawing boards or computers, 
CAD software, keyboards, and mice, that is, the entities found otherwise orchestrated 
within practices of drawing. I posited that this knowing assemblage achieves a 
mobility based on specific distributions of competencies (particularly the delegation of 
labour to more logistically mobile artefacts – the handbook) in tandem with 
prescribed elements being predominantly native to core drawing practices (notably, 
the drawing competencies of the ‘architect-as-transcriber’), thereby utilizing extant 
and well dispersed potential sites of knowing within architectural labour and 
reconfiguring and embedding within these rather than establishing new practices 
entirely. Consequently, the distribution of components required for the composition of 
this knowing assemblage is ensured and provides the ground for the spatio-temporal 
dispersion and reproduction of successful accomplishments of knowing the user. 
Additionally, I posited that this is reflected in the character of the knowing constituted, 
given that this embedding necessitates a congruence with the realities of the site of 
reception, drawing practices, and the elements found there. In this case, this 
manifests as the ‘spatial’ rendering of the user in the shift towards congruence with 
drawing, as identified within the results of content analysis. 
Chapter five extended this account, where I proposed, drawing from the 
results of discourse analysis of contemporary handbooks, that in addition to those 
requisite elements outlined in chapter four were equally necessary components in the 
accomplishment of knowing the user, namely, a host of meanings ascribed to the 
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handbook’s use situated within broader structures of significance. These were those 
that cast this knowing assemblage as a kind of ‘secondary’ activity. These were of 
interest in so far as they engender the stability (unproblematic and uncontentious 
status) and, thus, underlie the successful performances of this mode of knowing the 
user set within a hierarchy of architectural labour that I labelled the ‘schism’ of 
architectural practice. Additionally, in this chapter I turned to a previously bracketed 
concern with the historicity of this knowing assemblage in which the handbook is 
embroiled. Here, looking also to a broader range and longer history of ‘handbooks’, I 
posited that these texts were themselves a part of the history involving a project of 
the closure of practice, and the protection of architectural labour from appropriation, 
which established the ground for the emergence of this prominent schism and, on the 
basis of which, a problematic status of the agency of architect-and-book was averted. 
Accompanying my formulation of the research questions, and situated in the 
context of the project of ‘user-centred’ architecture, was the frame of ‘successes’ or 
‘obstacles’ to efforts to establish ‘knowing the user’ within architectural practice. With 
this frame in mind, and looking to parts of the case analysed, one might expect it 
would be sensible to, crudely, ‘recommend’ techniques for the successful 
‘incorporation of knowledge’ via the delegation of knowing action to technologies, 
such as handbooks, in a fashion that draws on extant configurations of architectural 
practice and the elements and affordances there-of. The immediate caveat to this, 
implied in chapter four, would be suggesting cautiousness given that such a process 
may bear on the character of the knowing thus constituted, and might as so be 
deemed ‘limited’ or ‘lacking’, and account for a less than diverse character of 
knowing the user in practice generally. 
However, this is obviously not the picture offered in the foregoing chapters; I 
illustrate the matter to be more complex than this. For instance, that same dimension 
of ‘mobility’ and dynamics of delegation identified in particular compositions of 
knowing as underlying its apparent ‘success’ is also, in the context of a specific 
practice complex, equally a ground for a problematic status that potentially 
undermines successfully accomplishing knowing the user. In the analysis I present, 
the ‘success’ of accomplishing knowing, and of such accomplishments being spatio-
temporally well distributed, stable, and reproduced, cuts across multiple dimensions 
in a manner that renders attempts to reduce ‘success’ to any single or persistent 
dimensions, or the identification of ‘general obstacles’, vacuous. Simply put, the 
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performance of knowing is rather messy, and in this thesis I have sought, primarily, to 
indicate this character. 
However, some tentative generalisations might be possible. Though 
‘antagonism’ may be too strong, there is certainly not a necessary congruence 
between the practice of architecture and knowing, or at least certain modes there-of. 
Instead, knowing has been shown to be entangled in complex issues, such as the 
ascription of agency and the power to exert effect and maintain control in a particular 
domain of labour, such that quite fundamental ways in which architectural practice is 
defined and sustained render certain modes of knowing (specifically, those in which 
agency is manifestly distributed) less than congruent with the practice of architecture. 
This case of the knowing assemblage wrought about the handbook has shown that it 
would seem reasonable to suggest that one is wary in attributing to architecture an 
‘enthusiasm’ for, or general openness towards, knowledge (or novel knowledge), that 
one might reasonably expect is implied by architecture’s status as ‘knowledge-based’ 
profession (on the problematic status of such ascriptions, see Alvesson 2001).  
I have made efforts in this thesis to illustrate that not all knowing is equal. This 
is to reiterate that the composition of knowing assemblages is diverse. However, it is 
also to emphasise that, on the basis of this diversity, there are variations in the kinds 
of significance and value ascribed to particular modes of knowing over others in 
certain contexts of practice. As in the case examined, the realities of the manner of 
composition of this particular knowing assemblage are such that its manifestly 
distributed character elicits ascriptions of meanings within broader structures of 
significance that stabilise but render it as of a ‘secondary’ character. Conversely, 
given these structures of significance, some knowing is of more ‘value’ to the figure 
of the architect and the reproduction of the practice complex of architecture in so far 
as it is congruent with and provides a resource to enact the status of their agency 
and, there-by, reproduce those structures that underpin the maintenance of their 
control over a jurisdiction of labour. 
Such a condition demands critical examination in so far as this resultant 
‘stabilisation’ of this mode of knowing, though underlying the successful 
accomplishment of knowing the user in practice, may also serve as grounds for its 
displacement. That is, on the basis of its ‘secondary’ status, this mode of knowing the 
user (through which the agency of this object, the user, might be constituted) may be 
displaced by other modes of knowing the user, or even of knowing some other object 
(recalling the jostling of agents in the architectural project), that, instead, work to 
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enact the primacy of the architect’s agency. This may be regarded as problematic, to 
that extent that it might dismiss otherwise more ‘authoritative’ or ‘objective’ 
knowledge in favour of the ‘intuitions’ of the architect. As to whether or not this is 
what occurs in practice remains to be seen and is, thus, a fruitful space for further 
research. This hypothesis does, however, appear to find some support in the 
descriptions of practice otherwise provided (see, for example, architects' dismissal of 
evidence-based guidelines in Buse et al. 2017, p.1443). 
Given that a particular mode of action and knowing is privileged in 
architecture, this is, moreover, a reason to examine those other diverse and less 
dominant modes of knowing (and action generally), such as those constituted in 
assemblages of orchestrated humans and nonhumans hybrids like the archi-text. 
Observation-based research within the walls of architectural offices may, turning to 
those jostling agencies around meeting and drawing tables, serve to draw out a finer 
account of the manner in which variations in the meaning and significance ascribed 
to different modes by which agents are mediated (different knowing assemblages) 
bears on the strength of the voices that come to shape built works. 
Pursuing these questions and the results attained has, in tandem, been 
directed by the goal of establishing ground and direction for further research and, 
parallel to this, evaluating the methods employed as a means for providing this 
direction of future research. The preceding material has indicated it has been fruitful 
in identifying possible avenues for future research into the knowing orchestrated in 
architectural practice. Though, it is only in undertaking such further research that this 
aspect of the utility of the research reported here will truly be ‘tested’. More broadly, 
however, I wish to propose that, of most value in orienting further studies, is this 
case’s illustration of and contribution to a particular conception of knowledge to be 
employed in social research: kowledge as a practical ability accomplished amongst 
extended assemblages (Gherardi & Nicolini 2000; Hetherington 2011, 2012; Law 
2000; Nicolini 2011; Orlikowski 2002, 2006), “not a substance but a capability 
produced and reproduced in recurrent social practices” (Orlikowski 2006, p.460). This 
is a view that is alert to the fact that for the architect to ‘know’ something, whether an 
object like the ‘user’ or the very building they are working to produce (Yaneva 
2009b), they must enlist a host of others in their aid. 
This picture is one where knowing, and the form and character it takes, can 
be seen to reside not ‘in the heads’ of architects but, rather, in the totality of the 
constellations of practice in which architecture is constituted, and, thereby, bears the 
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impression of its specificity and historicity. It provides a more fecund alternative to 
understanding knowing the user than those occasionally reductionist attempts to 
account for the constitution and character of the user by conceiving of it as those 
‘homunculi’ or ‘imaginary companions’ in the heads of architects (Ellis & Cuff 1989, 
p.10) or as an expression of ‘ideology’ or epochal character (Emmons & Mihalache 
2013). 
Though examining the ‘conceptions’ of architects, or the ‘representations’ in 
texts, may be valuable, this is merely one component within a broader ‘extended 
knower’ or knowing assemblage, in which knowing itself is more properly located. To 
conceive of knowing and its success as something playing out ‘in’ practitioners is 
misconceived.  Certainly, attempting to ascertain these ‘imagined people’ (Kostof 
1989) as a means of identifying a site for ‘correction’ appears mistaken. In as much 
as we wish to understand knowing, and, perhaps, even wish to alter it (lest we find its 
extant character or extension lacking), it is, thus, important to take account of the 
totality of these aforementioned assemblages. The task would, then, not be that of 
convincing architects to jettison and replace a stubborn person of the mind, or be 
more ‘open’ (Fawcett 1996) to novel conceptions, but to reconfigure these complex, 
messy, and heterogeneous arrays of practice within which the user is truly 
constituted.  
Thus, this picture is also not one that sees the movement of knowing into 
domains of practice as the transmission of an autonomous or self-contained thing or 
substance called ‘knowledge’ from centres of production (be they intrinsic or extrinsic 
to architecture) to application (Guy & Shove 2000, p.52). This picture of knowing 
thereby tempers those views which might see the problem of incorporating 
‘knowledge of the user’ into practice as one of simple ‘transfer’. This is notably 
illustrated in recent reports from the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) that 
cast the underlying problems of a less than ideal relation of architecture to ‘research-
based knowledge’ in terms of ‘access’, ‘finding’, ‘exchange’, and ‘dissemination’, to 
be resolved by different, perhaps “more commercial”, means of transfer (Collins 
2014, p.11).   
As the RIBA report itself identifies, the literature on ‘knowledge practices’ in 
architecture is lacking (Collins 2014, p.6); indeed, this perhaps underlies its 
perpetuation of this reductionist picture of knowledge. This thesis addresses this lack 
and, rather than seeing the ‘exchange’ or ‘dissemination’ of knowledge ‘quanta’ (Ibert 
2007), sees the extension and translation of knowers, of knowing assemblages, into 
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new areas of practice. To embed novel knowing or objects of knowledge into the 
practice of architecture is not, simply, to hand it a new tool or instrument, but is more 
akin to the addition of a new part to a machine (with the complex reciprocal 
adjustments, ad-hoc alterations, and messy reconfigurations this implies). There is, in 
fact, no ‘application’ of knowledge that is, once ‘produced’, thereafter simply applied 
or incorporated. Knowing is always constructed, in the linking up of chains, networks, 
and assemblages through which knowing action transpires. The shape of which, 
‘what’ is known, is bound far more strongly to the character of extant practice and the 
‘congruence’ of this with it, rather than something that might be called its ‘truth’ or 
‘objectivity’.  
This question of ‘truth’, that might be expected in an investigation of knowing, 
is of less interest and has been more-or-less bracketed here. Certainly, one might 
take issue with the occasionally dubious character of the knowledge of the user 
found in the pages of Architects’ Data or AGS,27 but it is the general mode of knowing 
(and the ramifications there-of) that cuts across particular instances of knowing (and 
their relative truth or objectivity) that is of interest here. For the most part, architects 
are not in the business of knowledge production (that is, most architects, most of the 
time), and my suggestion is that the ‘truth’ or ‘objectivity’ within knowing assemblages 
is less relevant to their successful accomplishment and spatial-temporal dispersion 
than their particular manner of composition, their congruence with extant contexts of 
practice, and their relative success in orchestrating resources and infrastructures for 
knowing. That is, ‘truth’, ‘objectivity’, ‘facticity’ or similar is no adequate fuel for 
knowing, nor does it provide the basis for it to be self-propelled into a supposedly 
truths-accruing ‘knowledge-based profession’. In so far as an account of the 
successful accomplishment of knowing is concerned, recourse is required to other 
dynamics. 
To conclude, it is valuable to return to the scene of jostling agencies that 
plays out within architectural projects and, again, re-frame knowing as embroiled 
within this contestation and negotiation. In chapter three, I posited that the 
significance of the particular manner in which the user is mediated in this process as 
                                                
27 For example, the apparent distortion of the dimensions of the human figure provided within 
Architects’ Data by the desire to have them accord with the ‘Octametric’ System 
(Vossoughian 2015, p.699), or the less than systematic methods in deriving standard 
dimensions for Architectural Graphic Standards involving the office boy’s excursion to find a 
tall policeman on horseback to measure (Emmons & Mihalache 2013, p.43). 
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object of knowledge relative to other modes in which it might bear on the project 
(perhaps through those who make a claim to be users) is bound to the status of the 
agency of the architect. In this thesis I have sought to articulate an account of such 
accomplishments of knowing at the level of action in architectural labour itself. In 
doing so, I identified that, even at this level, conflicts of agency play out. Within this 
particular mode of mediation, ‘knowing’, the shape of the knowing constituted and the 
modes of knowing given greater or lesser value are, again, bound to the agency 
figured as the architect. In enacting this object of knowledge within practice, the 
architect is to be counted alongside the user as amongst those people built in the 
process - the hospitableness of the one to the other is certainly no guarantee. 
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